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The study tests whether the intersectoral relationships of 157 grantees of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services’ (USDHHS) Assets for Independence (AFI) 
Demonstration Project and their financial partners form a small world network structure.  
Small world networks are networks of relations that are made up of clustered groups of 
network members connected through random, inter-cluster ties.  The small world network 
structure allows small changes in relations at the local level (i.e., within clusters) to have 
macro impact within the wider, global network.  Such networks have been found to be 
more efficient in transmitting messages and to have more sustainable relationship 
structures. 
 After finding that the network structure of the AFI Demonstration Project 
grantees and financial partners is a small world, the study performs two tests of 
correlation.  The first Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) tests whether the 
vii 
intercluster ties of the grantees correlated with the overall structure of the network.  The 
second QAP tested whether the emergent network structure was related to the distribution 
of grantees across USDHHS regional designations.  While both tests found significant 
Pearson Correlation values, neither had strong correlations indicating that other variables 
are influencing the distribution of relationships.  The limited findings for the study frame 
more in-depth studies to be performed, including innovative methods of network 
analysis, to further understand the multi-sector relationships of asset-building programs.  
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Chapter 1: The Study’s Purpose and Framework 
Introduction 
 We live in a small world that is growing smaller by the minute through 
globalization.  In the global context, local communities are no longer isolated from 
international actions; “mega-cities” share the same popular “local global culture”1 
regardless of national boundaries (Ahmadi, 2003, p. 16); and social change efforts 
become worldwide movements (Batliwala, 2002).  As social workers, we recognize the 
importance of relationships and networks in framing our understanding of the world 
(Trevillion, 2000).  One method for understanding complex interrelationships is social 
network analysis, which studies the patterns and structures of relations among people, 
organizations and communities (Scott, 2000). 
In “small world networks” (e.g., Watts & Strogatz, 1998; see also Watts, 1999, 
2003) – a special type of social network – strategic relationships among network 
members allow small changes on the local level to have widespread impact across a 
network.  Researchers studying small world networks can identify and measure the 
global effect of changes in local and group-spanning relationships for a large network.  
In so doing, researchers can identify local areas within a network for building 
relationships to create larger changes.  While applications of the small world concept 
have tended to focus on networks in biology and physics (e.g., Watts & Strogatz, 1998), a 
few recent studies have emerged that apply the small world concept to interorganizational 
relationships (e.g., Baum, Shiplov, & Rowley, 2002; Kogut & Walker, 2001).  This 
                                                 
1 Words bolded in the text can be found in the Glossary located in Appendix A. 
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dissertation study built on this work by performing a small world analysis of a large 
national network of grantee organizations and their financial partners that are 
participating in the federal Assets for Independence (AFI) Demonstration Project, a 
savings account program for low-income populations funded through the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS). 
This study is one of the first social work studies to use the small world network 
method.  Therefore, this dissertation details the analytic methods to make the research 
and its guiding concepts accessible to all social workers—academics, practitioners, and 
students.  However, in addition to explaining the discrete small world dynamics of the 
network relationships under study, the implications of the research address how social 
network analysis can serve as an approach for social workers to understand the complex, 
uncertain and dynamic environment of social welfare and, thereby, to create innovative, 
collaborative solutions to social welfare problems. 
Although the study’s subject was discrete in scope, the dissertation covers a broad 
array of concepts, methods, and analytical levels for studying a social change framework.  
In the context of the dissertation, social change means a change in social institutions that 
improves the equality, power, opportunities, and circumstances of disenfranchised and/or 
impoverished peoples.  The longitudinal development of the network structure of the 
Assets for Independence Demonstration Project, studied for this dissertation, provides 
one example of how concrete relationships among organizations can indicate how power 
might develop and change among institutional sectors. 
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Small actions have large implications for small world networks.  One effect is to 
improve its efficiency.  A simple example of this is the telephone game.  In a telephone 
game, a group of people passes a message from one person to the next until each person 
has heard the message.  The challenge comes in communicating the message reliably to 
the next person.  Often, by the time the last person in the group hears the message, what 
starts as a simple statement, such as “Why did the hen cross the road?” can end up as “I 
found a penny yesterday.”  If the first person, on the other hand, went directly to the final 
person to communicate the message, not only would that person receive the message 
faster, but it would also be far likelier that the final person would hear the message 
correctly. 
By directly ‘connecting’ to the last person, the first person has made what is 
called a “shortcut” across the group (Watts, 2003).  Small world networks are defined by 
these shortcuts, which span across and link different groups to one another.  Many social 
networks contain shortcuts.  Shortcuts make it possible for you to know the people who 
are friends of a friend.  They are also the interorganizational relationships that link 
different stakeholder groups together.  For example, the current study looks at the 
relationships between public sector entities and nonprofit organizations that comprise the 
AFI grantees and their financial partners.  Not long ago, these groups would not be 
working together (see the next section of this chapter).  However, as the social welfare 
context has changed, so have the partners.  Today it is common for government entities to 
have contracts with nonprofit and for profit organizations and for banks to partner in 
economic development strategies. 
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The shortcuts across the public, nonprofit and for profit sectors link disparate 
institutional sectors.  Each link is an opportunity for improved communication, a 
strengthening of community resources, and sustainability of multi-sector solutions to 
social welfare problems.  Social workers can use the identification of such links and the 
network structures they create to highlight important empowerment opportunities in the 
social welfare environment for our organizations and stakeholders.  By building 
relationships between different stakeholder groups and different organizations, social 
workers can take advantage of the small world’s characteristic “random” group-spanning 
relationships that can improve network efficiency, sustainability, and growth. 
The recent improvements in analytic software2 have broadened the analysis of 
social networks and have made the methods and results more accessible to practitioners 
through colorful graphs and maps of networks.  Emerging methods in social network 
analysis can be used to represent the dynamic nature of the systems in which social work 
in practiced.  Moreover, researchers have made important gains in integrating network 
analytic methods with practice, especially in the field of international development.  Rick 
Davies of Cambridge University and his colleagues with the Research, Evaluation, 
Monitoring, Appraisal, Planning and Policy (REMAPP) Network in the UK are working 
with international development agencies to develop ways to infuse program planning and 
practice research with network research methods (Davies, 2003).  These and other 
research and evaluation methods (e.g., participant-guided research) are infused with 
social change objectives and use an institutional perspective that places the development 
                                                 
2 For example, this study used the software program, UCINET 6.0 (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002), 
which was first developed in the early 1990s. 
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initiative in a dynamic, sociohistorical context.  In this context, researchers use network 
analysis both to describe and explain network relationships and to develop strategies 
wherein multiple stakeholders collaborate to form social welfare and social change 
solutions (Davies, 2003).  The next section of this introductory chapter places the present 
research in the complex environment of social work practice and research. 
The Social Work Context 
When Mark Homan called for social workers to become “change agents” in his 
1994 book Promoting Community Change: Making it Happen in the Real World, he was 
characterizing an emerging movement against the rise of public sector, bureaucratic 
responses to social welfare problems.  Homan explained in simple language the need for 
social workers to engage community members to make social change possible.  A decade 
later, social change remains one of the most important purposes of social work (Ahmadi, 
2003; Mulroy, 2004; Polack, 2004; Popple, 2000).  Yet, as fundamental as the objectives 
of social justice and social change are to the profession, in practice social workers may 
feel disempowered to make change happen as one professional working within a wide 
range of institutions in a global system. 
Research has shown that a social worker’s political presence often amounts to 
voting and other types of low-level participation (Gray, Collett van Rooyen, Rennie, & 
Gaha, 2002).  The social work literature reveals that social change remains an abandoned 
goal in practice (Beresford, 2000; Fitzpatrick, 2002; Popple, 2000; Weiss, 2003) and 
argues that the profession’s research methods and policy directions need to better 
incorporate social justice and social change aspects of practice (Lyons, 2000; Padilla, 
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Lein, & Cruz, 1999; Thompson, 2002; Trevillion, 2000; Davis, 2004).  While our 
profession considers social change and social justice as fundamental values, in practice, it 
is difficult to achieve. 
Why a Achieving Change is Difficult 
Part of the difficulty in achieving change is that the social work profession 
operates within a complex institutional environment.  The context of social welfare is 
complex, dynamic, and uncertain…and, as mentioned earlier, increasingly global.  A 
global perspective exacerbates the complexity through a multiplier effect that increases 
the number of stakeholder groups and communities who must be engaged.  It also 
aggregates the institutions that must be addressed in any social welfare solution.  When 
institutional change occurs in a global context (or within a local context with a global 
perspective), the dynamical interactions among stakeholders increase in number and 
intensity.  Within the institutional environment, uncertainty replaces inertia, and 
incremental change shifts to rapid and large-scale transformations.  Social workers may 
feel lost amidst a rapidly changing world of large-scale institutions.  Social network 
analysis, and especially the analysis of small world networks, assists in the identification 
of critical points where social workers and their agencies, professional networks, and 
communities can effect change on a wide-scale basis—even if it is simply reach out and 
create new and diverse interorganizational relationships. 
Furthermore, the complex environment of social welfare makes it difficult to 
evaluate program effectiveness and efficiency (Gambone, 2004).  For example, efficiency 
outcomes of state welfare reform projects may obscure the ineffectiveness of a “Work 
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First” philosophy in actually meeting the basic needs and employment goals of former 
welfare recipients (e.g., Edin & Lein, 1997 in Midgley, 2001).  When social and 
institutional changes are fundamental goals for community interventions, evaluation and 
research (and thus determining project success) become more challenging.   
Without clear-cut measures of success for social change goals, pursuit of such 
initiatives can seem fruitless and can lead to the disempowerment of social work 
professionals and their stakeholders.  More importantly, large-scale movements in social 
justice issues tend to lack stakeholder involvement when brought to the global level 
(Batliwala, 2002).  Global and other large-scale advocacy groups can develop agendas 
that lack the voices and input of local stakeholders and thus can perpetuate and intensify 
the disempowerment of local communities (Amy, 1987 in Reilly, 2001; Lucas, 2001).  
Research on the small world concept has begun to identify how efficiency and 
effectiveness can be measured in large-scale networks. 
While the present study does not directly measure effectiveness or efficiency of 
demonstration project’s network, the report does discuss how future studies may build on 
this work to develop methods for new types of social work evaluations, especially in 
areas where social work intersects with other institutional sectors.  Importantly, the study 
applies a ‘big picture’ perspective to the growing use of banks, credit unions and other 
financial intermediaries as partners in social welfare.  As these entities increase their 
participation in social welfare interventions, it will be critical for social workers to have 
the tools with which to evaluate the effectiveness of these partnerships.  Social network 
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analysis and the analysis of small worlds provide important evaluative tools for social 
workers studying into the ‘big picture’. 
A Changing Institutional Context 
In addition to the challenge of determining professional efficacy in social change 
initiatives, social workers face the concomitant issue of a changing institutional context 
for the delivery of human services.  One set of changing relationships is found in the 
devolution of the state and public sector as provider and protector to disadvantaged 
people and communities.  In the West, nonprofit organizations, nongovernmental 
organizations, and for profit businesses are taking on the provision and management of 
public human services in a wave of privatization and contractual relations with the state 
(Healy, 2002; McDonald, Harris, & Wintersteen, 2003; Mendel, 2003; Poole, 2003; 
Schmid, 2004).  These changing relationships between the public, for profit and nonprofit 
sectors are considered desirable because they are seen to be more efficient, flexible and 
innovative (Schmid, 2004).  Moreover, nonprofit organizations and other community 
businesses are responding to these market-based approaches in order to maintain 
legitimacy  (Dart, 2004) and to ensure continued funding (Healy, 2002; Mendel, 2003; 
Poole, 2003). 
Contractual relationships with the public sector emphasize measurable outcomes, 
efficiencies and successes.  Although social workers commonly perceive the emphasis on 
the “bottom-line” in social welfare contracts as antithetical to social work values, private-
public partnerships are becoming a common setting for the profession (Gray, Healy, & 
Crofts, 2003; Healy, 2002; Reisch & Sommerfeld, 2003).  Therefore, social workers must 
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increasingly understand more business-related aspects of human service work: strategic 
planning, staff recruitment and development, and resource development (Hopkins & 
Hyde, 2002); decision-making strategies, oral and written communication, and leadership 
skills (Claiborne, 2004; Hoefer, 2003; Mizrahi & Rosenthal, 2001; Patti, 2003); financial 
management skills (Wimpfheimer, 2004); organizational theory and how it informs 
practice (Austin & Kruzich, 2004); and collaborative and interprofessional strategies 
(Mulroy, 2004). 
Moreover, new types of organizations are emerging in the social welfare context.  
“Social enterprises,” which include the for profit provision of human services and 
business development entities (e.g., community development banks and 
microenterprises) (Gray et al., 2003), approach social welfare from the perspective that 
the state is an ineffective provider of human services.  Market-oriented solutions, which 
are delivered through organizations and businesses created for and focused on social 
welfare objectives, are perceived to more efficiently and effectively solve the problems of 
individuals and families (Dart, 2004). 
Additional organizational players are faith-based organizations, which are 
entering the human services milieu with more formalized, policy-supported roles (Lewis, 
2003).  Overlaying these organizational role changes is a shift in political priorities 
toward collaborative, multi-sectoral interventions and strategies for community 
development and human service provision (Ferguson, 2004; Gil de Gibaja, 2001; Libby 
& Austin, 2002; Mulroy, 2003; Shaw, 2003).  While interorganizational collaboration 
holds great promise in bringing about social and institutional change (Brown & 
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Ashman, 1999; Brown & Tandon, 1994), these collaborative ventures are fraught with 
complexities (Amir & Auslander, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Farmakopoulou, 2002; Poole 
& Colby, 2002; Reilly, 2001), which social workers and other human service 
professionals are increasingly required to address (Cherin, 2000; Cohen, 1999; Root, 
2000). 
A common issue for professionals in the complex environment of social welfare is 
the importance of establishing, maintaining, and understanding relationships among 
stakeholders and other organizational and institutional agents.  In a period of institutional 
change in the settings of social work, we need to have an understanding of the larger 
structures of relations (Ahmadi, 2003; Fitzpatrick, 2002; Gummer, 2002; Poole & Colby, 
2002).  For example, this dissertation study found that the structure of the network of 
USDHHS grantees and their financial partners was equally influenced by market forces 
leading to bank mergers as it was by the increasing number of grantees. 
Clearly, as this study’s preliminary results attest, social welfare institutions 
experience institutional pressures beyond those brought about by changing social policy 
or social welfare programs.  That is to say, not all shortcuts are created by social policy or 
social welfare interventions, and if network shortcuts confer power on those 
organizations that create them—as some network analysts (e.g., Burt, 2000) might 
argue—it is important for social workers to understand these larger, institutional 
dynamics in order to effectively plan and implement social welfare programs.  The social 
development approach uses an institutional perspective to integrate the complexity and 
dynamic forces influencing social welfare interventions. 
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The Social Development Approach 
The social development approach views social welfare with a dynamic 
perspective, which builds on community strengths and involves community stakeholders 
in comprehensive strategies for economic development and community change (Midgley 
& Tang, 2001).  The approach values social change goals as well as outcomes for 
individual and family well-being, and it can be seen as a logical heir to the community 
change models developed by Homan and other community social workers (e.g., 
Kretzman & McKnight, 1993).  The approach also focuses on the development of social 
and economic policies that move toward and support social justice and institutional 
change objectives (Midgley & Tang, 2001; M.S. Sherraden, Slosar, & Sherraden, 2002). 
Methods for social development integrate a wide range of social welfare practices 
(Midgley & Tang, 2001), which include community collaboration and coalition-building; 
expanding resources and capacities of local development organizations; expanding 
support services; forming and maintaining relationships among community stakeholders; 
and development of work skills (Alvord, Brown, & Letts, 2002).  The approach also 
includes investment in and creation of local businesses, the broadening of market choices 
for low-income communities, and other “asset development” strategies.  In the context 
of the social development approach, asset development is just one of many strategies to 
empower and develop communities.  Although social development and asset 
development have similar meanings in the literature, “asset development” can also refer 
specifically to the creation of wealth—for individuals through savings programs, and for 
communities through business creation and the formation of interpersonal networks and 
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interorganizational relationships.  In this context, asset development initiatives are also 
known as “asset accumulation” or “asset-building” strategies. 
Asset development strategies involve both individual and community-based social 
welfare interventions that assist the poor in becoming stakeholders in a development 
effort (Nyman, 2004).  On an individual level, asset-based welfare strategies, such as 
Individual Development Account   (IDA) programs, help individuals and families 
accumulate savings for high-return assets—a home, an education, and a growing small 
business.  In place of more traditional welfare strategies based on income maintenance, 
individual asset accumulation strategies can provide the poor with the tools they need to 
escape poverty and build on successive accomplishments—especially when supported by 
institutional mechanisms that reinforce asset development among the poor (Beverly & 
Sherraden, 1999; Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004). 
On a community level, asset development strategies involve local organizations 
and stakeholder groups in building community assets (Kretzman & McKnight, 1993).  
The approach focuses on building community capacity to create and sustain revitalization 
initiatives, identifying and using the innate strengths of a community as assets, and 
building wealth for individuals and communities (Scales & Streeter, 2004).  One type of 
community asset is social capital; the relationships between individuals and especially 
among community institutions that make it function better for all community 
stakeholders (Ashman, Brown, & Zwick, 1998; Lang & Hornburg, 1998; Putnam, 2000; 
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although see Kadushin, 2004 for a contrary perspective).3  Following Burt (2000), social 
capital is a metaphor for a valued item exchanged or developed through a network 
relationship of individuals (e.g., resources, power, trust, values), which, when exchanged, 
can convey benefits or improve the positions of those who exchange the item, and can 
benefit a cluster or entire network in the exchange.  Such capital is socially-derived, i.e., 
through social relationships; and may also be social in nature (as opposed to financial 
capital, which specifically refers to monetary exchanges). 
Social capital can also refer to the social capital of individuals and their 
connectedness to and within a community (e.g., Burt, 1992).  However, in the context of 
community-based interventions, social capital aggregates to stakeholder groups, 
organizations, and institutions (Brown & Ashman, 1999; Brown & Tandon, 1994; 
Waddell, 1997).  In the community context, social capital is about forming shortcuts.  
IDA strategies, such as those used by the studied demonstration project, build both 
individual and community social capital, and thus develop community assets by linking 
together nontraditional partners from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors (Nyman, 
2004). 
The Social Development Framework for the Dissertation Study 
The social development approach provides social workers with a comprehensive 
perspective in which to understand the complex and dynamic nature of social welfare 
practice and in which to “harmonise social and economic interventions” (Ahmadi, 2003, 
p. 18).  This dissertation study represents a preliminary assessment of institutional change 
                                                 
3 Different scholarly disciplines define “social capital” in different ways.  See Chapter 2 for additional 
discussions of social capital in the social development context. 
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mechanisms within the network of AFI grantees and their financial partners and is the 
first in a series of studies the author plans to pursue in the network analysis of multi-
institutional dynamics.  It is important, therefore, to place the present study in the 
context of this planned research, which will build on these early results. 
The theoretical framework for the study emerges from three different areas by 
which the profession can view the development of community assets: process, institution, 
and structure (see Figure 1.1).  The process perspective studies the “bottom-up” aspects 
of multi-sectoral collaboration, including the practice skills required for building social 
capital within communities and institutions.  The next chapter’s literature review looks at 
one type of collaborative strategy—strategic bridging—which views these 
interorganizational relationships as part of an effort by diverse organizations, businesses, 
and other stakeholder groups to strategically “bridge” or collaborate to achieve mutually 
beneficial ends.  Views of local stakeholders enhance the process perspective because 
this perspective must be “context-dependent” (Fitzpatrick, 2002, p. 163) in order to 
reveal both the processes by which institutional norms and structures develop and the 
meanings given to those norms and structures.  The findings of this report identify the 
need for further study into how the processes of multi-sector collaboration may affect and 
be affected by the structure of the network and by the institutions governing those 
relationships. 
The institutional perspective, as typified by the analysis of institutional 
structures, views interorganizational relationships as microcosmic examples of larger 
institutional movements among sectors and changes in social, political, and economic 
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institutions.  In studying institutional structures, research on asset development uses a 
“top down” viewpoint by studying the economic and social policies, societal beliefs and 
ideologies of social welfare, and how these norms and values create, maintain, legitimize, 
support, and limit social development initiatives.  While studies of process identify roles 
for stakeholders and professionals, studies of institutions identify roles for institutional 
sectors and the linkages formed between the for profit, private, and nonprofit sectors.  To 
study the grantee-financial partners relationships of the AFI Demonstration project from 
a process perspective, for example, one might examine the processes by which financial 
partners were approached to participate in the project to identify challenges, benefits and 
common facilitation practices. 
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From an institutional perspective, however, one might study the policies and 
informal norms governing these partnerships and the meanings and expectations they 
imply for other partnerships between the financial and nonprofit sectors.  One might also 
study the ideologies of the different types of financial partners.  For example, how does 
the participation of community development banks differ from that of large multinational 
banks? 
The structural perspective, as illustrated by network analysis, analyzes community 
asset-building in terms of the network structure of relations that emerges as community 
entities and stakeholders forge new collaborative partnerships.  As explained earlier in 
this chapter, network analytic methods reveal the patterns and structures of relationships 
among people, organizations, communities and institutions.  In so doing, it can both 
illustrate the processes that create institutional change (e.g., the building of social capital) 
and can illustrate larger institutional movements that affect local relations (e.g., how 
institutionalized relations shape intersectoral partnerships).  The current study analyzes 
the relationships built between the nonprofit and financial sectors in the AFI 
demonstration program using this structural focus on intersectoral relations.  While it is 
not the only way to study social development strategies, network analysis provides 
important information for planning, intervention, monitoring and evaluation (Davies, 
2003)—especially in terms of evaluating the outcomes of collaborative partnerships as 
seen in IDA programs. 
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Small Worlds 
From a structural standpoint, small world networks lie between order and 
randomness (Watts, 2003).  Order is represented in the tight subgroups of relations, e.g., 
one’s personal friendship network.  Randomness enters through the random relationships 
(the “shortcuts”) between the clustered groups of network members, e.g., one’s friends 
who are friends with different groups of people.  Through these shortcuts, every person 
can connect to every other person in a network in a small number of steps. 
The creation and deletion of shortcuts in a small world network has potentially far 
reaching effects.  Small world network structures can make networks more efficient 
(Latora & Marchiori, 2001; Watts & Strogatz, 1998); make networks better able to 
withstand environmental shocks and change (Kogut & Walker, 2001; Watts, 2003); and 
can increase the power of certain network members (Wilhite, 2001).  The longitudinal 
study of small world networks can identify the processes by which organizations become 
more central or powerful players (Baum et al., 2002), and identify whether forging new 
partnerships will increase an organization’s status in the network (Baum et al., 2002; 
Newman, Strogatz, & Watts, 2001; Wilhite, 2001). 
When applied to community development strategies, small world network 
analysis becomes a powerful analytic technique to plan and create new strategic 
partnerships.  Random shortcuts can emerge through strategic choice, as they are not part 
of the inherent structure of the larger network (e.g., an organization can decide to partner 
with a business that is not traditionally associated with social welfare interventions) 
(Watts, 2003).  As a result, a new shortcut emerges in the wider network and provides for 
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increased capacity, efficiency, and endurance.  These changes in the wider network (also 
known as the “global network”) change the structure of relations, create new shortcuts 
between groups and can have institution-wide effects.  The underlying premise for this 
dissertation study was that IDA programs, and their resulting network of partnerships, 
provide for these types of intergroup-shortcuts and thus have the potential for creating 
widespread institutional change. 
If the study’s results revealed that the AFI network was a small world, the 
network would have certain structural characteristics:   
1) Dense sub-grouping (known as “clustering”) within a relatively sparse 
network—as measured by the clustering coefficient developed by Watts and 
Strogatz (1998); and 
 
2) A short average number of linkages needed to move from one network 
member to another (called “path lengths”). 
 
These small world network characteristics have been used to explain network 
efficiency (Latora & Marchiori, 2001; Watts & Strogatz, 1998), network membership 
limits (Amaral, Scala, Barthélémy, & Stanley, 2000), and network tolerance for 
environmental shocks (Kogut & Walker, 2001; Watts, 2003).  The study’s scope covered 
just a small part of a continuum of research that deserves more attention from social 
work researchers.  The study highlights analytic techniques that can help social workers 
to rethink the process, institutional environment, and structure of interorganizational and 
multi-sector relations in community development. 
The present study uses the AFI network and small world methodology for a 
preliminary exploration of multi-sector dynamics; i.e., how interorganizational 
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relationships among partners from the public, private, and nonprofit institutional sectors 
develop and change through time.  Although limited in its focus, the study identified 
areas of small world analysis and related methodologies that have great potential for 
understanding behaviors of organizations and their institutional environments.  This study 
serves as a first step in the development of a new research area in the field of community-
based social work and social work administration by introducing contemporary theories 
of global network analysis as methods for understanding multi-sector behaviors. 
The next section of this chapter provides a brief overview of the AFI 
Demonstration Project. 
The Study’s Subject: AFI Grantees and their Financial Partners 
The primary appeal of the AFI Demonstration Project as a subject for the current 
study was that the program requires the collaboration of nonprofit, public, and private 
sectors for its implementation and thus forms a multi-sectoral network.  Most project 
grantees are local nonprofit organizations, which partner with one or more banks or credit 
unions to offer a savings account program for low-income persons who meet federal 
qualifying criteria.  Project grantees also collaborate with a number of other local entities 
to provide or make available subsidiary services to program participants, including basic 
financial education, specialized training on small business development or 
homeownership, and supportive services (USDHHS, 2003).  Financial education, also 
known by some in the field as “financial literacy” or “financial training,” refers to 
education and familiarization with basic banking and family finance methods (e.g., how 
to open a savings account, how to create a family budget, or how to apply for and manage 
 20
a home mortgage).  Financial education, savings account programs, low-cost lines of 
credit, and other financial instruments and programs are becoming more available to 
lower-income persons in the U.S. as banks, public entities, and nonprofit organizations 
strive to make the financial sector more accessible to a broader population (Seidman & 
Tescher, 2004). 
At the heart of the AFI program is the IDA, in which individuals who meet certain 
low-income criteria can save portions of their income in matched savings accounts.  The 
acronym “IDA” has not become as ubiquitous as the more familiar “IRA” mainly due to 
the limited population that can hold these types of accounts.  However, since the first 
proposal of IDAs by Sherraden in his 1991 book, Assets for the Poor, the interest from 
the financial sector as well as public entities on the federal and state levels has grown 
tremendously and has made IDA programs a more common alternative to the U.S. public 
welfare system. 
As of 2003, 34 states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have 
passed some type of IDA-related legislation, and other states have established state-
supported initiatives (Edwards & Mason, 2003).  Since 1993,  $84 million in state funds 
and over $100 million in federal funds have been dedicated to IDA initiatives.  Nearly 
20,000 accounts have been created in 49 states (Edwards, 2003).  All but two of the fifty 
states (Utah and Alaska) have programs participating in the AFI Demonstration 
(according to data current to April 2004). 
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Program Funding 
As an incentive for saving, program participants receive match monies on their 
savings, from one dollar for every dollar saved to up to eight dollars per saved dollar, 
with the highest match rates resulting from multiple small matches from several sources 
(USDHHS, 2003).  Federal AFI grants fund these match amounts, which must be 
supplemented by an equal amount of local, private donations as a requirement for 
receiving the grant—thus requiring grantee applicants to expand their resource base for 
the program.  The AFI grants also allow 7.5 percent of received funds to pay for 
administration costs, including the regular collection of data and reporting on program 
implementation to the Office of Community Services (OCS), the overseeing agency 
within USDHHS4. 
USDHHS periodically reports its findings for the demonstration project to 
Congress (USDHHS, 2000, 2003), which authorized the demonstration in 1998 with the 
passage of the Assets for Independence Act (42 U.S.C. 604 note) of the Community 
Opportunities, Accountability, and Training and Educational Services Act of 1998 
(Public Law 105-285, as amended).  Two such reports have been made publicly available 
since the project’s inception in 1999.  They report on the first and second years of the 
project: Federal Year (FY) 1999 (USDHHS, 2000) and FY1999-FY2000 (USDHHS, 
2003).  The data for the present study were collected from these reports and 
supplemented by additional data (current to July 2003) received from OCS personnel. 
                                                 
4 Recent changes in the administrative structure of USDHHS may have made this office obsolete, but such 
changes could not be confirmed at the writing of this report. 
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Each AFI grant and the required supplemental resources raised from community 
entities fund a local five-year demonstration of the AFI IDA program.  In two cases—
AFI demonstrations with the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic 
Development (PADCED) and the Indiana Department of Commerce (INDOC)—the 
grants subsidize grandfathered IDA programs, which the states implemented before the 
passage of the AFI policy.  Unlike the competitive funds most entities apply for on a 
yearly basis, PADCED and INDOC receive annual appropriations throughout the 
project’s demonstration. 
Although USDHHS has provided some entities with supplemental grants, it uses 
the greatest portion of yearly available funds to create new programs.  In 1999, USDHHS 
funded 38 demonstration projects, including the two grandfathered state programs.  By 
2004, 157 entities had received AFI grants through FY2002 (USDHHS, 2003) (new 
grants were in process for FY2003 at the writing of this report).  The reauthorization of 
AFIA, which passed the House in September 2003 and the Senate in February 2004, was 
in conference committee as of July 2004 (Corporation for Enterprise Development 
[CFED], 2004).  USDHHS requested its annual $25 million dollars as part of its 2005 
budget request, and the field is confident that Congress will reauthorize the program with 
minimal (if beneficial) changes (Cramer, Debroy, Parrish, & Boshara, 2004). 
The Choice in Using the AFI Network as a Sample for Study 
 The availability of data for a large, nationwide network of organizational entities 
was a major factor in the choice of this network as a sample for a dissertation study with 
limited resources.  However, the network sample was restricted in its scope—only 
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representing two of the many potential sectors collaborating in the AFI Demonstration, 
i.e., grantee and financial partners.  Nevertheless, the network’s size (Initial N = 157 
grantees and 157 financial partners) allowed it to meet one of the primary requirements 
for a small world network analysis: a network must be large enough to show meaningful 
results (Watts, 1999). 
Because it was not known whether the sample network would indeed prove to be 
a small world network, many explanatory analyses were excluded from the study.  
However, as a first step in exploring the potential of small world analysis in 
understanding the development of multi-sector collaborations, the study’s results point to 
some exciting areas for further research on large multi-sector networks, which are 
discussed in the final chapter of this report.  Additionally, the overall framework for the 
study pulled together theories of institutional development from many disciplines, of 
which the analysis of network structure is just a small part. 
Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation has five chapters.  Chapter 1 discussed the purpose of the study 
by placing it within the theoretical framework of social development approaches to social 
welfare.  Chapter 2 provides a review of the related literature, including recent social 
welfare research using network analysis.  Chapter 3 details the study’s methodology, and 
Chapter 4, its results.  Chapter 5 discusses the implications of the research and areas for 
further study.  Several Appendices supplement the material found in the main report.  
Importantly, Appendix A provides a Glossary of Terms, which is included in the 
dissertation to further define what may be new terms or ideas for a social work audience. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
This literature review builds on a social work goal of institutional change.  Here, 
the term “institutions” refers to persistent, replicable, and synthesizing norms and ideals 
(Fararo & Skvoretz, 1986) that characterize the interactions of individuals and larger 
social groups in social, economic, and political environments.  The term “institutional 
change” means a sustainable, participatory, and pluralistically beneficial movement from 
the current dominant culture of disengagement and disenfranchisement of the poor to one 
that supports opportunities for sustained growth and development. 
As change agents, social workers have the opportunity to participate, lead and 
broker institutional change in a multitude of institutional environments.  As was 
discussed in Chapter 1, the change agent role is a difficult one because the institutional 
environment is complex, dynamic, and involves multiple stakeholders thus making 
uncertain the identification of our roles in change.  There is the added challenge of 
determining what constitutes successful institutional change, which, therefore, obscures 
our notions of professional efficacy.   
To discuss institutional change, this literature review focuses on three areas of the 
literature that capture the processes, institutional mechanisms, and developing structures 
that make change possible.  This chapter begins with a discussion of strategic bridging, a 
method of interorganizational and multi-sector collaboration in which a mediating 
organization or collective group facilitates the interorganizational relationships of entities 
representing different institutional sectors (e.g., Brown & Ashman, 1999). 
 
 25
Following a discussion of strategic bridging frameworks, the next part of the 
literature review examines network analysis methodologies as a way to understand 
institutional structures.  Attention is paid to the literature of small world network analysis 
(e.g., Watts & Strogatz, 1998) and the emerging use of social network analysis in social 
development strategies.  The final section of the chapter gives an overview of economic 
and sociological perspectives of institutional change and relates these to the analysis of 
network structures. 
Models of Institutional Change Processes: Strategic Bridging Collaboration 
One of the newer models used in social development initiatives is that of strategic 
bridging collaboration, of which there is a considerable body of qualitative research in the 
international development literature (e.g., Ashman et al., 1998; Brown, 1993; Brown & 
Ashman, 1999; Covey & Brown, 2001; Lawrence & Hardy, 1999; Waddell, 1997; 
Westley & Vredenburg, 1991).  A compelling aspect of the strategic bridging model is 
that it encompasses 1) the skills and tasks of multi-sector collaboration; 2) the resulting 
interorganizational structures; and 3) an institutional change perspective.  This literature 
review covers these three areas of the model with a focus on structures and institutions.5  
Clearly, no one model of collaboration will apply to all situations; however, this model is 
supported by a number of assumptions—derived through case study research—that 
provide important structural and institutional perspectives in which to understand multi-
sector collaboration.   
                                                
5 A discussion of specific skill sets is beyond the themes of this review.  However, readers wishing to learn 
more about strategic bridging skills and interorganizational tasks are encouraged to visit the Institute for 
Development Research website at http://www.jsi.com/idr/IDRreports.htm to read the case studies, which 
detail many of the professional skills used in multi-sector collaboration. 
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Major Structural and Institutional Concepts in the Strategic Bridging Model 
The strategic bridging approach began as a discussion of the conflicts that emerge 
when organizations interact (Brown, 1977 in Brown, 1983).  Successful interaction 
hinges on the careful management of differing organizational characteristics and 
philosophies during the interaction process.  By identifying organizational 
interdependence—e.g., shared resources and information and characterized by shared 
tasks, common values and authorities, and physical proximity—such interdependence can 
create new units that “bridge” autonomous organizations (Brown, 1983). 
In his studies of local economic development strategies in developing countries, 
Brown (1987) identified the need for approaches that “bridged” the public, private, and 
nonprofit sectors to develop multi-sectored approaches to social welfare problems.  
Bridging organizations were seen as potential facilitators of these multi-sector strategies 
(Brown, 1987; and in Westley & Vredenburg, 1991).  Westley and Vredenburg and, 
subsequently, Sharma, Vredenburg, and Westley (1994) argued that the purposes of 
interaction made the interdependence “strategic.”  Facilitators of such strategic 
partnerships—strategic bridging organizations (SBOs) (Nyman & Moore, 2002)—are 
similar to “collaboration conveners” (Wood & Gray, 1991) and “referent 
organizations” (Trist, 1983). 
However, whereas traditional perspectives of interorganizational collaboration 
argue for a neutral mediator (Gray, 1989), the SBO can be purposefully motivated 
(Westley & Vredenburg, 1991); can facilitate multi-sector partnerships (also known as 
intersectoral partnerships) (Brown, 1993); and can achieve legitimacy by strategically 
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balancing its own interests with those of its partners (Ashman et al., 1998; Brown & 
Tandon, 1994).  This last quality of strategic bridging (balancing interests) acknowledges 
organizational interdependence and the need for partners to exert “mutual influence” in 
collaboration settings (Brown & Tandon, 1994).  Therefore, a strategic bridging 
framework assumes empowering and purposeful relationships for the bridging 
organization and for its potential partners, which can include local stakeholders.  
An institutionally-directed model. 
 The strategic bridging model is appropriate for highly complex and multi-sector 
interorganizational relationships because it views the organizational environment with an 
institutional perspective.  Even in single-sector collaborations, when an organizational 
environment becomes too complex for one organization to manage, an 
interorganizational approach can change the perspective from the single organizational 
level to a “domain” level (Trist, 1983, p. 270).  Once viewed at the domain level, the 
organization can identify the areas of “interconnectedness” and reduce the uncertainty 
that emerges in complex environments (Trist, 1983).  When organizations look beyond 
their organizational or sectoral boundaries, they use what is known as a macro or 
institutional perspective (Covey & Brown, 2001). 
 The macro perspective reveals the institutions that shape social and community 
interaction.  Using an example from asset development strategies, nonprofit organizations 
that facilitate savings programs need to understand how banks respond to customer and 
community needs.  These organizations will also need to understand the public policies 
that influence bank decisions (e.g., the Community Reinvestment Act, which regulates 
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and monitors bank responsiveness to local communities).  In strategic bridging 
collaborations, the SBO facilitates these intersectoral relationships and builds capacity 
and knowledge in a number of areas to mediate multi-sector collaboration (Brown, 1993). 
New Institutional economics (a sub-discipline of economics) explains that 
economic institutions develop through and are managed by mediating entities (North, 
1993).  These entities facilitate the development of rules for interaction (and the means to 
enforce them) and standardized means to exchange resources.  Figure 2.1 provides an 
illustration of the function of mediating entities.  Here, the environment is characterized 
by a complex set of individual actors, including potential mediators, each operating under 
a separate set of assumptions.  
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Through the development of institutions (top half of the figure at A), mediating 
entities reduce the environmental complexity by developing institutional norms and rules 
for interaction.  Similarly, in the transition depicted in the bottom half of the figure (B), 
mediating entities further reduce the growing complexity through the development of 
inter-institutional norms for interaction.   
Strategic bridging organizations play this critical mediation role in collaborations 
by facilitating complex, multi-sector relationships.  The bridging organization defines the 
problem domain so that it encompasses (bridges) both the needs and resources of each 
institutional stakeholder in the effort (Brown, 1987).  Therefore, another assumption of 
the strategic bridging model is that organizations can serve as mediators between sectors 
by assisting with the development of norms, rules, and enforcement strategies for 
interaction, and that these norms eventually create institutional arrangements for 
interactions among organizations and sectors. 
Figure 2.2 (on the next page) illustrates the bridging of sectors by the SBO.  In the 
figure, the SBO bridges two institutional sectors through interorganizational relationships 
with Partners A and B.  Nyman (2004) argued that the “problem domain” should be 
termed the “opportunity domain” because it is solution-focused.  In the figure, the SBO 
defines the opportunity domain in such a way that the problem and its solutions are 
relevant to the needs and resources of both partners.  However, as the figure shows, 
because the SBO includes itself in the opportunity domain, it is not a neutral mediator 
and has a stake in the overall success of the collaborative effort (Nyman, 2004; Westley 
& Vredenburg, 1991). 
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The growing availability of high-quality data through funded case studies allows a 
cross-comparison of many different strategic bridging and multi-sector collaboration 
cases.  As the strategic bridging approach has gained attention, researchers have sought to 
classify bridging dynamics and structures into typological frameworks.  A comparison of 
these frameworks is presented in the next section of this chapter. 
Typological Frameworks of Strategic Bridging Collaborations 
The frameworks discussed in this section come from case studies of strategic bridging 
collaborations in international development: 
A. Westley and Vredenburg (1991) compared two Canadian multi-sector endeavors 
to determine bridging roles, strategic focus and purposes for collaboration.  
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Sharma et al. (1994) later used this framework to study a West African 
collaboration. 
 
B. Brown and Ashman (1999) studied thirteen international, multi-sector 
development partnerships in Africa and Asia to understand how grassroots-
directed and nongovernmental organization (NGO)-directed partnerships differed 
in level of conflict, types of decision-making processes, and the degree of focus 
on social learning. 
 
C. Ashman et al. (1998) studied the relationships of Civil Society Research 
Organizations and their partners in international development to examine the 
types of conflict experienced. 
 
D. Lawrence and Hardy (1999) studied how differing levels of alignment with 
dominant institutions by three multi-sector collaborations in the field of refugee 
assistance influenced organizational structures, levels of legitimacy with 
stakeholders, and the bridging strategies employed by the organizations. 
 
Framework A: Altruistic vs. Egoistic Bridges 
Interorganizational relationships, especially those that bridge different sectors, can 
be costly and challenging (Waddell & Brown, 1997).  Moreover, as interdependence 
among organizations increases, the costs associated with poorly managed conflicts will 
increase (Brown, 1983).  Nevertheless, organizations pursue intersectoral relations in 
order to develop new strategies for which prior single-sector interventions have failed 
(Kalegaonkar & Brown, 2000).  They may also pursue such relationships to enhance their 
legitimacy and to increase their access to new sources of financial and informational 
resources (Ashman et al., 1998).  Westley and Vredenburg (1991) categorized these 
motives as “altruistic” or “egoistic” and classified bridging organizations by the 
motivations they have to collaborate. 
Egoistic bridges tend to volunteer for the bridging role in order to maintain their 
place and legitimacy within an institutional domain.  Altruistic bridging organizations, 
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on the other hand, may be designed or mandated by other entities in the domain.  
Altruistic bridges are often developed in order to address a specific problem and to 
synthesize the institutional arrangements of the domains that they bridge (Westley & 
Vredenburg, 1991).  Subsequent research has indicated that altruistic bridges tend to be 
temporary in order to bring about the direct collaboration of multi-sector partners, while 
egoistic bridges tend to have enduring bridging roles for long-term collaborative 
facilitation (Sharma et al., 1994). 
Nevertheless, Westley and Vredenburg consider relationship endurance and thus 
the maintenance of the SBO’s position as important factors in strategic bridging success: 
“[S]uccess in bridging situations should be judged less by the consensus achieved 
regarding a negotiated order and the commitment to implement decisions than 
by…building enduring links” (Westley & Vredenburg, 1991, p. 87).  Weakening multi-
sector relationships can be seen as strategic failures.  Therefore, one conflict in strategic 
bridging collaboration is that when organizations are mandated or created to bring about 
direct collaboration among sectoral partners, the loss of the facilitating SBO may actually 
inhibit the long-term success of the partnership. 
Sharma et al. (1994) argued that when altruistically-motivated bridges seek to 
create direct collaboration among the multi-sector partners, it makes the organization 
“structurally transitory” (p. 474) and thereby undermines the bridging effort.  Emerging 
weaknesses in a bridging organization will subsequently affect its ability to define the 
opportunity domain; to secure internal commitment from its stakeholders; and to achieve 
a balance between its own goals and motives of those in the domain—each of which is an 
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additional measure of successful bridging (Sharma et al., 1994; Westley & Vredenburg, 
1991) (see Table 2.1).  The authors argue that strategic bridging collaborations, if 
altruistically motivated, will be more successful if they pay some attention to building 
legitimacy and sustainability into their role as bridgers. 
 
Table 2.1 Frameworks of Strategic Bridging – Westley & Vredenburg (1991) 
 
Authors Westley & Vredenburg (1991); Sharma, Vredenburg & Westley (1994) 
Approach Purpose of the strategic bridging organization 
Type of bridge Assignment of 
bridging role 
Strategic focus Purpose for seeking 
relations 
Egoistic Bridge Voluntary Self-serving Maintain domain 
relations 
Classification 
Altruistic Bridge Designed or 
mandated 




 Endurance of links 
 Successful articulation of problem domain 
 Bridging organization securing internal commitment 
 Balancing self-interest with domain concerns 
Emerging 
Issues 
Organizations may not have the resources or authority to collaborate 
Potential partners may have vastly differing ideological perspectives 
Partners may have historical conflicts that set the tone for collaboration 
 There may be legal barriers that need to be overcome 
 
 
While self-interest is clearly an important part of the bridging model, Sharma et 
al. (1994) do not sufficiently clarify how egoistic bridges that seek to maintain domain 
relations are better able to address the emerging issues of collaboration (e.g., historical 
conflict, lack of resources, differing ideologies).  However, one might argue that in such 
cases, the bridging organization has the strength of the dominant institution to legitimize 
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its function and goals.  Strategic bridging collaboration need not have goals for 
institutional change.6 
Organizations that seek enduring roles to “become a part of the fabric of the 
domain” (Sharma et al., 1994, p. 474) provide certain legitimacy to the effort, which 
assists them in addressing a partner’s lack of resources or legitimacy.  By focusing on its 
own legitimacy, the SBO will be able to mediate the collaboration of ideologically-
different organizations and their historical conflicts, and may make itself better situated 
to overcome legal and political barriers (Westley & Vredenburg, 1991). 
Westley and Vredenburg argue that in the altruistic domains of Third World 
development, the egoistic motives of a bridging organization may be the deciding factor 
in collaborative success.  However, their research inquires neither into successful 
altruistic bridges, nor into their transformative purposes.  The work of Brown and 
Ashman (1999) gives some insight into these bridging processes. 
Framework B: Grassroots-directed vs. Organizationally-mediated Multi-sectoral 
Partnerships 
Strategic bridging among sectors has been found to foster the development of 
interorganizational social capital and social learning (i.e., the building of capacities to 
collaborate and approach problems collectively) (Brown & Ashman, 1999; Waddell, 
1997).  Brown and Ashman’s (1999) study of thirteen developing world partnerships 
identified two types of multi-sector bridging: 1) bridging by organizations to increase 
                                                
6 The strategic bridging model is equally powerful in explaining how dominant and oppressive institutional 
structures are developed and maintained.  This is a particularly interesting area of study, which deserves 
more attention in social work. 
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service capacity, and 2) bridging by grassroots organizations to create social change and 
address community interests.  Social capital and social learning are integral to the success 
of such collaborative endeavors.  However, the degree of direct participation and 
decision-making by grassroots entities and their stakeholders varies.  The authors found 
that participation and decision-making depended on whether grassroots institutions were 
critical to a project’s sustainability (Brown & Ashman, 1999).  In some projects, 
grassroots participation was not a critical factor. 
Brown and Ashman (1999) defined collaborative success as the number of people 
who were served by the effort (size: less than 10,000 to greater than 100,000 people) and 
by its level of sustainability (degree to which the effort was able to raise resources from 
each of the partnering public, grassroots, and nonprofit sectors).  The authors tied 
successful multi-sector collaboration to the level of social capital built by the partnerships 
and to the degree to which social learning was used to strengthen the partnerships. 
The authors measured social capital by the existence and extensiveness of 
grassroots organizations and grassroots networks, the number and strength of 
intersectoral contacts, the level of conflict among partners, and the degree to which less 
powerful partners were able to participate in decision-making.  Social learning, which 
“produces enduring changes in the institutional arrangements that enable future 
intersectoral action” (Brown & Ashman, 1999, p. 164) was defined as capacity-building 
that brings about “changes in interorganizational arrangements that enable multiple 
organizational actors to understand and work together effectively” (p. 156).  Performed in 
conjunction with program learning, which “enables the parties to deal with specific 
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issues to carry out the program” (p. 156) and organizational learning, which “indicates 
changes in specific organizational actors” (p. 156); social learning—on a multi-sector 
level—supports multi-sector capacity-building, mutual influence in decision-making, and 
the building of sustainable relationships (Brown & Ashman, 1999). 
Once Brown and Ashman categorized the cases according to these differing levels 
of success, social capital, and social learning, they found that two types of intersectoral 
initiatives emerged, each appropriate to the purposes of the collaborative endeavor.  The 
first type, the grassroots-directed initiative, had a similar voluntary role as that of the 
egoistic bridges studied by Westley and Vredenburg.  However, its purpose is much more 
transformative and social change-seeking than found for egoistic organizations.  Projects 
mediated by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), on the other hand, resembled 
problem-focused, altruistic bridges, yet they had few transformative goals. 
Grassroots-directed endeavors experienced higher levels of conflict because they 
tended to have a greater diversity of partners (Brown & Ashman, 1999).  The authors 
found that in such initiatives, grassroots parties participated at higher rates and exerted 
mutual influence in decision-making.  Social learning was fostered and catalyzed by 
grassroots leaders, who supported the examination of multiple perspectives in order to 
identify better solutions.  For projects that required local resources and information to 
ensure sustainability, these network structures appeared to be the most appropriate (see 
Table 2.2). 
The authors argued that NGO-mediated projects experienced lower levels of 
conflict because they had lower levels of grassroots participation.  NGO-mediated 
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partnerships were appropriate for initiatives with few participation incentives or in 
situations where grassroots groups lacked capacity.  Such initiatives had success with 
projects that required the building of organizational capacity and projects where services 
addressed individual social welfare goals (e.g., delivery of rural health services) rather 
than social change goals. 
Both Westley and Vredenburg (1991) and Brown and Ashman (1999) define 
multi-sector partnerships and bridging relationships as functions of collaborative motives.  
Both studies link motives to the structures of the relations formed among the intersectoral 
partners and identify the level of internal conflict as influencing bridging success.  
However, while Westley and Vredenburg (1991) use organizational measures of success, 
Brown and Ashman (1999) measure success in terms of initiative impact and 
sustainability—factors that influence institutional success.  Sustainable transformation 
and especially the emergence of new multi-sector institutionalized relationships relate to 
the level of social capital building and social learning that takes place among sectors. 
The Brown and Ashman study also highlights important considerations for 
stakeholder involvement in development projects.  NGO-mediated projects achieved 
success with minimal involvement of stakeholders, yet the authors found that these 
projects also were less likely to build local networks and organizations to sustain the 
project locally.  In contrast with the Westley and Vredenburg framework, the 
altruistically-motivated organizations did not seek “transformative” social change.  
Although NGOs were better able to form and maintain relationships among the public,
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Table 2.2 Frameworks of Strategic Bridging – Brown & Ashman (1999) 




Different “patterns of success” in Grassroots-directed and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)-mediated projects in serving greater 
numbers and having more sustainable resources. 
Type of 
Project 
Level of Conflict Decision-making Social Learning Application 
Grassroots-
directed 
Moderate to high 
levels of conflict 
among parties due 
the representation of 
diverse interests. 
Grassroots parties 
participate and have 




Local resources and information are needed 
to solve problems.  Networks of grassroots 
organizations allow larger geographic areas 
to be served and also make connections to 
large agencies in other sectors.  Community 








Lower levels of 
conflict due to less 
participation by 
grassroots groups.  A 
more likely structure 
when parties do not 
want to participate or 
grassroots 
organizations do not 
exist.  Less conflict to 
manage makes it 




partners.  Less 
emphasis on direct 
negotiation and 
grassroots 
participation.  NGOs 
serve as decision-
makers and consider 
all interests. 
Some social learning 
but tend to focus on 
organizational 
learning. 
Efforts less likely to 
create local entities to 
sustain the projects 
and generate fewer 
resources from within 
the served 
communities. 
Best for narrowly-defined projects.  NGOs 
deliver services and technical assistance to 
underorganized grassroots agencies with 
fewer resources.  Depends less on local 
resources and capacities and more on the 
service capacities of NGOs and government 
agencies.  Can be successful when 
organizational capacity for providing 
services is important to success of project 




The level of conflict and degree to which grassroots entities participate in decision-making influences the degree to which there is 
mutual influence among the parties in framing problems, setting directions, articulating plans, and guiding actions. 
Success can be achieved even with moderate to high levels of conflict. 
Catalysts in the participating organizations were often individuals who encouraged and fostered the examination of multiple 
perspectives and facilitated problem solving for better solutions. 




private and for profit sectors and were able to provide services when grassroots capacities 
were negligible, grassroots-directed initiatives formed networks with other grassroots 
groups to serve larger geographic areas and provide broader development programs, thus 
achieving the more transformative objectives one would expect from “altruistic” 
organizations. 
More importantly, grassroots-directed projects supported participation of local 
stakeholders and were more likely to foster social learning strategies for development.  
The Brown and Ashman study underscores the idea that creating a network of 
relationships is only a part of the development process: The formation of network 
relationships (or “ties”) among organizations, institutional sectors, and stakeholders must 
be accompanied by the development of local capacities and participatory decision-
making in order for lasting social change to occur.  Ashman et al.’s (1998) study of the 
network ties of Civil Society Research Organizations (CSROs) further clarifies the link 
between network structure and sustainability. 
Framework C:  The “Strength of Strong and Weak Ties” 
 Ashman et al. (1998) studied eight CSROs, which are grant-making organizations 
that fund and support grassroots groups and NGOs in the developing world.  CSROs 
must generate funding and create distribution systems to allocate these funds to local 
organizations.  CSROs meet many of the strategic bridging criteria discussed in the 
earlier frameworks.  The organizations link multiple sectors, must balance internal 
interests with those of the partnering stakeholders, and staff within the organizations 
recognize and mediate multiple perspectives and values.  The authors argued that the 
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types of relations founding board members (and thus their organizations) had with their 
respective networks would influence the challenges they faced and how they dealt with 
these challenges.  
 Board members with stronger network relations held common interests and values 
with their network colleagues.  They founded their CSROs to increase their 
organization’s access to financial and informational resources and to broaden their 
network’s impact in international development.  On the other hand, CSROs with board 
members from more weakly-tied networks represented a greater diversity of interests and 
sought to build diversity in their CSRO boards to gain local legitimacy.  The authors 
found that both types of organizations were challenged to maintain a balanced 
perspective in order to be effective grant-making entities.  If the boards became too 
strongly aligned with the populations that the grant recipients served, financial donors 
were alienated; if ties were too strongly aligned with donors, then grant recipients 
experienced challenges in meeting grant requirements (Ashman et al., 1998).  See Table 
2.3, on the next page, for a summary of findings. 
 Interestingly, Ashman et al. (1998) found that neither type CSRO (neither 
weakly-tied nor strongly-tied) recruited grassroots actors for their boards due to the 
potential for conflict: both types of organizations relied on professional opinion to make 
decisions.  However, both types of CSROs purposefully sought ties, either through board 
inclusion or through weak links to resource-generating entities, in order to address 
organizational sustainability.  An important contextual factor in this framework is the fact 
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Table 2.3 Frameworks of Strategic Bridging – Ashman et al. (1998) 
Authors Ashman, Brown & Zwick (1998) 





























Closed boards to 
retain homogeneity 
Internal conflicts among 
board and staff 
regarding values and 
uses of resources 
Classification 







New ties Heterogeneous Legitimacy developed 
through board 
interlocks 
Boards open for new 








 Organizations were challenged to maintain a balanced perspective.  If ties were too strong to marginalized populations, then donors 
were potentially alienated.  If ties were too strong to donors, then rules and requirements would be challenging to groups receiving 
funds. 
 Strongly-tied, homogeneous networks sought additional resources through intersectoral ties.  Weakly-tied, heterogeneous networks had 
access to a diverse set of resources, but required legitimacy. 
 Neither type recruited grassroots actors for their boards, because of the potential for conflict, and relied on professionals for decisions. 
 Strongly-tied networks can forge external weak ties to generate new resources but retains its orientation and values.  However, this 
means that such networks need to constantly seek new ties (resources).  Weakly tied networks can include new ties in its structure, thus 
reducing its need to seek resources.  However, if such ties are not legitimized, then the network may have trouble maintaining its 




that the CSROs studied by Ashman et al. (1998) were founded by status-elite members of 
their respective countries, who either founded the CSRO as an extension of an existing, 
strongly-connected social network, or as a multi-sector initiative.  Participation of 
grassroots organizations and stakeholder populations was scarce.7 
 Strongly-tied CSRO networks sought external relationships to generate new 
resources but maintained their homogeneous orientations and values.  The authors saw 
these relationships as the “weak ties” discussed by Granovetter (1973): “[W]eak ties 
which connect otherwise socially-isolated groups have been noted for their capacity to 
bring new information and resources that would otherwise not be accessible….” (Ashman 
et al., 1998, p. 2).  However, because these CSRO boards did not seek new members, 
they experienced continual pressure to link themselves to financial donors in order to 
ensure an appropriate level of resources. 
 By contrast, the more heterogeneous CSRO boards sought new members and 
diversified their financial and informational resources.  Diverse ties can be mediated by 
bridging organizations (Brown, 1993 in Ashman et al., 1998), or through “participatory 
decision-making” (p. 2) strategies.  However, the diverse CSRO boards experienced 
challenges in creating and maintaining legitimacy, and had to balance their diverse 
sectoral alignments.  Additionally, their diverse membership made it difficult to strike a 
balance between consistency and flexibility in goal orientation (Ashman et al., 1998). 
                                                
7 Ashman et al. (1998) explained that one CSRO was “created in part to respond to revolutionary 
movements which, from the perspective of the business community, constituted a threat to social and 
economic stability” (p. 5). 
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 The study’s findings illustrate how network structure influences organizational 
sustainability and resource access.  Strong and weak ties to external entities in an 
institutional environment create different challenges for organizations that bridge sectors.  
The final bridging framework, developed by Lawrence and Hardy (1999), studies how 
the different structural positions of bridging organizations affect their respective 
organizational challenges and structures. 
Framework D: Structural Position in Activist Domains 
Lawrence and Hardy created a typology of bridging organizations based on the 
degree to which a bridging organization aligned itself with institutionally powerful and 
centralized institutions or connected to and allied itself with more peripheral interests 
(e.g., the interests of activist organizations).  The authors studied three systems created to 
serve refugees in Canada, Denmark and the United Kingdom.  The level to which the 
bridging organizations aligned themselves with dominant institutions affected their 
organizational structures, partnership approaches, and organizational cultures (Lawrence 
& Hardy, 1999). 
Lawrence and Hardy argued that the dominant organizations’ centrality did not 
necessarily reflect perceived legitimacy, but rather that centrality was a function of “their 
activity in a wide variety of domains and on their power within the capitalist system” (p. 
50).  The bridging organizations sought to link refugees and related stakeholder 
organizations to the central public sector entities that served this population.  The value 
differences among the three types of bridging organizations influenced the methods by 
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which they served refugees in the three countries and depended on the organizations’ 
proximities to centrally dominant sectors and dominant paradigms. 
Using Douglas and Wildavsky’s model of organizational culture (1982 in 
Lawrence & Hardy, 1999), the authors categorized the bridging organizations’ structures 
as markets, hierarchies or sects, depending the openness of the organizations’ boundaries 
(Lawrence & Hardy, 1999, p. 61).  The authors explained that because the organizations 
they studied had “strong, enduring boundaries” (p. 61), the “market” type of 
organizational structure, which typically has more fluid boundaries, did not apply. 
The bridging organization that aligned closer to the central dominant paradigm 
(the “center extension,” p. 58) reflected a more hierarchical structure, i.e., had a culture 
that was regulated by formalized rules and constraints and used decision-making 
standards (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982 in Lawrence & Hardy, 1999).  A sectarian 
structure (used by the “border federation,” p. 59), on the other hand, was characterized 
by egalitarian, decentralized methods of decision-making, lacked formal rules, and used 
participatory decision-making.  The authors identified this structure in the bridging 
organization that aligned itself with border entities.  The “pure bridge” case (p. 58) 
exhibited characteristics of both these types and was thus considered a hybrid. 
The hierarchical nature of the center extension made it prone to perceived threats 
to its stability and the stability of the dominant institutions.  It employed bridging 
strategies such as compromise, standardization, and norm enforcement by creating 
communication channels with border entities.  This type of bridging organization was 
most likely to suffer from a lack of legitimacy with the border groups.  These challenges 
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Table 2.4 Frameworks of Strategic Bridging – Lawrence & Hardy (1999) 
 
Authors Lawrence & Hardy (1999) 
Approach The position of a bridging organization within the institutional fields of activist domains (between “center,” dominant groups and “border” 
activist groups) will affect the organization’s structure, strategies, and other organizational characteristics. 










Positioned closer to 
the dominant 
paradigm 





Supports the center’s enforcement of standards and 
norms.  Such bridging organizations stress 
communication and compromise between the center 
and border entities.  However, because 
communication is often put in terms of the dominant 
paradigm, such bridges may lack legitimacy with 
border groups. 
Border Federation: 
Positioned closer to 
activist organizations 
that oppose the 
dominant paradigm 
Sectarian Fissioning (the 




Supports activist values of border groups but may risk 
losing members if it becomes too bureaucratic or if 
the center is unresponsive.  However, legitimacy as a 





















Threats to legitimacy come from both the dominant 
paradigm and from “border” groups that may perceive 
the organization as co-opted by dominant groups.  
Therefore, pure bridges focus on negotiating 
standards with the center and negotiating 





to legitimacy are similar to the difficulties faced by the strongly-tied networks studied by 
Ashman et al. (1998), which may explain why multi-sectored bridging initiatives 
encounter challenges when grassroots and local stakeholder groups perceive an 
organization to be allied with dominant institutions. 
 In contrast, the border federation bridging organization was challenged by 
“fissioning” (Lawrence & Hardy, 1999, p. 66), i.e., the breaking away of members 
because they perceived alternatives as more effective.  In such cases, an increase in the 
level of bureaucracy, the exclusion of certain grassroots groups, or a perceived lack of 
impact caused the bridging organization to lose members and thus diminished the power 
it gained by having a diverse membership.  These challenges relate to Ashman et al.’s 
(1998) weakly-tied networks, which must balance the needs of their diverse memberships 
without sacrificing flexibility. 
 Pure bridges can be threatened from “both sides” (p. 67)—undermining by the 
dominant center and experiencing fissioning from member border groups.  Pure bridge 
sustainability depends on the careful negotiation of standards with the use of participatory 
strategies that allow for representation of its diverse membership.  The authors argued 
that in this “schizophrenic” case (p. 68), a bridging organization should assess its mission 
and determine whether its alliances serve its organizational goals.  The authors appear to 
argue that in activist domains, effective bridging may need to be defined in terms of 
alliances with one side or the other, and that strategic bridging may not be effective as a 
hybrid of both dominant norms and norm challenging institutions. 
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 Lawrence and Hardy’s typology illustrates the necessity of the institutional 
perspective in studying strategic bridging collaborations.  Bridging partnerships that seek 
to maintain the dominant paradigm through the mainstreaming of marginalized groups 
and populations may be undertaken for purposes other than that of social change (e.g., to 
maintain the status quo).  The strategies undertaken by centrally-aligned bridging 
organizations might only address the needs of marginalized populations without 
addressing the root causes of those needs.  Nevertheless, one could argue that some 
institutional change is possible through cooperative strategies as well as through 
competitive and activist ones. 
Summary of Frameworks 
 Table 2.5 (on the next page) summarizes the four strategic bridging frameworks 
reviewed here.  While the studies vary in focus, there is a general theme that differing 
levels of diversity in their boards, stakeholders, constituents and partners characterize 
bridging organizations.  Not all bridging organizations seek partnerships with grassroots 
organizations and stakeholders.  However, many do and thus experience some of the 
challenges inherent in bringing together diverse perspectives, including difficulties in 
maintaining membership cohesiveness, balancing the interests of partners and the goals 
for collaboration, and determining to what degree dominant institutions influence the 
decision-making procedures of the collaboration.   
 Another theme that emerges from a comparison of the studies is that bridging 
organizations have both transformative and maintenance roles.  Transformative roles 




Table 2.5 Summary of Strategic Bridging Frameworks 



























Problem-focused, Transformative * * * 
Grassroots-
Mediated * 
Facilitating community action to solve 





building to provide services Low Low High 
Strongly-
tied Designed 
Increasing impact or autonomy through 
resources Low 
Low 
(as studied) High Ashman et 
al. (1998) 
Weakly-tied Designed Gaining legitimacy and resources High Low (as studied) High 
Pure 
Bridges * 
Mediating norms of dominant institutions 
and activist, peripheral entities * Moderate Moderate 
Center 
Extensions * 
Developing compromises between 






Supporting activist voices in negotiations 
with dominant institutions * High Low 
* Not specified in the study. 
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Organizations filling maintenance roles may not actively seek to maintain dominant 
institutional arrangements (although they can).  However, maintenance roles may be 
given to exogenous organizations that extend services to a community, while retaining 
the existing institutional relationships.  The next section of this chapter completes the 
discussion of strategic bridging by linking strategic bridging assumptions to the asset 
development approach.  
Framework Assumptions: Purposeful Bridges and Social Change 
 The frameworks presented in the four case studies illustrate the complex 
challenges associated with social change objectives in multi-sector collaboration.  It is 
not enough to collaborate or to create ties with organizations in other sectors (Marra, 
2004): Strategic bridging collaboration models assume that organizations, their leaders, 
their partners, and their staff need to make strategic choices at each stage of the 
collaboration process.  Decisions influencing the success and sustainability of projects 
include: 
How and what kinds of ties are to be formed with other organizations? 
How and by what degree are local stakeholders to be involved in decision-
making processes? 
How are resources to be generated? 
How is information to be disseminated?  
How closely does one align with dominant paradigms?   
 
Negotiating through each of these decision stages requires careful consideration 
of the institutional environment, the partners involved, the goals for collaboration, and of 
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the capacity level of the bridging organization to facilitate and manage multiple 
perspectives.   
 The collaborative model is not appropriate in all instances.  Organizations can 
have few conflicting interests and few convergent interests, which leads to a “non-
engagement” with few incentives to collaborate (Covey & Brown, 2001, p. 3).  At the 
other end of the spectrum, organizations and groups may have many converging and 
conflicting interests, which are deeply tied to issues of power and social justice, and 
which make bridging a difficult endeavor.  The bridging approach seeks to build new 
arrangements and to create new social units (Brown, 1983) that merge and define the 
mutual influences, common interests, and roles within each of the bridged sectors.  There 
is a clear focus on linking institutions through interorganizational relationships and thus 
on the creation of new institutional arrangements (Brown, 1993; Brown & Ashman, 
1999; Brown & Tandon, 1994; Kalegaonkar & Brown, 2000; Waddell & Brown, 1997).  
Here, the emphasis is on “new,” i.e., new institutional arrangements that do not merely 
replicate the dominant paradigm:   
 
[E]xisting institutional arrangements have proved largely inadequate to the 
challenges posed by the global problematique…[and] efforts to respond to the 
problematique are undermined by the lack of common values and visions…Organizations 
that enable diverse stakeholders to articulate and implement solutions to complex 
problems can make seminal contributions to solving both the institutional and the values 
problems…[T]hey are key actors in articulating shared visions and in constructing 
institutional arrangements for achieving them (Brown, 1993, pp. 2-4). 
 
 
The strategic bridging literature emphasizes that local decisions and collaboration 
strategies can have institution-wide effects.  Such effects can be seen in the IDA 
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movement.  Seidman and Tescher (2004) found that five factors have increased the 
access of low-income persons to the financial sector.  Among these factors were major 
changes in the financial sector that have led to alternative financial institutions; 
“unconventional partnerships” (p. 12) between financial firms and other entities to reach 
underserved populations; and the growth of the IDA movement.  Nyman (2004) 
elaborated on the capacity-building strategies and activities of IDA collaborations as 
methods to build political advocacy mechanisms of rural, grassroots groups to foster 
institutional change.  She found that grassroots support for multi-sector projects can 
empower residents of rural areas by building community assets: 
 
The multi-organizational networks serving the colonias regions build community 
capital and community assets, which strengthen the communities from within.  For 
disinvested, rural communities this can mean sustainable and meaningful community 
development, which can turn temporarily-funded projects into enduring economic 
development strategies…The key is not to parcel development strategies into funding 
streams and demonstration projects, but to build networks, community capital, and 
community assets for sustainable development (Nyman, 2004, p. 19). 
 
 
 The replication of the multi-sectoral relationships in IDA programs has helped to 
increase the institutional legitimacy of the asset development strategy.  IDA and IDA-
related policies have gained the attention of policymakers, who on a federal level are now 
introducing proposals for child savings accounts, tax credits for banks participating in 
IDA programs, and new savings options for retirement, among others (Cramer et al., 
2004).  Nevertheless, even as savings programs become a more frequent strategy in social 
welfare policy, the amount of federal asset-building policies remains disproportionately 
favorable to the wealthy over the poor (CFED, 2004; Cramer et al., 2004).  This unequal 
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advantage in asset-based policy has yet to be resolved fifteen years after Sherraden first 
noted it in his book (1991). 
 For social workers endeavoring to make change in the dominant paradigm, these 
findings can be discouraging.  Even with promising tools, such as strategic bridging 
collaboration, which can lead to institutional change, institutional factors weigh heavily 
on a change agent’s success and how change takes place.  Nevertheless, local changes 
can create widespread change.  Social network analysis, and specifically small world 
network analysis helps us to understand how these small changes do manifest larger scale 
changes on the institutional level.  
 
Social Network Analysis and the Small World 
 That localized changes can affect larger systems is not a new idea.  We have all 
heard of the chaos theory anecdote that a butterfly flapping its wings in Hong Kong can 
create a tornado in Texas (postulated by MIT meteorologist, Ed Lorenz in 1963)—this is 
known as the butterfly effect.  However, the study of institutions shows us that this effect 
feeds back onto the greater institution, which influences the local area, which influences 
the institution, and so on.  The early work of institutional theorist Talcott Parsons 
captured a similar idea in the burgeoning field of 20th century sociology: the short-term 
interests of the individual moderate the effects of common values in the institutional 




The influences of discrete changes on a local level—nontraditional partnerships in 
a local collaboration, for example, or the flapping of a butterfly’s wings—can manifest 
themselves in macro-level changes in the environment.  To discern and study all of the 
variables that influence institutional change is a massive undertaking.  Nevertheless, the 
need to explain institutional change is great, and the need to make those explanations 
meaningful may be even greater.  From the perspective of the mathematical sociologist, 
John Skvoretz, “Inevitably, it seems formalization capable of supporting rigorous 
analysis requires that we discard much of the richness and complexity of a topic.  And it 
is this rich complexity that motivates our interests in the first place” (2000, p. 511) 
Perhaps it is this complexity that makes institutional change so daunting.  We 
know from research in many different fields that small changes do have big effects 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Granovetter, 1973; Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; 
North, 1996; Watts & Strogatz, 1998).  Early in his seminal article, The Strength of Weak 
Ties, Granovetter (1973) argued: 
[T]he analyses of processes in interpersonal networks provide the 
most fruitful micro-macro bridge.  In one way or another, it is through 
these networks that small-scale interaction becomes translated into large-
scale patterns, and that these, in turn, feed back into small groups (p. 
1360). 
 
Watts would later echo similar sentiments in 1999: 
Significant changes in global structure [of a network] can result from changes in 
local structure that are so minute as to be effectively undetectable at the local 
level (p. 498). 
 
That being said, a map of social relations is only as good as the kinds of relations 
it maps, and the use of the network analytic method is only as good as the 
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operationalization of its nodes and ties.  Nodes in a network of relations represent the 
actor, or the roles of an actor.  For example, a network of relations among a group of 
community organizations can reveal how those organizational actors interact, or the 
network could also be used to make some conclusions on the roles of the different 
organizations in the collaborative effort.  Strategic bridging concepts are decidedly about 
the roles of organizations.  Institutional analysis can take it one step further.  In one 
sense, institutional analysis is concerned with the way the roles of organizations are 
influenced by overarching norms of interaction.  In another sense, it focuses on the way 
actors’ interactions with others create and change the institutional norms (Fararo & 
Skvoretz, 1986). 
Similarly, the ties of a network represent the relationships between and among the 
nodes, and can be seen as representing the actual structure of a network, or can reflect the 
role relationships that create node positions in an underlying institutional structure (Burt, 
1992; Fararo & Skvoretz, 1986).  Therefore, when network analysis is used to study 
interorganizational collaboration, for example, the ties may simply reflect common 
affiliations among nodes (e.g., an AFI grantee having the same financial partner as 
another AFI grantee), or the ties can reflect actual relations and positions within a 
network (e.g., an AFI grantee shares resources with another grantee through a particular 
financial partner). 
While in this study’s case, the network described by the data can only represent 
grantee-bank affiliations, the curious characteristics of small world networks—that 
simple structure can have meaning—allows us to identify where interesting things may 
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be happening on the local level.  Small world network analysis does this by comparing 
the actual structure of networks to abstract random networks, a theoretical perspective 
developed by Rapoport (1957) and Erds and Rényi (1960, in Watts, 2003). 
In his studies of disease contagion, Rapoport (e.g., 1957) developed many of the 
common network concepts we use today: reciprocity (a tie from point A to point B is 
also a tie from point B to point A); average cluster size; measures of density vs. the 
number of connections; homophily (the tendency to associate with like people); and, 
“triadic closure” (adding dynamic interactions to the work of George Simmel) (Watts, 
2003).  Rapoport’s “random-biased nets” were ordered networks constructed under 
certain rules (thereby “biased”) to which additional ties would be added randomly (in 
Watts, 2003).  Before this, network ties had been assumed mathematically as independent 
events (e.g., Erds & Rényi, 1960 in Watts, 2003).  Therefore, Rapoport introduced 
causality into the formation of network ties (Watts, 2003). 
Randomness and Order 
The interaction of order and chaos (random chance) manifests the larger effects in 
the small world.  Watts and Strogatz (1998) argued that introducing chance linkages to 
ordered networks creates opportunities for inter-cluster links between nodes that are 
originally far apart.  These are the “six degrees of separation” popularized by Guare’s 
1990 play of the same name.  Most social networks are comprised of individuals who 
have mutual acquaintances and who form closely-knit clusters.  That “clustering” lessens 
the degree to which a message can be communicated to someone you don’t know: 
“clustering breeds redundancy” (Watts, 2003, p. 40).   
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It being a small world means that not only can you get a message across a small 
group of like-persons, but also (because each person is connected to every other person 
on the planet by an average of six degrees or “steps”) that message has the potential to go 
worldwide even though we are clustered in small groups (Travers & Milgram, 1969; 
Watts, 2003).  The clustering of persons or organizations is developed by strong ties 
between and among similar nodes.  However, if one were to create a tie at random, it 
would be much more likely that such a tie would connect individuals from two different 
clusters.  By adding randomness to an otherwise orderly network, one can quickly reach a 
threshold that links all the clusters. 
These are the “weak ties” that Granovetter linked to getting a job (1973, 1983).  
The measure of the “density” of a network is derived as the number of ties a particular 
node has within a cluster of its network divided by all the number of all possible ties that 
could be had within the network (Barnes, 1969 in Granovetter, 1973).  Dense networks 
are those whose density ratio approaches one.  Granovetter argued that networks need not 
be fully tied (a fully-tied graph is called complete in graph theory) to impact information 
diffusion across a network: weak, inter-cluster ties could have just as much impact as the 
strong ties within the clusters. 
 The small world theory derives its explanatory power from the mathematical 
tension between randomly-created networks and highly ordered ones.  Watts (2003) 
explains that our actions are determined partly from the structure of the networks in 
which we exist and partly from our own decisions and choices—what he terms 
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“structure” and “agency” (p. 72).8  Mathematically, agency-derived ties can be treated 
like random events because they are not constrained by the structure of the network, 
whereas structure-derived ties emerge as a consequence the existing network structure: 
Once these apparently random affiliations have been made…structure 
reenters the picture, and the newly created overlaps become the bridges 
over which other individuals can cross and form additional affiliations of 
their own” (Watts, 2003, p. 72). 
 
 Now the connection to strategic bridging becomes clearer.  Even the purposeful 
bridges formed between institutional sectors by strategic bridging organizations can be 
considered random events, thereby adding “chaos” to an otherwise structured (clustered) 
network.  Burt related a similar concept to organizational power: organizations can take 
advantage of the structural holes between strongly tied networks to control the flow of 
information and resources (Burt, Gabbay, Holt, & Moran, 1994).  This is similar to the 
“strength of weak ties” argument advanced by Granovetter (1973), which Ashman et al. 
(1998) used to describe dimensions of intersectoral relations. 
Measuring Small World Networks 
 Using this range from completely ordered networks to completely random ones, 
Watts and Strogatz (1998) created two abstract models of network interaction.  In one 
network, sparse populations live isolated from one another but have equal (random) 
chances to be connected (independent of network structure).  In the other network, the 
population is highly clustered with a high degree of probability that like persons will be 
connected and strangers will remain strangers.  This created a measurement of what 
                                                
8 Watts (2003) provides a very easy-to-understand explanation of the small world network concept.  His 
discussion is used as a guide for the next few pages of the literature review.   
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Watts and Strogatz called the “clustering coefficient”: “The degree to which, on average, 
a person’s friends are more likely to know each other than are two strangers” (Watts, 
2003, p. 77). 
Watts and Strogatz then created the Beta Randomness Model (1998), which 
describes the relationship between the number of paths it takes on average to go from 
point A to point B and the degree of clustering in the network.  The point where these 
two network properties—clustering and average shortest path between two points in a 
network—meet, is the critical point when the network moves from a “fragmented 
network” to a small world (Watts, 2003, p. 79, 81). 
When one remembers that “agency” or individual choice can be considered a 
random event because it is not dependent on network structure, then the implications for 
the small world network model become substantial.  With the addition of a number of 
random (agency-derived) linkages between clusters, e.g., strategic bridges between 
institutional sectors, the path length of connections among differently-clustered points is 
reduced significantly. 
Applications of the Small World Model to Real Networks 
Taking off from Milgram’s 1967 study of the “small world problem,” wherein he 
studied the number of connections it would take to link populations the size of the U.S., 
Watts and Strogatz (1998) began to apply the small-world model to existing networks.  
There were difficulties, however: “[O]ne can never be sure that the chain of 
intermediaries actually traced between two people was the shortest one possible” (Watts, 
1999, p. 514).  Because the identification of a small-world network depends on its 
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comparison to a randomly-tied graph of a similar number of nodes and ties, in large “N” 
networks, very few “shortcuts” or ties among clusters “k” are needed to differentiate the 
network from that of a randomly-tied one (Watts, 1999).  Therefore, when studying real 
networks, it is difficult to determine whether the identified ties really are “shortcuts,” or 
are, instead, the only identified ties among a range of others that remain unidentified but 
indeed comprise shorter paths. 
Watts and Strogatz (1998) identified three cases of small world networks in the 
real world: the collaborative connections between actors in a movie database (based on 
Tjaden, 1997); Phadke & Thorpe’s 1988 study of the North American power grid; and 
data from the study of the neural network of a nematode C.elgans, studied by White et al. 
and Achacoso & Yamamoto (1986 and 1992, respectively) (all studies listed in Watts & 
Strogatz, 1998).  For the varying ranges of N (from N = 282 for the nematode’s neural 
network to N =226,000 for the movie database), Watts and Strogatz found that each could 
be represented by the small-world model for their respective measures of k (number of 
ties among clusters), L (average minimum path length), and C (clustering coefficient). 
Subsequent to their study, the small world network concept has become a hot 
topic among mathematicians and sociologists, especially social network analysts.  
Although few scholarly studies have applied the model to organizational networks, its 
application appears to have substantial implications.  For example, Kogut and Walker 
(2001) performed a small world analysis on a network of German enterprises and found 
that even when they simulated changes to the network structure through the addition and 
deletion of ties, the network structure retained its small world properties.  Kogut and 
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Walker concluded that concerns that weaknesses may emerge with the growth of the 
global market in the German business sector may not be as severe or even as likely as 
was predicted.  Baum et al.’s (2002) study of strategic partnerships within the Canadian 
financial sector revealed a persistence of small-world structure over a longitudinal period 
(1952-1990).   
Small world networks have other benefits, including rapid communication across 
the network, as Watts and Strogatz (1998) found when they applied the small world 
network concept to a network representing disease contagion (similarly affecting network 
communication as in the telephone game example discussed in Chapter 1).  However, 
other models of large networks exhibit similar properties to the small world model, and, 
in fact, very large networks exhibit the short path lengths found in small world networks 
(Bollobás, 1985 in Newman, 2003).  Additionally, the predictive value of the small world 
model is still under investigation (e.g., Lahtinen, Kertész, & Kaski, 2001; Latora & 
Marchiori, 2001; Newman et al., 2001).   
Although shortcuts are possible in very large networks, it is the combination of 
these short path lengths with a high degree of clustering that makes the small world 
model useful for understanding network dynamics.  Local partner decisions by AFI 
grantees may be made to enhance a program or service—perhaps a new financial partner 
has a lower rate of interest on home mortgages for participants.  Local decisions may also 
affect a program negatively, e.g., a financial partner decides to not continue partnering 
after it merges with another bank.  We can understand these local decisions in terms of 
the collaborative process, in terms of service effectiveness for participants, and in terms 
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of program sustainability—what does it do to the larger network?  As was found in this 
study, these local decisions aggregate to have substantial effects on the larger network 
across the entire demonstration project.  Local partnership decisions can strengthen a 
cluster (thus creating more homogeneity within clusters), or can link new clusters 
together (thus forming shortcuts between clusters).  When we ask, “What is the overall 
effect of the AFI Demonstration Project?” part of the answer must include the widespread 
effects the project has for the participating sectors, and whether the small changes in 
personal wealth we see on the local level are matched by equally important changes in 
the structure of power relations among the organizations providing these services.  One 
could argue that this larger picture goes to the heart of the growth potential for the project 
and its sustainability.  The decisions made by social workers at the local level can, 
indeed, have widespread effects. 
Networks and Institutional Change 
The strategic bridging approach emphasizes that building social capital among 
multi-sector partners influences the creation of new institutional arrangements.  However, 
as was brought out in the review earlier in this chapter, the presence of social capital does 
not necessitate social change.  This is because “social capital” is a metaphor (Burt, 2000), 
which can symbolize trust (Church et al., 2002; Putnam, 1993 in Burt, 2000); resources 
(Bordieu, 1980 in Burt, 2000; Robison & Flora, 2003); and power (Sharp, 2001), among 
other concepts and relationships. 
Burt argues in his extensive review of network analyses of social capital (2000) 
that research should not be as concerned with what social capital is, but it rather should 
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focus on the “network mechanisms” that convey value onto the metaphor.  That is to say, 
the positions of the persons or organizations in a structure will confer competitive 
advantage that makes it possible for them to control information or other resources, exert 
power in decision-making, and influence the diffusion of norms across a network (among 
other advantages).  Therefore, relationships become strategic assets, which when viewed 
in the context of a network of relations, become strategic “capital.” 
Social Capital and the Development of Institutions 
 Two approaches can be used to understand how social capital influences the 
development of institutions.  The first approach comes from New Institutional 
Economics, which uses a “bottom-up,” micro-perspective by looking at how relationships 
gradually formalize into institutional arrangements.  The second approach comes from 
institutional sociology, which uses a “top-down,” macro-perspective by studying how 
larger institutional processes guide the actions and decisions of people and organizations. 
 The development of economic institutions. 
In economic terms, relationships among persons and organizations are defined by 
“transactions,” which are the exchange of resources.  Many transactions are risky 
because one or more of the actors in the exchange do not have sufficient information to 
determine whether they are getting value in return for the resources they are exchanging.  
This uncertainty leads to certain costs, e.g., to acquire information on the legitimacy or 
trustworthiness of a partner.  If the costs associated with acquiring information (to reduce 
the risk in the exchange) are less than the benefits one could get from the exchange, this 
provides an incentive to proceed with the transaction.  Economic institutions are created 
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when exchanges are repeated over time, which reduces uncertainty and creates 
institutional norms for the exchange (i.e., institutional arrangements) (Oberschall & 
Leifer, 1986). 
The control over institutional arrangements is often held by those actors with 
power (e.g., those whose social capital places them in positions of power within a 
network); and there are multiple perspectives in society as to how to best organize these 
institutional arrangements (Eggertson, 1996).  When faced with multiple interests, actors 
in power are not likely to seek egalitarian arrangements, even if they are the most 
efficient (North, 1991 in Eggertsson, 1996), because formal arrangements and informal 
norms of interaction that support the current power structure influence their decisions.  
The formal institutional arrangements and informal norms (as emerging through repeated 
transactions) reduce exchange uncertainty and thus provide incentives to maintain the 
current structure of relationships.  Therefore, one aspect of the power conferred by a 
network structure to a person or organization with high levels of social capital is that the 
person can exert control over who has access to resources, information, and power (Burt, 
2000). 
The strategic bridging model assumes a reworking of these institutional 
arrangements, through the building of social capital with marginalized stakeholders and 
thus creating situations where these groups can exert mutual influence in decision-
making (Covey & Brown, 2001).  Network analysis provides the means to reveal current 
power structures, which can help to explain successful development projects.  For 
example, in his analysis of three community development networks in the rural Midwest 
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of the U.S., Sharp (2001) analyzed the interlocking directorates among local 
organizations and institutional entities.  Sharp found that the networks with either a 
strong central leadership structure or a collaborative, less centralized “coalitional” 
structure (p. 40) exhibited greater capacities to develop community-wide development 
projects than the network that had fewer cluster-spanning or centralized ties. 
Importantly, Sharp used a number of methods to investigate the relationships of 
the community network partners.  In addition to studying the common board 
memberships of the community organizations and their multi-sector partners, Sharp 
(2001) performed in-depth interviews with key informants in those communities in order 
to ascertain the degree to which the projects were perceived as successful.  What emerges 
from Sharp’s research is the multiplicity of relationships required to assess community 
development success and effectiveness.  He argues for a broad and diverse range of 
measures of local capacity: 
The research reported here suggests more appropriate proxies for 
measuring the community field, including a diverse and inclusive 
community organization or coalition, which generates communitywide 
awareness and facilitates the flow of local information or resources; 
generalized leaders, who seek to build bridges between diverse social 
fields; capacity for leadership development; organizations or institutions 
with stockpiled resources available for community development; multi-
interest planning processes; and proactive action organized in response to 
collectively recognized community needs…” (Sharp, 2001, p. 422). 
 
The network structures revealed by Sharp’s analysis present an incomplete picture 
of community development strategies that requires additional study of the complex 
interactions of the actors represented in the network—a complexity acknowledged by 
social development researchers who are developing field evaluation techniques using 
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network analysis (e.g., Church et al., 2002; Davies, 2003; Nuñez & Wilson-Grau, 2003).  
Often, informal networks emerging through relationships have the greatest influence 
(Benini, 1999; Lawrence et al, 2002).  Institutional economists would call these 
developing “non-market institutions,” which informally guide behavior outside the 
formal rules of the market (Oberschall & Leifer, 1986).  From a sociological perspective, 
informal institutions are the substantive methods by which norms and values influence 
behavior. 
The development of sociological institutions. 
Sociological views of institutional change focus on the aggregation of norms that 
create change on the local level and affect institutional change through isomorphic 
processes (i.e., processes that create similar structures).  The work of DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) is often cited as the formative sociological work on the development of 
institutions.  In their work, organizations are aggregates of human action.  The authors 
argue that institutional change no longer emerges from organizational variation but, 
rather, derives from institutional processes leading to organizational homogeneity.  These 
institutional processes include increased interaction, the formation of interactional 
structures and patterns, increased information flow among organizations, and the 
development of mutual awareness among organizations (DiMaggio, 1982 in DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). 
Isomorphic processes encourage organizational innovation by conveying 
institutional legitimacy rather than recognizing demonstrated efficiency (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  Therefore, changes in the structure of an organization or in an 
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interorganizational network can be explained through competition for institutional power 
and legitimacy (Dart, 2004).9  The authors identified three isomorphic processes: 
normative processes of isomorphism, as communicated through professional agreement; 
mimetic processes of isomorphism, as organizational responses to environmental 
uncertainty that cause organizations to replicate legitimate forms; and coercive processes 
of isomorphism, which are “forced adoptions” and pressures of conformity to legitimized 
forms of the state and other powerful entities’ (e.g., funders) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Normative pressures come from a profession’s attempt to legitimize or 
institutionalize itself.  Norms for organizational structure are communicated via 
professional networks and groups and through educational activities (such as the 
conferring of professional degrees) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Mimetic processes 
occur in institutional and organizational environments of uncertainty, which cause the 
“modeling” (p. 151) of organizational structures that are perceived to be more legitimate.  
For DiMaggio and Powell, environmental uncertainty emerges as poorly understood 
technologies, ambiguous goals, or as a nebulous “symbolic uncertainty” that 
organizations perceive in the environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Coercive 
pressures from the state and other powerful entities come in the form of laws and formal 
rules that require organizations to take on specific forms.  Each of these isomorphic 
processes encourages organizations to seek homogenous forms within the institutional 
environment.  One could identify a similar set of processes in the development of 
interorganizational and intersectoral structures. 
                                                
9 Dart (2004) explains that it is legitimacy, not efficiency or effectiveness, that drives the movement toward 
contractual agreements in social welfare. 
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Linking Process and Institutional Change 
 Lawrence (whose work on activist bridging organizations was reviewed earlier) et 
al. (2002) contends that studies of institutional development tend to view institutional 
change as related to “field-level dynamics” rather than to the “micro sources of macro 
changes” (p. 281).  The authors used DiMaggio & Powell’s approach to the development 
of institutions by studying how collaborative partners link to one another and to outside 
entities conferring legitimacy.  Lawrence and his colleagues argued that the process-
outcome focus of studies of collaboration neglect the macro changes that develop in 
institutions.  Their qualitative study of a series of collaborative interactions of an NGO in 
Palestine (sic.) highlights how the NGO’s interorganizational relationships with various 
partners in its field created “proto-institutions,” which the authors defined as “practices, 
technologies, and rules that are narrowly diffused and only weakly entrenched, but have 
the potential to become widely institutionalized” (p. 283). 
 Because the authors saw the relationships as informal and emergent, they 
identified the development of proto-institutions (and related norms of interaction) as part 
of an informal, on-going process.  Collaboration innovations in technologies, practices, 
etc. diffused into the field where they developed into proto-institutions.  Once adopted, 
the proto-institutions become “full-fledged institutions” (Lawrence et al., 2002, p. 283).  
The authors concluded that when there was a high degree of involvement (information 
flow, interactions) between partners, it provided a ripe setting for interorganizational 
learning (a form of social capital, Brown & Ashman, 1999).  However, when the NGO 
had collaborative ties to organizations, professional associations, and other institutional 
 
 68
entities, these ties allowed local practices and norms to be communicated throughout the 
field.  The authors found that collaborative interactions that tied partners to these outside 
entities could serve as “catalysts” for institutional development (Lawrence et al., 2002).  
Through the development of proto-institutions, normative, mimetic, and coercive 
processes influenced changes in institutional arrangements. 
Conclusions 
This chapter presented a review of the literature that links the structures of 
relationships among people, organizations, and institutions to approaches of 
understanding institutional change.  Mediating organizations have the potential to bridge 
marginalized stakeholders to organizational and institutional resources, which can assist 
these groups in gaining greater influence in the decisions regarding social and economic 
development initiatives affecting them.  While neither appropriate nor effective in all 
instances, multi-sector collaboration, as characterized by strategic bridging relationships, 
can create strategic linkages that build the social capital of local stakeholders, and thus 
provide them greater legitimacy in the institutional environment. 
Network analytic methods reveal formalized and informal structures and patterns 
of relations within this institutional environment and assist in conceptualizing the 
mechanisms by which powerful entities make choices in how resources are generated and 
shared, how information is created and disseminated, and how legitimacy is conferred 
within the community and institutional context.  The small world model presents a 
structure of relationships that acknowledges the strategic choices people and 
organizations make to increase their strength within their own group and throughout a 
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network of relations by forging ties across to dissimilar groups.  Nevertheless, even when 
such a structure exists, it is but one of a multiplicity of relationships that are part of the 
dynamic and complex context of the institutional environment. 
The challenge is to resist the isomorphic pressures to remain locked to one’s 
discipline or sectoral boundary and to span across a network to build relationships and 
share goals with other groups.  Economic perspectives of institutions imply that the actors 
in current community and institutional structures have used this property of networks to 
their advantage, and thus exert powerful influence over the distribution of wealth and 
resources in society.  Social development strategies necessitate an analysis of what the 
current structure is, and then an identification of what needs to change to make social 
justice and social change a reality. 
The next two chapters discuss the methods and results of the small world analysis 
performed on the AFI network of grantees and financial partners.  Time and resources 
greatly limited the study, which neither includes participant perspectives, nor studies the 
relationships in any way other than the formal acknowledgement of a simple 
“partnership.”  However, the study makes the crucial first step in analyzing the current, 
multi-sector environment under which the asset development model is implemented. 
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Chapter 3:  Methodology 
Overview to Chapter 3 
 This chapter details the methodology followed to perform a small world network 
analysis for the dissertation study.  The methodology includes the following phases: 
1. Sampling; 
2. Data Collection; 
3. Data Coding; 
4. Data Preparation; 
5. Testing the data to ensure they meet criteria for a small world analysis; and 
6. Performing the small world analysis. 
 
 The network data used for the small world analysis (the final phase of the 
methodology) differ substantially from the original network samples, which are discussed 
in Part 1 of this chapter.  The original samples are case-by-affiliation network data, i.e., 
the data identify network relations between grantee organizations and their financial 
partners.  This chapter details how the data are sampled, collected, coded, prepared, and 
tested prior to the small world analysis. 
Part 2 explains additional data collection activities (unanticipated in the 
dissertation proposal), which were performed to ensure data accuracy.  Part 3 refers to 
the data coding process by which financial partner identities were checked against public 
records to recode banking partners in terms of their holding companies. 
Before a small world analysis can be performed, the grantee-by-financial partner 
network data must be transformed into grantee-by-grantee and financial partner-by-
financial partner network data.  Part 4 of this chapter explains this process.  Part 5 of the 
chapter discusses the testing of the network data against Watts’ (1999) criteria (size, 
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density, centrality, and clustering) for a meaningful small world analysis.  Part 6 
discusses the methods by which the small world analysis was performed, the results of 
which are discussed in Chapter 4 of the dissertation. 
Part 1:  Sampling 
 Two network sample groups were used in the study, each comprising a sample 
year of Assets for Independence (AFI) demonstration grantee organizations and their 
financial partners.  The first year of network data covered those organizations and their 
then-current financial partners receiving AFI grants in Federal Year (FY) 1999.  These 
network data were compared to the current group of AFI grantees, which comprised all 
AFI grantees and their current financial partners that had received grants in FY 1999, 
2000, 2001, and/or 2002 and were currently operating a program.10 
 A list of grantees and their financial partners (noted as current to July 18, 2003) 
was provided by the US Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS).  This 
list was used as an initial listing of all currently operating AFI programs.  Three grantees 
that were expected to receive funding in FY 1999 and FY 2000 were no longer operating 
a program and were not included in the USDHHS list (S. Shalit, personal communication, 
September 30, 2003).  The omission of these three programs was confirmed by the two 
reports the federal agency made to Congress on the AFI project (USDHHS, 2000 and 
2003) and were not included in any further data collection or data analysis activities. 
                                                
10 The organizations and financial partners receiving grants in FY2003 were not included in the 2004 
Network sample because USDHHS had not yet processed all the FY2003 grants at the time of data 
collection in early 2004. 
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 When it became clear that the USDHHS list had several inaccuracies, it was 
decided that the grantees would be contacted to confirm their current financial partners.  
Furthermore, because USDHHS had not yet identified all the FY2003 grantees, it was 
also decided that the planned analysis of five years of data (FY1999 through FY2003) 
would be reduced to a comparison of two years of network data, i.e., data for network in 
1999 and data for the current network (as of April 2004). 
A sample of all possible current grantees and financial partners was created from 
the list provided by USDHHS, as well as grantee lists contained in the USDHHS’s 
reports to Congress (2000, 2003).  This sample included 157 grantee organizations and 
270 unduplicated financial partners (39 of these grantees and 155 of these financial 
partners were noted to have received grants in FY 1999). 
Part 2: Data Collection 
Contact information was gathered from USDHHS program webpages, agency 
reports, the USDHHS list, and state telephone directories.  Using this information, calls 
were made to each of the 157 potentially operating grantee organizations.  Grantee 
contacts or other persons identified by the grantees as an appropriate contact for the 
program (e.g., the Executive Director) were asked to confirm their current financial 
partners.  The term “Financial Partner” was defined as those banks11 and/or credit unions 
with which the grantee held its Reserve Account and Participant Accounts.  Reserve 
Accounts hold the USDHHS grant funds, which are used for program, evaluation and 
other administrative expenses, and are used to match participant savings deposits 
                                                
11 For the purposes of this report, the term “banks” refers to all financial partners except credit unions.  The 
term encompasses all types of financial intermediaries, including thrifts, banks, and savings & loans. 
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(USDHHS, 2000).  A Reserve Account also holds funds that the grantee has received 
from local funders, which provide the required matching funds for the federal grant.  
Participant Accounts are the savings accounts held by the participants in the project.  
Grantees that had received funding in FY1999 were asked to retrospectively confirm their 
financial partners for that funding year. 
Of the 157 grantees listed, 150 were successfully contacted.  Financial partners 
were confirmed for 137 current grantees and for 38 (of the 39 possible) grantees from 
FY1999.  The seven grantees that could not be contacted were assumed to not have 
programs.  Of the 150 grantees that were successfully contacted, one refused to confirm 
the information; ten said that they were not or no longer doing a program, or that their 
organization had never received funding, and two were unable to provide the 
information.12  Table 3.1 details these data collection statistics (see Appendix B for more 
information on grantees). 
 
Table 3.1 Data Collection Statistics 
Total Grantees on list 157 
 Grantees that could not be contacted 7 
 Grantees Contacted 150 
Current grantees that confirmed their financial partners 137 
Refused to answer 1 
No longer doing a program or never received funding 10 
Contact person was unavailable to confirm data2 2 
Final samples of Grantees  137 – 2004 Network 
 (38 – 1999 Network) 
                                                
12 After the data were collected and analyzed, one of the grantee contacts, who had been unavailable during 
the data collection phase, called to confirm the data.  This information was not included in the analysis. 
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Part 3:  Data Coding 
 Once a grantee contact confirmed the financial partners for the organization, 
online business databases and search engines were used to check all the identities of the 
identified financial partners, and to determine any changes or inconsistencies in bank 
names or identities due to mergers or inaccurate information.  Hoover’s Online 
(www.hoovers.com) is an Austin, Texas-based company that provides up-to-date industry 
information on all companies listed on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (NASDAQ), as well as current information on thousands of other non-
publicly offered companies operating in the U.S. and around the world.  Their online 
database and other available materials are nationally recognized as providing current and 
comprehensive industry information (Oppel, 1999).  This free online database was the 
primary reference used to check bank identities and to recode the banking partners to 
their holding company names. 
If a bank’s identity or location was not confirmable through Hoover’s Online, 
another online resource, The Community Banker (www.thecommunitybanker.com), was 
used to identify a bank’s website to gather more information.  The Community Banker 
website is operated by R. Kinney Williams & Associates, a financial intermediary 
auditing company based in Lubbock, Texas, which specializes in auditing financial 
institution websites.  The website categorizes individual bank websites by state, thus 
making it easy to identify banks partnering with specific grantee organizations.  In many 
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cases, the website was used to clearly identify independent and locally-owned banks, 
which were not publicly owned, but which had an internet presence. 
Credit Unions Online (www.creditunionsonline.com) and the online nationwide 
directory SuperPages.com (yellowpages.superpages.com) were also used to confirm bank 
identities.  If none of these resources could be used to locate and/or confirm the identity 
of the bank or credit union, the online search engine Google (www.google.com) was used 
to find the financial intermediary’s website or to find current information on the financial 
partner.  Online information from regional Federal Reserve banks was often found 
through Google searches, and this information was used to confirm local business name 
changes, to identify very small banks that did not have an internet presence, or to confirm 
bank mergers that had taken place several years ago. 
For analysis purposes, all bank names were coded to their holding company 
names (if applicable).  Therefore, in some cases, although the name given by a grantee 
contact for its banking partner may have differed from that of another grantee’s banking 
partner, if the banks were held by the same holding company, they were considered the 
same bank (Appendix C provides information on all financial partners in the sample). 
Dates and incidences of banking mergers were noted for each of the sample 
banking partners, and the identities of the banks and credit unions were amended as 
appropriate for the two sample years.  As some mergers took place between the issuing of 
the FY1999 grants and the 2004 sample year, occasionally a banking partner present in 
both network samples had a different name in 2004, although it was the same partner.  
Merger-based name changes that took place in or before 1999 were considered the 
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current name for the 1999 financial partners (these cases are also noted in Appendix C).  
Moreover, mergers taking place after April 2004 were not applied to the sample. 
Grantee contacts often confirmed several additional financial partners than those 
listed by USDHHS.  Therefore, the sample of financial partners grew substantially.  After 
the data collection process was completed and the banking partners coded according to 
their holding companies, the 1999 Network resulted in 154 total partnering entities (38 
Grantees and 116 Financial Partners), and the 2004 Network totaled 448 partnering 
entities (137 Grantees and 311 Financial Partners).  Table 3.2, below, lists the final 
sample sizes for the two networks. 
Table 3.2 Final Samples for the 1999 and 2004 Networks 
Network Sample Grantees Unduplicated Banking 
Partners 
Total Nodes in the 
Networks (n) 
1999 Network 38 116 154 
2004 Network 137 311 448 
 
Part 4:  Data Preparation 
Network analysis uses relational data, which describe the relationships or ties 
between members (or nodes) of a network (Scott, 2000).  Streeter & Gillespie (1992) 
classified the information gleaned from analyses of networks into two categories of 
properties: 1) “relational properties,” which are explained through the types of 
relationships represented in the network; and 2) “structural properties,” which are the 
structures that are revealed in the analysis at the individual, group or global network 
levels.  For example, relational properties of networks may explain the flow of 
information throughout a network by measuring the number of e-mails network members 
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send to and receive from one another.  Analyses of structural properties, on the other 
hand, may use the same network data and identify the person who is the go-between for 
the greatest number of network members (in basic network analytic language this person 
would be the most “central,” [Freeman, 1979]).  Structural properties may also reveal that 
certain members of the network are clustered together, i.e. they send/receive many more 
e-mails to one another than they do to other members of the network. 
In each case, the relational data used by the analysis are operationalized as “e-
mails sent and received,” but relational properties characterize the network in terms of 
what is exchanged and variations in network relationships, while structural properties 
identify roles and the structural mechanisms that underlie these relations (Burt, 2000; 
Streeter & Gillespie, 1992).  This dissertation study performed an analysis of the 
structural properties of the AFI grantee-financial partner network.  The network ties are 
operationalized as an acknowledged and identified partnership.  While the financial 
partners were not contacted to confirm or acknowledge a partnership with a grantee, for 
the purposes of the analysis, the relationships are assumed “symmetrical,” (i.e., the 
relationship identified by the grantee would be equally acknowledged by its partner). 
A Matrix Format for Relational Data 
One way that network analysts organize their data is by constructing a data matrix 
(Streeter & Gillespie, 1992).  The simplest matrix for network data is the “rectangular 
case-by-affiliation” matrix (Scott, 2000, p. 40).  This type of matrix is a “two-mode” 
matrix because the rows (cases) and columns (affiliations) refer to two sets of data.  The 
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data collected on the AFI networks results in case-by-affiliation matrices with grantees 
serving as cases and financial partners as affiliations (see example in Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 Sample Portion of a Grantee-by-Financial Partner Matrix 
Financial Partners  
Charter One 
Bank 
First Niagara Compass 
Bank 
Fleet Bank 
Action for a Better 
Community 1 0 0 0 
Allston Brighton 














CTE Inc. 0 0 0 1 
 
This type of matrix is also known as an “incidence” matrix (Scott, 2000, p. 41) 
because it identifies the incidences when cases are tied to affiliations.  In the above 
example, Action for a Better Community is “tied” to Charter One Bank (represented by a 
“1”) but not to the other financial partners listed in the matrix (represented by zeros).   
Data Language Files 
UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) software limits the number of columns that can be 
entered into a matrix format to 255 columns.  Therefore, the data for the dissertation 
study was entered using Data Language (DL) files, which can handle much larger data 
sets.  DL files for the 1999 and 2004 data sets are found in Appendix D. 
Reducing the Samples to the Largest Components 
Small world analyses assume “full connectivity” within a network, i.e., that all 
members of a network are connected to it by at least one tie (Watts, 1999).  Therefore, the 
analyses are performed on the largest component of a network (on the largest group of 
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connected members).  Both years of network data contained a large component.  Figures 
3.1 and 3.2 present graphs of the two networks using asymmetrical data collected for 
1999 and 2004 (readers may refer to Appendices B and C for identified acronyms). 
 











Note:  The largest components in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are represented with red (grantee) and 
yellow (financial partner) nodes.  The remaining unconnected dyads and components are 
represented by gray (grantee) and blue (financial partner) nodes.  In Figure 3.1, the largest 
component is pictured on the right side of the figure.  In Figure 3.2, the largest component is 























Following the full-connectivity assumption, Kogut and Walker (2001) and Baum 
et al. (2002) focused their small world analyses on the largest components of the 
networks they studied.  A similar focus was used for the present study—all isolated 
dyads and other small components were removed from the two samples, and DL files 
were created for the largest single components in the 1999 and 2004 Networks (see 
Appendix D for copies of the DL files of largest components).  As shown in Figures 3.1 
and 3.2, the network components with red and yellow nodes were identified for analysis.  
Table 3.4, below, details the numbers of isolated nodes removed for the small world 
analysis. 
 
Table 3.4 Network Sizes Before and After Dyads and Smallest Components Removed 
Number of Grantees Number of Unduplicated 
Financial Partners 
Size of Network and 
Size of Component Used 


























Network 38 13 116 62 154 75 
2004 
Network 137 99 311 255 448 354 
 
The 1999 Network started with 154 nodes and was reduced to 75 nodes when 10 
grantee-financial partner dyads and an additional 12 small components were removed 
from the sample.  The 2004 Network, formerly 448 nodes, was reduced by 26 dyads and 
10 small components, netting 354 nodes for the largest component. 
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Creating Adjacency Matrices from Incidence Matrices 
 Small world analyses study direct relations among a set of network nodes in 
contrast to the indirect relationships represented in case-by-affiliation matrices (Kogut & 
Walker, 2001, p. 324).  This means that the data should reflect direct relationships among 
a network of nodes, e.g., ties between neural network nodes in a nematode or Hollywood 
actors (Watts & Strogatz, 1998); firm ownership patterns (Kogut & Walker, 2001); or 
(for the present study) federal grantees sharing the same financial partners. 
Small world analyses of the two largest components in 1999 and 2004 in their 
present case-by-affiliation format would yield no result—every grantee is connected to 
another grantee through at least one financial partner (and vice versa).  Network analysts 
deal with this problem by transforming case-by-affiliation data into “adjacency” data, 
which divide incidence data into two sets.  One set shows the common partnerships 
among grantees (e.g., a case-by-case matrix), and the other set shows the common 
partnerships among the banks and credit unions (e.g., an affiliation-by-affiliation matrix) 
(Scott, 2000).   
 UCINET was used to transform the incidence matrices into two adjacency 
matrices: one matrix showing the common partnerships among grantees (a grantee 
affiliation matrix) and another showing the common partnerships among the banks and 
credit unions (a financial partner affiliation matrix).13 
                                                
13 To generate a grantee affiliation matrix from incidence network data, one need only request the UCINET 
program to perform its “Affiliations” procedure.  However, in order to acquire the financial partner 
affiliation data, one must first “Transpose” the incidence matrix—make rows into columns and columns 
into rows—and then request an affiliation matrix from the transposed matrix. 
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 When incidence data are transformed into adjacency data, the sizes of the 
resulting networks reflect two sides of the incidence network (e.g., the resulting networks 
are composed of the grantee or financial partner nodes only).  This reduces the size of the 
network on which an analysis is performed.  As shown in Table 3.5, the largest 
component for the 1999 network was transformed into two affiliation networks of 13 
grantees and 62 financial partners, respectively.  A similar transformation procedure on 
the 2004 network yielded affiliation networks of 99 grantees and 255 financial partners, 
respectively. 
 
Table 3.5 Sizes of Incidence and Affiliation Networks for 1999 and 2004 




Size of Grantee 
Affiliation Network 
Size of Financial 
Partner Affiliation 
Network 
1999 Network 75 nodes 13 nodes 62 nodes 
2004 Network 354 nodes 99 nodes 255 nodes 
 
Matrix Symmetry and Dichotomization 
Small world analyses assume unidirected, unweighted ties among members of a 
network (Watts & Strogatz, 1998; Watts, 1999; Kogut & Walker, 2001; Baum et al., 
2002).  When an incidence matrix is unidirected (as was the assumption in the present 
study), cell values are symmetrical, i.e., they have the same values for each row/column 
and column/row pair.  However, when incidence matrices are transformed into affiliation 
matrices, cell values represent weighted relations among pairs of cases (e.g., a pair of 
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grantee programs sharing more than one financial partner).  Because the small world 
analysis also assumes unweighted ties, UCINET was used to dichotomize the adjacency 
matrices for the two network years. 
 Once the largest component was identified and its network data transformed and 
dichotomized, the data were ready to perform the preliminary tests to ensure that the 
network met the criteria for a small world analysis.  These tests are discussed in the next 
section of this chapter. 
Part 5: Testing the Data to Ensure they meet Criteria for a Small World Analysis 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, Watts identified four criteria that must be satisfied 
before a small world analysis can be performed on a network (1999, pp. 495-496).  They 
are: 
1. The network must be large enough so that a small world 
network analysis is meaningful; 
2. The network must be sparsely connected; 
3. The network must be decentralized; and 
4. The network must be clustered. 
 
This part of the chapter discusses the testing of the network data to ensure that 
they meet these four criteria for the small world analysis. 
Criterion One:  Network Size 
When Watts and Strogatz (1998) performed their small world analyses on real 
world networks, they chose three differing sizes of networks to study:  a) n = 282 for a 
nematode’s neural network; b) n = 4,941 for an electrical power grid; and c) n = 226,000 
for an actors’ database.  Kogut and Walker’s 2001 small world analysis of a German 
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enterprise network reported affiliation networks of 291 firms and 429 firm owners, and 
Baum et al. (2002) studied affiliation networks ranging in size n from 92 to 152 nodes. 
Although the sizes of the affiliation networks of the 2004 sample (99 nodes in the 
grantee affiliation network and 255 nodes in the financial partner affiliation network) 
were clearly within these parameters, the affiliation networks from the 1999 sample were 
deemed too small for the analysis (13 grantees and 62 financial partners).  Therefore, the 
1999 networks were omitted from the small world analysis.  The small world network 
analysis was performed only on the 2004 Network data.14 
Criterion Two:  Network Sparsity 
 Watts’ (1999) second criterion for small world analysis is that the network must 
be sparsely connected, i.e., that the number of connections between the nodes is far fewer 
than the actual number of nodes.  The number of connections is computed as a statistic k, 
or the average minimum number of ties among members of the network.  Table 3.6 (on 
the next page) compares the network sizes (n) and average minimum ties (k) for this 
study and other small world analyses found in the literature. 
 The statistic k was calculated for both affiliation matrices for the 2004 Network: 
kGrantee = 10.85 (n = 99) and kFinPart = 20.68 (n = 255).  Although the average minimum 
numbers of ties for the two affiliation networks in 2004 were proportionally higher than 
those found in the literature, network connectivity was found to be adequately sparse to 
meet the second small world criterion (k << n; the number of network ties is much 
smaller than the number of network nodes). 
                                                
14 Other network analyses were performed on the 1999 data, the results of which are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Table 3.6 Network Sizes and Average Minimum Ties in This Study and in the Literature 
Study Size of Network (n) Average Minimum 
Number of Ties (k) 
Present Study 
[Affiliated Grantees, 2004] 
99 10.85 
Present Study 
[Affiliated Financial Partners, 2004] 
255 20.68 
Watts & Strogatz (1998) 
[Actor Database] 
226,000 61 
Watts & Strogatz (1998) 
[Nematode Neural Network] 
282 14 
Watts & Strogatz (1998) 
[Power Grid] 
4941 2.94 
Kogut & Walker (2001) 
[Affiliated Firms] 
291 6.59 
Kogut & Walker (2001) 
[Affiliated Owners] 
429 3.23 







Criterion Three:  Network Decentralization 
 The third criterion for a small world analysis is that the network must be 
decentralized, which means that the “shortcuts” in the network are not due to one or a 
few central nodes connecting the network (Watts, 1999).  UCINET provides several 
options for measuring network centralization: the three most common measures were 
used for this study.  Measurements of degree, closeness, and betweenness centralities 
were calculated for both of the affiliation networks of the 2004 Network sample.  The 
results of the betweenness centralities are reported in the main body of this report.  The 
results of the degree and closeness measurements can be found in Appendix E.  Before 
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reporting the centrality results, however, a short discussion of the centralization cut-off 
value is presented. 
Centralization cut-off value. 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on small world analyses.  However, an 
additional methodological issue surrounding centrality requires discussion here—that of 
establishing a cut-off value for centrality.  Although a cut-off value for the third small 
world criterion was not defined in the literature (Watts, 1999, 2003; with Strogatz, 1998; 
as well as Kogut & Walker, 2001 and Baum et al; 2002), a cut-off value of 0.50 was 
chosen for the present study.  That is to say, if any of the network centralization index 
scores were equal to or above 0.50 (50 percent), then the assumption would be that the 
network was too centralized for a small world analysis to be meaningful. 
 Although the centrality of networks has been a common measurement tool for 
network analysis for many years (e.g., Freeman, 1979), the probability distribution of 
centrality measurements has not been standardized.15  However, there is no absolute cut-
off point on which network researchers agree (Bonacich, personal communication, April 
22, 2004).  Moreover, there is disagreement as to which measurement methods are best 
suited for a given network in the context of its purpose and structure (Borgatti, 2002a, b), 
which further obfuscates the distribution of centrality scores for a given method. 
 The 0.50 cut-off established for this study considers the nature of the banking 
sector (that it is becoming more centralized among larger banks) and the fact that some of 
                                                
15 Koehly & Wasserman’s 1996 article on stochastic (random) centrality provides one statistical approach 
to determine the probability of centralization scores.  However, this procedure was not used for the study.  
Future studies may want to investigate this issue further. 
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the larger, state-wide grantees will likely connect to several partners because their portion 
of the sample involves multiple locations of grantees.  Centrality indices reflect “the 
degree to which [a network’s most central point] exceeds the centrality of all other 
points,” (Freeman, 1979, p. 228) compared to its maximum potential centrality within a 
network.  With a .50 cut-off value for centrality, if a given network has an overall 
centralization measurement of .50 (or lower), the centrality of a network’s most central 
node reaches maximum centrality with half or fewer of the remaining network nodes. 
Network centralization indices, as described by Freeman, represent an interplay 
between point centrality and network centrality.  Given that there is no clear agreement as 
to which centrality measurements are optimal for network analysis (as recognized by 
Freeman in 1979), multiple measurement methods are a useful way to understand the 
dynamics of network centralization.  The following sections briefly cover degree and 
closeness measures of centrality, and describe how the centrality measurements of a 
highly centralized, example network are compared to those of the 2004 AFI networks.  
The report focuses on the findings for betweenness measures of centrality.  However, as 
indicated earlier, detailed descriptions of the measurements for degree and closeness 
centrality are located in Appendix E. 
 Degree and closeness measurements of centrality. 
 Degree measurements of centralization measure the size of network node’s 
neighborhood (Freeman, 1979)—in this case, how many grantees are directly connected 
(within one step) to a particular grantee or how many financial partners are directly 
connected to another financial partner (Freeman, 1979).  It is a local measure of 
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centrality, i.e., it determines centrality based on the neighborhoods of alters (nodes to 
which a node is directly connected) of individual nodes. 
Closeness centrality measures how far points are from one another by taking the 
inverse of the sum geodesics of a point (Freeman, 1979).  A closeness centralization 
index measures the amount by which the point that is closest to the greatest number of 
points in the network reaches maximum possible closeness.  Unlike degree centralization, 
which reflects the size of a node’s neighborhood, and thus its connectedness within the 
network, closeness measures the degree to which points can reach other points in a 
network through as few intermediaries as possible (Freeman, 1979). 
Closeness centrality is useful in measuring how quickly a message can be sent 
across a network given a set network size and the ability to choose a path from node to 
node (Borgatti, 2002a, b).  When referring to a small world network, closeness centrality 
could reflect the sparse connections among points which are on opposite sides of a 
network and yet very “close” in terms of geodesic distance. 
An example of a highly centralized network. 
Figure 3.3, on the next page, shows an incidence network made up of 17 nodes.  
The example network centralizes around a three nodes.  When the network is transformed 
into two affiliation networks, the spoked members become dense, interconnected clusters 
(Figure 3.4), and the central hub nodes appear as three connected points (Figure 3.5).  
The centrality around a “hub” in an incidence network (Figure 3.3) creates a clustering 
effect in at least one of the two resulting adjacency networks (Figure 3.4). 
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 Degree and closeness centralization indices for the example networks shown in 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 reflect the high number of nodes in the example incidence network 
(Figure 3.3), which are centered around a few points (see Appendix E).  Measurements of 
betweenness centrality for these networks reveal the high centrality of the example 
network when they are compared to the betweenness indices for the 2004 grantee and 
financial partner networks (see the next section of this chapter). 
 Betweenness measures of centrality. 
 Betweenness centrality measures the proportion of times a point lies on the 
geodesics or geodesics between two points.  Network analysts often relate this structural 
property to the degree of control a point has in acting as an intermediary between points 
(Freeman, 1979), and the more frequently a point lies on geodesics and the larger 
proportion of geodesics it lies on, the more central it is. 
The occurrence of certain central nodes along short paths among parts of the 
network would intuitively relate to the small worldliness of a network.  As the small 
world structure reveals densely clustered network areas connected by “random,” sparse 
ties, it would follow that a certain number of these sparse ties would reveal high 
betweenness scores as they connect cluster to cluster.  Therefore, some level of 
betweenness centrality is expected in a small world network, and the 0.50 cut-off value 
should allow an adequate amount of betweenness centrality to be identified without 
removing a network from the small world analysis.  Table 3.7 contrasts the data on 
betweenness centrality for the 2004 affiliation networks and the example networks of 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5. 
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n = 99 




n = 255 




n = 14 




n = 3 
1.00 0.00 0.33 0.47 100.00% (1.00) 
 
 As indicated in final column of Table 3.7, both of the 2004 affiliation networks 
fall within the 50 percent cut-off value for betweenness centrality.  As one might expect, 
the two example affiliation networks (in Figures 3.4 and 3.5) have betweenness indices 
greater than the 0.50 cut-off.  The most central nodes in the two example graphs lie on 
proportionately greater numbers of geodesics than the central nodes of the 2004 grantee 
and financial partner networks.  The results of the centralization measurements indicate 
that centralization is not an issue for the network, which thus meet the third criterion for a 
small world analysis. 
Criterion Four:  Network Clustering 
 The final criterion for performing a small world analysis is that the network must 
be highly clustered.  The term “network clustering” is often interchanged with that of 
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network cliquishness, although the terms actually refer to two different network 
characteristics (Scott, 2000).  While clusters define similarities (or dissimilarities) 
according to some characteristic (e.g., organizations interconnected by credit unions 
versus those that do not partner with credit unions), “cliques” refer to structural properties 
of subgroups within the network, usually defined by the number of ties among nodes 
within a particular node’s neighborhood (Scott, 2000). 
Because small world analyses are concerned primarily with the structural 
properties of a network, the measurement of cliques was used to measure the level of 
clustering in the network.  The requirement for the network to be “highly clustered” 
means that the network must be structured in a way that a node’s neighbors are linked to 
their neighbors more closely than to other nodes and cliques of nodes within a network.16  
Therefore, the requirement for a high amount of clustering is assumed to mean, here, that 
the network contains multiple cliques.  To test this structural property, both of the 2004 
affiliation networks were analyzed using the UCINET procedure for identifying 1-cliques 
within the network; i.e., all node groups whose members are connected within one link of 
one another.17 
For the present analysis, all 1-cliques containing three or more nodes were 
reported.  For the 2004 Grantee network, a total of thirty-one (31) 1-cliques of size 3 
nodes or greater were found.  Figure 3.6, on the next page, shows the resulting 
                                                
16 This definition of “clustering” also corresponds to the use of the “clustering coefficient” in the small 
world analysis, explained later in this chapter. 
17 As the set value for the number of links increases, the criteria for membership within a particular clique 
are “relaxed” (Scott, 2000).  Therefore, all things being equal, a higher number of cliques will be identified 
in a 1-clique procedure versus one that identifies all 2-cliques within a network. 
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dendrogram of the n-clique procedure for the 2004 Grantee network.  Roughly 90 percent 
of the network fell into one or more of the node groups. 
 












The dendrogram illustrates both network clustering and centrality.  The numbers 
across the top of the dendrogram in represent the “clustering levels,” which indicate the 
number of shared memberships nodes have in a particular clique.  For example, if nodes 
share memberships at level 4.00, as only two nodes do so in these results, then the 
members of that “clique” share at least four ties.  The majority of nodes fall into cliques 
at level 1.00 or lower, which indicates a more decentralized network (Scott, 2000).  The 
average size of the cliques found for the 2004 grantee network was 5.42 grantees.18 
                                                
18 A list of the 1-clique memberships for the two affiliation networks can be found in Appendix F. 
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For the 2004 financial partner network, a 1-clique analysis found 51 one-cliques 
sized 3 nodes or greater.  Figure 3.7 presents the resulting dendrogram.  The mean group 
size was 6.67 banks for each 1-clique in the 2004 Bank network.  Over 95 percent of the 
financial partner nodes (95.3 percent) were included in a sized-3 clique prior to the final 
permutation.  Again, a majority of the nodes fall into 1-cliques at the 1.00 level, 
indicating relative decentralization in the network. 
 






















The larger sized 1-cliques in the networks reveal the presence of grantees with 
several financial partners or banks with several grantee partners.  These are the more 
centralized nodal groups within the incidence network (as shown in the top half of Figure 
3.2).  However, apart from these larger affiliation clusters, the networks emerge as 
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smallish cliques, which are sparsely connected through nodes sharing memberships in 
multiple groups.  A denser network structure would result in many more cliques than the 
31 grantees shown for the 2004 grantee network and the 51 cliques for the 2004 financial 
partner network (Scott, 2000).  Results from further analyses, reported in Chapter 4, 
support these initial findings. 
Comparison to the Caveman graph. 
As was the case for the centrality cut-off value, the literature has not identified a 
clustering level to test against the fourth criterion for a small world analysis.  However, 
the clustering levels of the two 2004 networks can be compared to that of Watts’ (1999) 
“Caveman graph” (see Figure 3.8, below).  The Caveman graph is an example of a highly 
clustered, sparsely connected graph.  The UCINET n-clique procedure finds twelve 1-
clique clusters sized 3 nodes or greater within its 30-node network. 
 









                                                
19 The caveman graph was created using a constructed DL file input to UCINET. 
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The resulting dendrogram for the 1-clique (sized 3) procedure for the Caveman graph is 
shown in Figure 3.9.   
 













The Caveman graph is an example of extreme clustering/sparsity (Watts, 1999), 
which, nevertheless, appears to be less clustered than either of the two affiliation 
networks in 2004.  One can reasonably surmise that the two 2004 networks show 
adequate clustering for the small world analysis.  Moreover, as will be shown in Chapter 
4, findings for the clustering coefficient for the two studied networks are similar or show 
even higher clustering than findings for other small world networks (e.g., Watts & 
Strogatz, 1998; Kogut & Walker, 2001; Baum et al., 2002). 
At the other end of the clustering extreme, Watts (1999) explains, is a randomly-
generated network, where clustering is much less likely to happen.  That is to say, if you 
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were to choose a person at random in the world, Watts explains (2004, p. 47), it would be 
far more likely that you would choose someone far away from you than you would 
someone around the corner.  Networks in the real world will likely fall between the 
highly clustered networks of the “caveman” graph and the sparsity of random networks.  
Where networks are highly clustered (representing order), but have sparse short ties 
among clusters (representing randomness or disorder), they take on small world 
properties.  It is this balance between randomness and order that makes the small world 
situation possible. 
 The tests for the appropriateness of a small world analysis on the sample 
networks revealed that the 2004 Sample network and its resulting affiliation networks 
were of adequate size, sparsity, decentralization, and clustering to perform a meaningful 
small world analysis. 
The final part of this chapter describes the procedure by which a small world 
analysis was performed. 
 
Part 6:  Methods for Performing a Small World Analysis 
To perform a small world analysis, Watts (1999), Kogut & Walker (2001) and 
Baum et al. (2002) calculated the clustering coefficient (C) and average minimum path 
length (L) for their networks.  These values are then compared to a similar calculation for 
a random network of the same size (n) and density (k).  The following sections of the 
chapter discuss these calculations and methods for calculating similar measures for a 
random network. 
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Clustering Coefficient (C) 
The clustering coefficient (Cactual) is a measure of the local network(s) of each 
node, i.e., “the probability that two vertices (u, v) will be connected, given that each is 
also connected to a ‘mutual friend’ (w)” (Watts, 1999, p. 498-499).  As explained in 
Chapter 2, the compelling part of the small world concept is that small changes on the 
local level can bring meaningful change at the institutional level.  Following Watts, 
Kogut & Walker (2002) used the following formula for calculating C for their small 
world analysis: 
 
 k (k-1) 
 Cactual =            averaged over all nodes in the network 
 2 
 
 Large values of C (approaching 1) in a sparse network indicate that “the network 
is comprised of densely interconnected cliques” (Baum et al., 2002, p. 16).  
 Clustering coefficients are easily computed using UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002), 
which has a procedure to identify these values for a given network.  Results of the 
procedure using the datasets of the 2004 Grantee Network and the 2004 Bank Network 
are reported in Chapter 4. 
Average Minimum Path Length (L) 
 The average minimum path length (Lactual) measures the global network, i.e., “the 
average number of ties along the shortest path between any two nodes (i.e., banks) in a 
network” (Baum et al., p. 16).  The shortest path between two nodes in a network is the 
geodesic, which is also computed in UCINET via its “Distance” procedure.  Large values 
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of L indicate that “resources” (Baum et al., 2002, p. 16), such as information, must pass 
on average through many nodes before reaching all members of network.  Because this 
statistic varies with network size, the shorter the average geodesic in reference to network 
size, the more efficient information flow will be. 
Identifying Small World Networks 
 To determine whether a network is a small world, Lactual (LA) and Cactual (CA) 
statistics for a network are compared to L and C values for a random network (LR and CR, 
respectively), given the same number of nodes (n) and ties (k).  Watts & Strogatz (1998) 
calculate CR = k/n and LR = ln(n)/ln(k)20 (p. 440).  If the network is a small world, CA will 
be much larger than CR, and LA and LR will be near in value. 
 Kogut and Walker (2001) summarized a comparison of these four values in what 
Baum et al. (2002) termed a “Small World Critical Statistic” (p. 17), which was a ratio of 
CA/CR over LA/LR.  This study planned to use this critical statistic as part of determining 
whether the networks were small worlds.  However, with additional research into the 
small world concept, the calculation of a “small world statistic” was dropped from the 
analysis.  A discussion of why this choice was made can be found toward the end of 
Chapter 4. 
 Having passed the initial criteria for performing a small world analysis, the two 
affiliation networks from 2004 were evaluated for small world properties.  The results of 
the small world analysis and additional network analyses performed on the data are 
reported in the next chapter. 
                                                
20 “ln” in mathematical notation represents “the natural log of…” 
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Chapter 4: Results and Findings 
Overview to Chapter 4 
 This chapter reports on the results of the small world analysis and relates these 
findings to other research on small world networks.  The results of two Quadratic 
Assignment Procedure correlation analyses for the grantee network are discussed.  
Findings regarding betweenness centrality of individual grantees and financial partners 
are presented.  The chapter ends with a discussion of limitations of the study, including 
two methodological issues that emerged while performing the analysis.   
Results of the Small World Analysis 
A small world analysis of the largest components of the 2004 Financial Partner 
and 2004 Grantee affiliation networks revealed small world characteristics for both 
networks.  Table 4.1 presents the findings for the clustering coefficients and average path 
lengths for the actual networks and their random approximations. 
Table 4.1 Small World Results for 2004 Grantee and Financial Partner Networks 




n of Largest Component 99 255 
k – Average number of ties in Largest Component 10.85 20.68 
CA –Clustering Coefficient for Largest Component 0.84 0.93 
LA – Average Path Length in Largest Component 2.69 2.98 
CR—Clustering Coefficient for Random Network 
with Same number of Nodes and Ties 0.11 0.08 
ln(n) – Natural Log of n (for computation of LR) 4.595 5.537 
ln(k) – Natural log of k (for computation of LR) 2.385 3.033 
LR—Average Path Length for Random Network 
with Same number of nodes and ties 1.93 1.83 
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 Clustering coefficient values range from 0 to 1.00, with larger values indicating a 
higher degree of interconnections among a node and its alters and among the alters 
themselves (Watts & Strogatz, 1998).  The 2004 network of Assets for Independence 
(AFI) grantees, as connected via their financial partners, has a high clustering coefficient 
(CA = 0.84), as does its reciprocal network of financial partners, the 2004 Financial 
Partner network, which has a clustering coefficient equal to 0.93. 
 Watts and Strogatz (1998) argued that the clustering coefficient for a random 
network of the same number of nodes and ties (CR – approximated by the calculation n/k) 
would be much smaller than the actual clustering coefficient for a network if it were 
indeed a small world.  The calculations for the random approximations of the two 
affiliation networks resulted in much lower clustering coefficients: CR = .11 and .08 
respectively.  A randomly generated network with the same numbers of nodes and ties 
would likely be much less clustered than the actual studied networks. 
 For average path length calculations (LA), the average geodesic of the largest 
component was measured as 2.69 for the Grantee network and 2.98 for the Financial 
Partner network.  That is to say, on average, the shortest path between two nodes is just 
under three steps in either network.  Given the low density of the networks (.081 for the 
Financial Partner network and .111 for the Grantee network), the small value for the 
average geodesic supports the networks’ small world trend. 
If the networks are small worlds, random networks of the same number of nodes 
and ties will have similar average geodesics (Watts & Strogatz, 1998).  Approximate 
values of average path length can be calculated using the ln(n)/ln(k) formula (Watts & 
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Strogatz, 1998).  Using this calculation, it was found that the average path length of 
similarly sized, sparse random networks (LR) approximated the actual average geodesic 
values: the random networks average geodesics fell just under two steps per network 
node. 
Comparison of Findings to Prior Research 
 How do the current study’s findings compare to findings of prior research?  Later 
in this chapter’s Limitations section, the utility of the “small world critical value” used by 
Baum et al. (2002, p. 17) is debated as a measure to compare the small world values for 
networks.  However, it is useful to put the values found for the present study in the 
context of prior research.  As Table 4.2 (on the next page) indicates, the findings of the 
present study fall within the range of values for actual and random clustering coefficients 
and average geodesics for similarly sized networks with similar numbers of ties. 
 While it is important to reiterate that the average numbers of ties per node in the 
two studied networks are somewhat larger in proportion to their network sizes, as 
compared with earlier research, the low density of the networks indicate relative sparsity, 
and thus hold to the requirements of the small world analysis. 
 For most small world networks, average path lengths are surprisingly short, which 
runs counter to what one might intuit for a large, sparsely connected graph (Kogut & 
Walker, 2001).  Interestingly, clustering coefficient values for actual networks vary 
considerably, with the present study finding some of the larger values in the table. 
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Table 4.2 Comparisons to Findings for Small World Networks in the Literature 
 
Network n k Path Length Clustering Reference 
   Actual Random Actual Random  
Bank Syndicates '57-'62 76 1.47 4.29 4.78 0.096 0.019 Baum et al., 2002 
2004 Grantee Network 99 10.85 2.69 1.93 0.837 0.1096 Current study 
Bank Syndicates '76-'81 100 2.99 2.83 3.33 0.358 0.03 Baum et al., 2002 
*Ythan Etuary food web 134 8.7 2.43 2.26 0.22 0.06 Montoya & Solé, 2000 
2004 Financial Partner Network 255 20.68 2.98 1.83 0.93 0.0807 Current study 
C. Elegans 282 14 2.65 2.25 0.28 0.05 Watts & Strogatz, 1998 
*E. Coli Substrate 282 7.35 2.9 3.04 0.32 0.026 Wagner & Fell, 2000 
German firms 291 6.59 5.64 3.01 0.84 0.022 Kogut & Walker, 2001 
German owners 429 3.23 6.09 5.16 0.83 0.008 Kogut & Walker, 2001 
Power grid 4,941 2.67 18.7 12.4 0.08 0.005 Watts & Strogatz, 1998 
*Internet, domain level 6,209 4.11 3.76 6.18 0.3 0.001 Pastor-Satorras et al., 2001 
*Words, synonyms 22,311 13.48 4.5 3.84 0.7 0.0006 Yook et al., 2001 
*Math. Co-authorship 70,975 3.9 9.5 8.2 0.59 5.4x10-5 Barabási et al., 2001 
*WWW 153,127 35.21 3.1 3.35 0.108 0.0002 Adamic, 1999 
*Film Actors 225,226 61 3.65 2.99 0.79 0.001 Watts & Strogatz, 1998 
*Words, co-occurrence 460,902 70.13 2.67 3.03 0.437 0.0001 Ferrer i Cancho & Solé, 2001 
*MEDLINE Co-authorship 1,520,251 18.1 4.6 4.91 0.066 1.1x10-5 Newman, 2001 
 




 As discussed in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, the purpose of the study was to 
determine whether the AFI network—as defined by the network of grantees and financial 
partners—was a small world; and if so, what makes it a small world.  This secondary 
question has both easy and difficult answers.  One easy answer is that the grantee and 
financial partner networks are comprised of dense subclusters of nodes that are connected 
by “shortcut” ties, which reduce the average path length a node must travel in order to 
connect to another node across the network (Watts, 1999). 
 Small world networks resemble Granovetter’s (1973) networks of weak ties, and 
Burt’s (1992) networks of structural holes.  The shortcuts, weak ties, and filling of 
structural holes provide for intercluster connections among the more densely populated 
parts of a network.  The concept of transitivity is an integral part of the Granovetter weak 
ties theory.  Transitive triples are made up of three nodes in which each node connects to 
the other thus forming a triad.  Weak ties are those ties that connect multiple transitive 
triples thus serving as “bridges” between clusters.  The clustering coefficient developed 
by Watts and Strogatz (1998) takes the concept of transitivity and applies it to larger 
degree neighborhoods, i.e., measuring “transitivity” for clusters of more than three nodes.  
Their “shortcuts” are versions of weak ties across large networks of dense clusters. 
Quadratic Assignment Procedures on the Network Data 
 If these weak ties are responsible for the structure of network relations, then a 
matrix representing the values of the ties between the network nodes should correlate 
with a matrix representing the overlap of the nodes (Borgatti & Feld, 1994).  Using the 
 106
procedure outlined in Borgatti & Feld’s 1994 article on testing Granovetter’s weak ties 
theory, a Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) was performed to test the correlation 
between the valued 2004 Grantee network (the network matrix prior to its 
dichotomization for the small world analysis) and a matrix measuring the strength of the 
overlap among the nodes of the network.21  
The procedure resulted in a moderate value for the Pearson Correlation coefficient 
(.385, p<0.001), which indicates that in the Grantee network, the stronger the tie between 
two of the grantees, the more likely their local neighborhoods overlap (Borgatti & Feld, 
1994).  Given the high degree of clustering for this network (a clustering coefficient of 
0.837), this finding would seem appropriate.  However, because the relationship is only a 
moderately sized one, there would appear to be other variables affecting the structure of 
grantee affiliations.  
 In terms of grantee growth, USDHHS administers its programs through ten 
regional offices, each overseeing the implementation of programs for between four and 
eight states.  Do the shared banking partnerships have something to do with the region in 
which the grantee is located?  A QAP correlation test of the relationship between the 
network structure of the 2004 grantees (as affiliated by financial partners) and the same 
network of 2004 grantees as affiliated by USDHHS region shows a low, but significant 
correlation (.165, p<.001).  Although regional distribution appears to have a better 
likelihood than chance in influencing the distribution of partnerships, its effect is fairly 
                                                
21 See Appendix G for a detailed explanation of this procedure. 
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low, which indicates that some other variable or variables are influencing the distribution.  
This finding is understandable given the high number of multiregional banking partners. 
Other factors in Network Structure 
 It is very possible that the structures of the financial partner and grantee networks 
are related to the clustering that results from transforming an incidence network into two 
affiliation networks (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of this issue).  A graph of the 
incidence network’s largest component helps to illustrate the high-degree values of 
certain nodes in the network.  In Figure 4.1 (on the next page), circles represent grantees 
and squares represent financial partners.  Red nodes are those grantees and financial 
partners that had the highest betweenness scores for their respective affiliation networks 
(a key to the color scheme is found at the bottom of the figure).  While Figure 4.1 
represents the same incidence network as shown in Chapter 3 (with the largest 
component of the graph in Figure 3.2), this graph emphasizes the clustering among the 
nodes in the 2004 network. 
 One might think that it is the number of partners that determines the centrality of 
a grantee in its affiliation network, but this is not the case.  As Table 4.3 reveals (on page 
107), it is not how many you know, but who you know that counts.  For the grantees with 
the top ten neighborhood sizes (as measured by degree) in the 2004 Grantee network—
with the exception of a few cases—the size of a network neighborhood does not 
necessarily translate into a high degree score in the affiliation network.  Rather, those 
grantees with high degree scores have well-connected partners.
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Key to Figure 4.1 
  Grantee in 1999 and 2004 Networks  Financial Partner in 1999 and 2004 
  Grantee in 2004 Network only  Financial Partner in 2004 network only 
  Grantee with High Betweenness Score  Financial Partner with High Betweenness Score 
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 Even more importantly, it is not necessarily how many grantees with which a 
bank (or credit union) partners that affects its degree-influence on the centrality of a 
grantee.  Rather, it is whether that financial partner then connects to a grantee with many 
partners.  For example, Spokane Neighborhood Assn. (SpokeNeigh) has four financial 
partners, two of which are Wells Fargo and US Bank.  Even though SpokeNeigh is 
connected to the 2004 grantee network by only 2 shared partners, it is sharing Wells 
Fargo with 16 other grantees and US Bank with 15 other grantees.  That those grantees 
may overlap (i.e., also partner with both US Bank and Wells Fargo) means that 
SpokeNeigh becomes well-connected and central, in terms of degree, within the network.  
Table 4.3, on the next page, lists those grantees that link to well-connected partners. 
 
The relationship, now revised, becomes:  It is not who or how many people you 
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Table 4.3  The Well-Connected Partners of the 2004 Grantee Network 
Grantee Size of Network 
Neighborhood in 
Incidence Network 
(# of bank partners) 
Number of partners 
of degree sized 2 or 
more in 2004 Bank 
Network 
Degree  




(as a frequency of 






























Bank of America 
27 4 

























MesaCAN 2 Wells Fargo 
ZION 
19 8 








Bank of America 
Wachovia 
18 9 




Centrality in the Networks 
What do the affiliation networks look like?  Remembering that a small world 
analysis requires a decentralized network, the short average path lengths in the networks 
will relate more strongly to shortcut ties rather than to highly centralized nodes.  Average 
path length is simply an average geodesic for all pairs of nodes, averaged over the entire 
network.  Therefore, measures of betweenness centrality would appear to most closely 
relate to the existence of shortcuts because betweenness centrality identifies the number 
and proportion of times a node lies on the shortest path between two other nodes 
(Freeman, 1979).  Table 4.4, below, lists the normalized betweenness centrality 
measurements for the ten most central nodes in the 2004 Grantee Network. 
 





















EBayALDC 18.84 1 3.00 3 +15.84 
PADCED 17.14 2 0 6 +17.14 
INDOC 16.36 3 0 6 +16.36 
AllBright 12.42 4 0 6 +12.42 
UWGtrLA 9.51 5 N/A N/A N/A 
UWTXGC 9.35 6 N/A N/A N/A 
CTEInc 8.92 7 0 6 +8.92 
WICAPAssn 8.51 8 5.90 1 +2.61 
NCDOL 7.27 9 0.90 5 +6.37 
KYRiverFoot 5.96 10 0 6 +5.96 
*Note:  Ranks for normalized betweenness determined by frequency of scores.  Therefore, rank from one 
year to the next is only normatively comparable. 
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 Rank and normalized betweenness scores for the grantees in the 1999 network are 
provided in Table 4.4 for comparison.  What becomes immediately clear is that the fifth 
and sixth most central nodes—the United Way of Greater Los Angeles (UWGtrLA) and 
the United Way Texas Gulf Coast (UWTXGC)—have achieved high betweenness 
centrality despite being newly added nodes to the network.  The table also reveals the 
major changes in network structure over time.  Five of the ten most centralized grantees 
in the 2004 largest component lay on no geodesics in the 1999 network.  Moreover, the 
Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (PADCED, now 
#2), the Allston Brighton Community Development Agency (AllBright, now #4), and 
CTE, Inc. (CTEInc, now #7) were not even connected to the largest component in 1999.  
Figures 4.2 (below) and 4.3 (on the next page) provide graphic representations of the 
changes in the entire Grantee affiliation network (isolates included) from 1999 to the 
largest component of the grantee network in 2004. 















 Structurally speaking, weak ties (or shortcuts) are those parts of a network that 
connect together highly clustered nodes of a network, but are themselves not part of a 
tight cluster.  In the 1999 Grantee Network (Figure 4.2), CSA&DC plays this type of 
bridging role.  However, the theory of weak ties relies on more than structural aspects of 
a network in order to identify bridging ties.  A structurally weak tie in a network has only 
as much value as the concepts by which tie strength is operationalized and indexed 
(Marsden & Campbell, 1984).  For example, while CSA&DC in Figure 4.2 structurally 
meets the definition of a weak tie, it might not serve as a weak tie in terms of the 
normative application of the theory (Granovetter, 1983), i.e., does it really “bridge” nodes 
in a network other than structurally speaking?  What roles do the weak ties play in linking 
together denser clusters of the network? 
By 2004, CSA&DC is just another node in a cluster (see Figure 4.3).  Green 
nodes represent grantees that received grants in 1999, with the most centrally-between 
grantees labeled. 














 Similar changes can be found for the affiliation network of financial partners.  
Figure 4.4 (below) presents the graphs of the 1999 affiliation network of financial 
partners and the largest component of the network of 2004 financial partners. 
Figure 4.4 (A) Graph of the 1999 Financial Partner Affiliation Network; (B) Graph of the 


























 A list of the most central banks as measured by normalized betweenness scores 
shows the persistence of a few banks as central nodes (see Table 4.5, below).  
Interestingly, however, many of the nodes that were central in the 1999 network became 
more central in 2004 by virtue of mergers (such as can be seen with the merger of Firstar 
(FIRST) with US Bank (USB)). 
 
Table 4.5 Ten Most Central Nodes in the Largest Component of the 2004 Financial Partner 
























USB 30.843 1 4.272 6 +26.571 
FIRST (USB in 2004) -- -- 8.429 3 -- 
FBF 16.446 2 0 10 +16.446 
SUB (FBF in 2004) -- -- 0 10 -- 
WB 15.381 3 6.262 4 +9.119 
FU (WB in 2004) -- -- 0 10 -- 
WFC† 15.019 4 0 10 +15.019 
PNB (WFC in 2004) -- -- 5.034 5 -- 
NCC 13.418 5 0 10 +13.418 
FITB 12.819 6 10.206 2 +2.613 
C 11.555 7 0 10 +11.555 
CALFED (C in 2004) -- -- 0 10 -- 
WM 10.76 8 0 10 +10.76 
SKYF 10.034 9 N/A N/A N/A 
BAC 9.837 10 13.166 1 -3.329 
*Note:  Ranks for normalized betweenness determined by ordinal ranking of frequency of scores. 
† A 1999 subsidiary of ZION became WFC by 2004, but many other ZION banks remained with the 1999 
bancorporation.  Therefore, although it is not included in this chart for simplicity, this merger may account 
for some of the change in centrality for WFC. 
 
 Of the ten most central banks according to betweenness scores, SKY Financial 
(SKYF) was the only bank that did not have a presence in the 1999 network.  On the 
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other hand, Fleet Bank (FBF), as well as its future subsidiary, Summit Bank (SUB); 
Wells Fargo (WFC); National City Bank (NCC); Citibank (C) and its future subsidiary, 
California Federal Bank (CALFED); and Washington Mutual (WM) all increased their 
share in betweenness centrality from 1999 to 2004.  Bank of America (BAC) became less 
central, in terms of betweenness, and Wells Fargo seems to have enjoyed an increase in 
its centrality partly due to its acquisition of Pacific Northwest (PNB).22 
So It’s a Small World 
 While the implications of the study for future research on asset development 
strategies, multi-sector development, and for the field of social work will be discussed in 
Chapter 5, it is useful here to put the current study’s findings in the context of current 
research on small world networks.  Following from the connections sought in the popular 
Kevin Bacon Game, Watts and Strogatz (1998) used the actor database to measure 
average path length and the clustering coefficient for the resultant network.  With an 
average path length of 3.65 and a clustering coefficient of .79, the authors found that each 
actor in the network could be connected to every other actor in the network by an average 
of four steps—“six degrees of separation” worked for every actor in the network (on 
average), not just for Kevin Bacon (Watts, 2003).  Their findings also revealed “any 
actor’s costars were very likely (80 percent of the time) to have starred with each other” 
(Watts, 2003, p.95). 
 Putting the current study’s results in the same framework, every financial partner 
in the largest component of the 2004 network can link to every other financial partner in 
the component by an average of three steps (LA = 2.9).  Every grantee in that same 
                                                
22 One wonders what the effect of the recent Fleet Bank-Bank of America merger or others might have on 
the network structure given the changes in centrality for other mergers that took place between 1999-2004. 
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component is linked to every other one by an average of three steps, as well (LA = 2.7).  
In about 84 percent of the time, if two grantees share the same partners, their partners will 
also share the same partners.  Over 90 percent of the time (93 percent), any credit 
union/banks’ partners will have partnered with each other.  Although these findings do 
not have the same cache as those for Watts and Strogatz’s actor network, they do lead to 
some very interesting questions for further research (discussed in Chapter 5). 
 Shortcut development. 
 For example, one area that requires additional study is what additional ties do to a 
network over time.  Kogut and Walker (2001) found in their study of ownership ties in 
the network of German enterprises that the network retained its small world properties 
even under various simulated restructuring conditions.  With a greater range in 
longitudinal data for the AFI demonstration project, such changes in the small world 
structure could be studied.  Even the limited comparison of the 1999 network and the 
2004 network shows remarkably similar clustering and average path length values despite 
large increases in the size of the affiliation networks (see Table 4.6, below).   
Table 4.6 Changes Over Time in Density, Clustering Coefficient and Size of Network 1999-2004 

















Network 38 13 .692 2.64 .269 
2004 Grantee 
Network 137 99 .837 2.69 .111 
1999 Bank 
Network 116 62 .943 2.71 .207 
2004 Bank 
Network 311 255 .930 2.98 .081 
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The percentage of clustering rose for the grantee affiliation network (and 
decreased for the financial partner network by a negligible amount).  The overall 
densities of the networks decreased by half as much between 1999 and 2004 with average 
path lengths remaining between two to three steps on average between network nodes.  
Even with larger densities in their early structure, the affiliation networks were exhibiting 
small world properties. 
Clearly, shortcut ties, which contribute only miniscule amounts to the density of a 
large network (Newman, 2003), are assisting in keeping the network highly clustered, 
despite the near tripling of financial partners and quadrupling of grantees.  How do these 
ties develop?  In their study of the privacy of internet networks, Ramakrishnan, Mirza, 
Grama, and Karypis (2001) explain that weak ties can emerge in three different contexts.  
In one setting, a weak tie can represent an individual who has no real “allegiance” to any 
particular group and who rarely extends ties to the network, but who happens to bridge 
two or more clusters.  A second type of tie is a person who is tied most closely to a 
particular cluster and then branches out to a different cluster.  A third type of tie, one in 
which Ramakrishnan et al. indicate is the classic type of weak tie, is the person who is 
not tied to any particular cluster, and who extends ties to many different clusters 
throughout the network, but never strongly ties to any cluster (Ramakrishnan et al., 
2001). 
 As was discussed earlier, weak ties have meaning: they are not simply structural 
aspects of a network.  For Ramakrishnan et al., a tie is a common rating of a music 
sharing network.  The authors found that certain weak ties could isolate individuals and 
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make them more prone to hacker attacks: “One wonders if weak ties will happen at all, if 
concerns are raised about their compromise” (Ramakrishnan, et al., 2001, p. 11). 
 The identification of conceptually weak ties (as opposed to simple structural ones) 
in the AFI network would need to take into account the changes in both the Grantee 
Network (i.e., its growth over time from 38 grantees in 1999 to 157 grantees in 2004)23 
and the changes in the Financial Partner Network.  Changes could be attributed to the 
creation and dissolving of bank partnerships by grantees (for numerous reasons) or to the 
mergers and acquisitions of banks during the 1999-2004 time period.  It is an 
understatement to say that the US financial sector is becoming more centralized.  After 
data collection was completed for this study, announcements were made of the Bank of 
America-Fleet Bank merger, the JP Morgan Chase-Bank One merger, and a proposed 
merger between SunTrust and National City Bank (to name a few). 
 Whether partnering banks in one part of the country speak to their colleagues in 
another part of the country is debatable.  In one case, a large bank has partnerships with 
several grantees in one state but branch personnel in another state have been cool to the 
idea of partnerships (S. Shalit, personal communication, September 30, 2003).  In another 
case, according to a grantee contact, a merging bank’s willingness to continue the 
partnership with the grantee was uncertain even though this merging bank partnered with 
several other grantees in the demonstration project.  Local decisions appear to influence 
banks’ choices to participate in the AFI demonstration.  Although the current study did 
not collect this type of data, it is an interesting area for further research.  Perhaps what is 
                                                
23 Grantee numbers as provided by USDHHS. 
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considered a “weak” tie on the local level becomes a stronger tie in the national 
framework.  This issue deserves further study. 
 Classes of small world networks. 
Amaral et al. (2000) found that small world networks fall into three classes.  In 
one case, connectivity (i.e., distribution in the number of ties per node) decays as a power 
law as the number of ties per node increases.  This type of small world network is 
considered “scale-free” because new ties are most likely to connect to the most highly 
connected nodes (Amaral et al., 2000).  The authors found that two other classes of small 
world networks seem more limited in where ties are added.  In “broad-scale” networks, 
the distribution of ties observes the power-law but has a sharp drop off at larger numbers 
of ties per node (p. 11150).  “Single-scale” networks have a “fast decaying tail” (p. 
11151), which means that at a certain limit of number of ties per node, the distribution 
drops off dramatically. 
The authors argue that the scale free nature—or “preferential attachment” (p. 
11151)—of tie additions can be influenced by the number of nodes no longer seeking 
additional ties: “every actor will stop acting” (p. 11151).  Cost is also a factor in the 
addition of new ties, which the authors illustrate in their example of an airport hub that 
can no longer accept new airlines.  The power-law relationship is evident in the small 
world of the big world, as well.  People are limited in the number of friends they can have 
simply by the time that they allot to developing their friendships (Watts, 2003).  
Therefore, at some point, tie-increase in a small world network will reach a critical 
maximum—and it is at this threshold that the power-law relationships breaks down. 
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As interorganizational collaboration is tied to cost reductions (at least as far as 
costs pertaining to mitigation of uncertainty in transactions, e.g., Oberschall & Leifer, 
1986), the thresholds at which point the benefits of adding partners dissolve must be 
given some attention.  Moreover, cost increases due to additional partnerships must also 
be accounted for in future research.  For example, of the 38 grantees in 1999, over half 
retained the same partnerships (in number and in partner) that they had in the first year of 
the project.  Yet by 2004, some grantees had become “connected” to the network, or had 
become more central, by virtue of the addition of grantees with the same partners or the 
addition of banks to existing grantees.  Others grantees remained isolated components. 
These changes to the network may affect the costs associated with the formation 
of new ties even if a grantee has not, itself, made changes to its local partnership 
structure.  This is an important part of the small world concept—small changes on local 
levels can have far reaching changes in the global network.  Given that the AFI network 
has many more ties than are reflected in this study’s data of grantee-financial 
partnerships, subclusters and the network as a whole may be far denser or centralized 
than the current data reveal.  
Limitations of the Study 
The limitations of the study fall into two groups.  The first group of limitations 
derives from the sampling and data collection processes, which could affect the accuracy 
of the data and the generalizability of the results.  The second group of limitations 
emerges from the development of the methodology used to analyze small world 
networks.   
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Limitations due to Sampling and Data Collection 
 Sampling adequacy is a cornerstone in research in order to generalize about the 
topic under study.  In network analysis, it is important to identify the boundaries of the 
network to be studied:  Will the full network be studied or a sample of it?  In the present 
study, a full network was available:  all grantees participating in the AFI demonstration 
project were contacted (or a contact was attempted) to identify their current (and if 
applicable, past) financial partners.  Nevertheless, it is debatable whether the full network 
was actually sampled. 
The AFI network was chosen for the research project because it exhibited multi-
sector properties.  However, only two sectors are represented in the sample.  As will be 
discussed in later in this Limitations section, the network of grantees and their financial 
partners provides little data to make generalizations of the AFI network beyond the 
structure created by grantee-financial partner relationships.  From a sampling standpoint, 
the available data provided an interesting picture of the network, albeit a limited one.  
Given more time and resources, the sampling of network partners should be increased so 
that additional sectoral partners (e.g., faith-based entities, higher education institutions, 
and public sector agencies) are included in the depiction of the network structure. 
Data Accuracy 
 Several issues arose during the course of sampling and data collection, which may 
have affected the accuracy of the network data.  Researcher errors could have been made 
during the data collection phase, and in fact, one important lesson found in working with 
network data is the need to be aggressive in checking their consistency and accuracy.  
The dynamic change that characterizes the current climate of the financial sector can 
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make accurate identification of banks and other financial intermediaries difficult.  The 
strict boundary on changes of bank identities due to mergers was made for this reason, 
with a cutoff set at March 30, 2004.  It is very likely that the network became denser 
since March 2004 with the addition of new partners, the addition of new grantees 
(through FY 2003 grants), and the mergers and acquisitions in the financial sector (as 
noted earlier in this chapter).  Moreover, while the researcher is confident that the bank 
identifications are accurate, it is possible that a bank that was identified as a small 
independent bank was indeed a subsidiary of a larger bank of the network.  This 
limitation must be taken into account when reviewing the findings. 
 Furthermore, grantee contacts may have misunderstood the question regarding 
financial partners, or the question of whether they were indeed operating an IDA 
program, or the researcher did not properly clarify the request for data.  In a few 
instances, grantee contacts did not identify their AFI program by that term, and it took 
several minutes before the contact understood the purpose of the call.  A few contacts of 
grantees that were identified by USDHHS as having received grants indicated that their 
organization did not have an IDA, AFI or savings program for low-income persons.  It is 
possible that these organizations did indeed have such a program but that the contact was 
misinformed.  In all cases, the researcher attempted to speak to a contact who was either 
the Executive Director or a person in charge of programs for the organization.  In most 
cases, the person in charge of the IDA program was the contact.  Nevertheless, errors 
may have been made during this part of the data collection process. 
 The sample of financial partners must also be qualified by the accuracy with 
which partners were identified by contacts.  In one case, a grantee refused to confirm the 
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information from USDHHS but allowed the researcher to use the information that was 
listed by USDHHS (“just use what is publicly available”).  In this specific instance, the 
data provided by USDHHS was used for the analysis, but it may not accurate reflect the 
array of financial partners for the grantee.  In a separate case, a contact refused to answer 
any questions that did not come from grantor agencies.   
Some grantees serve as pass-throughs or financial administrators for the grant, 
subsequently subgranting the funds to local organizations.  In some of these cases, the 
contact knew only a few of the local banks being used, and thus there may be additional 
partners used by these local programs, which are not represented in the network.  Related 
to this issue is that these subgranted programs are not represented in the network, and 
only the main grantees are shown as connected with the financial partners.  Therefore, it 
is possible that with a higher degree of sampling (sampling beyond the original dyadic 
relationship), a different network would have been identified. 
 Staff changes were found to be frequent among the grantees’ contacts, and it is 
possible that some grantee contacts who were asked to recollect the partners they had in 
1999 (if applicable) were not able to accurately recollect the identities of these banks. 
 Finally, a small portion of the original sample of grantees could not be contacted 
despite repeated attempts.  In one case, a program was operating out of a church, and the 
contact did not have a phone but could only be contacted by fax.  It was decided by the 
author to preclude this grantee from the analysis.  In another case, repeated attempts and 
messages did not return data for analysis.  Further attempts to contact the programs or 
find information through other local organizations or through the internet yielded no 
meaningful results. 
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In most cases, these programs were assumed defunct, but they may have had an 
active program.  In one case, the person who was the main contact for a program was not 
able to be contacted due to illness and responded long after the data analysis had 
commenced.  These data were not included in the analysis, but are available for future 
research.  In all cases, researcher error at any number steps in the process of sampling, 
data collection, and data analysis could account for inaccuracy of the findings, although 
steps were taken (often repeatedly) to check the accuracy of the data during the course of 
data collection and analysis. 
Methodological Limitations 
Since the publishing of Watts and Strogatz’s landmark article in 1998, the interest 
in small world analysis has increased tremendously in the field of network analysis.  The 
sociological community readily accepted its potential application to the dynamics of 
interorganizational networks.  As small world analyses have increased in the literature, a 
corresponding increase has been found in the breadth of its application to real world 
networks.  Methodologically, the small world concept developed out of random network 
theory (e.g., Erds & Rényi, 1959 in Newman, 2003) and work on large, sparsely 
connected networks by Milgram and colleagues in the 1970s. 
In any discipline that combines the theories of many scholarly areas—in this case 
theoretical mathematics, physics, and sociology (especially the study of networks)—the 
successful application of that discipline to its inherent parts can often be challenging.  
Without a doubt, the rigorousness of research is an implicit requirement for a new 
discipline or theoretical line of study, as well as the careful evaluation of prior research, 
in order to best promote what is rigorous and critique what needs work. 
 126
The difficulty in applying mathematical theory to the field of sociology (or social 
work!) is that sociological concepts are based on real world experiences and relations 
while much of contemporary mathematics is based in the abstract.  The challenge is to 
find a common ground between the two disciplines so that benefits may be shared.  For 
the field of social work, that challenge is even more demanding given its focus on 
practice.  Studies of abstract relationships seem to have little relevance to the goal of 
helping people. 
However, the concept of small world networks is compelling, and intuitively 
appeals to a relationship-oriented social worker who wants to help people and 
organizations collaborate more successfully.  Moreover, applying small world concepts to 
real world examples is a desired direction for study (Watts, 1999, 2003), particularly 
because the structure of small world networks has the potential to explain a number of 
real world relationships 
Probably the most difficult part of the present study was the need to understand 
advanced statistical mathematics in order to grasp the concepts underpinning the study of 
small world networks.  At times it appeared that once converging disciplines were again 
diverging into the often mutually exclusive territories of theoretical mathematics and 
sociology.  A few questions (best answered by experts in the field of mathematics) arose 
while performing the small world analyses, and these are discussed below. 
Issues with the small world statistic. 
Kogut and Walker (2001) developed a ratio of the two actual-random calculations 
in order to compare small world findings (“How Small is Germany’s Small World…” p. 
325).  Baum et al. (2002) called this the “Small World Statistic,” (p. 17) by which a 
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critical value for networks of a particular size and average number of ties could be 
compared to other networks.  The small world statistic is calculated as follows (Baum et 
al., 2002; Kogut & Walker, 2001): 
 
 CA (Clustering Coefficient for Actual Network over 
 CR the Clustering Coefficient for Random Network) 
SWSTATISTIC = 
 LA (Average Path Length of Actual Network over 
 LR the Average Path Length for Random Network) 
 
 Taking off from Kogut and Walker’s work, Baum et al. (2002) determined that an 
a priori critical value for Kogut and Walker’s ratio could be estimated and then compared 
to the found small world statistic.  A small world would thus be revealed by values for 
the SWSTATISTIC that are larger than SWCRITICAL.  Baum et al. argued that small world 
“critical values” are positively related to the size of a network, i.e., that the value of the 
SWSTATISTIC (and thus its critical value) will increase with an increase in a network’s n, 
and that such critical values could be estimated based on the values found in prior 
research.   
Although this positive relationship between the SWCRITICAL and n seems 
intuitively possible, a few substantial issues that make such comparisons ill-advised.  One 
issue is that the small world statistic has as its denominator the ratio of actual mean path 
length to random mean path length.  In a small world network, these values should be 
close in value (Watts & Strogatz, 1998; see also Watts, 1999, 2003), the “closest” values 
approaching 1.00.  Therefore, the value of the overall small world statistic is most 
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dependent on the value of the clustering coefficient ratio, which does not have a linear 
relationship with network size (Newman, 2003).   
The clustering coefficient measures the degree to which nodes that are connected 
to a particular node are also connected to one another, averaged over the entire network 
(Kogut & Walker, 2001; Watts, 1999).  Small world networks are expected to have high 
clustering coefficients, as opposed to the clustering coefficients of a random network of 
equal size and number of ties, which should exhibit much less clustering behavior (Watts, 
1999).  Watts’ random network exhibits the properties of the random network developed 
by Erds & Rényi in the 1940s (1946 in Watts, 1999).  The numerator of the small world 
statistic is determined by calculating CACTUAL over CRANDOM, with a small world network 
exhibiting potentially very high values for this calculation.   
While an increase in the size of the network can translate into an increase in the 
clustering coefficient ratio, the relationship observes a power-law rather than a linear one 
(Amaral et al., 2001; Watts, 1999; Watts & Strogatz, 1998).  Therefore, a very large n, 
and a small k (as is a requirement for the small world analysis, see Chapter 3) can make 
CRANDOM (calculated as k/n)—and thus the denominator of the clustering coefficient 
ratio—very, very small.  Figure 4.6, on the next page, was created using the data depicted 
in Table 4.2, on page 105 (in this chapter), as well as resulting clustering coefficient and 
average path length ratios to map the relationship between n and the small world statistic.  
The graph in Figure 4.5 reveals a power law relationship between these two values with 















*Note: The seventeen studies used to make this graph are listed in Table 4.2 of this chapter. 
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A power law trend line for the graph (in black) has an R2 value of .83, indicating a 
good fit for the power relationship with the data.  The inset to the right depicts the nine 
studies with smaller sized networks.  The outlier point to the top left of the main graph is 
the study by Pastor-Satorras, Vázquez, and Vespignani (2000) (in Albert & Barabási, 
2002) of the network of the internet at the domain level.  It should also be noted that the 
values for n jump substantially once past the lower n levels depicted in the inset graph.  
The final point in the inset has an n = 429 (Kogut & Walker, 2001), while the next 
highest point depicted in the main graph has an n = 4,941 (Watts & Strogatz, 1998).  
Also, two points in the inset have n-values = 282, and the close proximity of small world 
statistic values show this as the same point. 
Even if a power relationship can be identified between n and SWSTATISTIC, path 
lengths increase logarithmically (i.e., very slowly).  Increases in network size are a 
function of random graph dynamics (Newman, 2003), and it is not likely that one would 
find a large network that did not have a small path length (Bollobás, 1985 in Newman, 
2003).  Watts and Strogatz (1998) contributed the clustering coefficient to the small 
world effect to develop the concept of a small world network—it was not only short path 
lengths that made it a small world, but is was also that these shortcuts connected denser 
parts of a network. 
Given that the clustering coefficient has a value between 0 and 1, and the ratio of 
the denominator of SWSTATISTIC will approach 1, variance in the statistic is most dependent 
on the value of CRANDOM (or k/n).  Since CRANDOM is based on the Erds & Rényi random 
graph, it will likely follow a power law relationship, which although is somewhat 
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predictable, is not an adequate measure of small world criticality and cannot be easily 
determined from an a priori argument.  
Another issue regarding the small world statistic is that the calculations for the 
random network are only approximations of actual random network values (Watts, 1999; 
Watts, personal communication, 2004), which can differ substantially from values for a 
“created” random network of equal nodes and ties.  Watts and Strogatz (1998) created 
this type of random network to compare to the values found for the actual network.  
Therefore, when the path length ratio is computed using the network’s size (n) and 
number of ties (k) [as LACTUAL = ln(n)/ln(k)], the computed statistic will not necessarily 
match the value found by the authors with their created random network.  The 
interchanging of the approximation formula for LRANDOM [ln(n)/ln(k)] with the use of 
values for “real” random networks makes specious any meaningful conclusions about 
size and the value of the SWSTATISTIC.  Suffice it to say that the field of small world 
network analysis has a great deal of potential that requires additional study.  For these 
reasons, a SWCRITICAL value was not used in the present study, although it had been 
planned in the proposal. 
Issues regarding centralization. 
 The criteria for the small world analysis discussed by Watts (1999, 2003) include 
an a priori requirement of network decentralization.  However, the literature is vague as 
to what is considered a centralized network, and whether there is a cut-off point for 
centralization that would preclude a network from a small world analysis.  One 
suggestion has been to control for centralization via large hubs using the methods 
detailed by Newman et al. (2001) (M. Schilling, personal communication, April 21, 
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2004).  These are the “scale free” networks discussed earlier in this chapter in reference 
to Amaral et al.’s work (2001).  There is still some debate in the field as to whether such 
centralized networks can still be considered small world networks. 
Schilling (personal communication, April 21, 2004) asks whether we should 
distinguish cluster-tying short paths that derive from a few centralized hubs from short 
paths that are caused by random or long-spanning links.  If the definition of a “random” 
link conforms to Watts’ view of agency-derived randomness, then it is possible that 
despite a hub-structured network, short paths originating from hub centers could be 
“random,” and thus leading to a small world network structure.  Future research will have 
to determine the methods by which partner decisions are made—i.e., if they are created 
via some sort of structure (e.g., a bank is “known” for pursuing such ties or this is the 
only bank available), or if the decisions of the person or organization seeking such 
partnerships causes these linkages to occur (and thus, via agency, and thereby random 
choice). 
Such influences of structure and agency on network design and characteristics 
may help to elucidate and quantify theories of isomorphism put forward by DiMaggio & 
Powell (1983)—how such decisions are made, when they are made, and the effects such 
decisions have on the development of a network of relations.  Institutional development 
typically relies on market forces and the intermediary properties of financial partners to 
determine how a network is connected and the strength of the ties among partners.  Could 
it be that these decisions are determined less by market forces than by the individual 
decisions of participating organizations and partners?   
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There are clearly many areas for potential research using small world network 
concepts.  However, until the issue of centralization in small world networks is resolved 
or more fully developed, a cut-off value will remain an elusive criterion in small world 
analysis.  The next chapter discusses the major implications for the present study and 






Chapter 5: Summary and Implications 
Following a summary of the study’s results, this chapter examines the 
implications of the dissertation study.  First, the chapter discusses the implications for the 
field of asset development and how network analysis may assist in understanding the 
participation of financial intermediaries.  The chapter ends with implications for social 
work. 
Summary of the Results of the Dissertation Study 
 The analyses of the network of AFI grantees and their financial partners revealed 
that their two corresponding affiliation networks comprised small worlds in 2004.  
Although a small world analysis was not performed on the 1999 network data, average 
path lengths and clustering coefficients were computed for the 1999 network to compare 
with the findings for the 2004 network.  Table 5.1 summarizes these findings. 
 
Table 5.1 Major Findings of the Small World Analysis 
 
 
• Both the affiliation network of grantees and the affiliation network of 
financial partners were found to be small world networks in 2004. 
• Average path lengths did not vary much between 1999 and 2004.  
The bank affiliation network’s largest component went from an 
average path length of 2.7 steps to just under 3 steps between 
affiliated banks.  The average path length for the grantee affiliation 
network’s largest component held constant at an average 2.6 steps. 
• Clustering coefficients remained near in value between 1999 and 
2004, although for the grantee affiliation network’s largest component, 
the coefficient rose over time (.69 to .84).  However, the clustering 
coefficient of the largest component of the bank affiliation network 





 Both affiliation networks (the network of grantees and the network of financial 
partners) experienced substantial growth between 1999 and 2004.  The size of the largest 
components in the affiliation networks also increased over time.  However, the density of 
the networks decreased (see Table 5.2, below).  









Two tests of correlation were performed on the 2004 grantee affiliation network data.  
Neither Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) tests showed strong correlations, 
although both were found to be significant (see Table 5.3, below). 
 







• The number of financial partners in the network grew from 116 in 
1999 to 311 different banks and credit unions in 2004. 
• The number of AFI grantees grew from 38 to 137 from 1999 to 2004. 
• The size of the largest components also grew substantially over the 
five-year period:  Nine banks connected to one another in 1999, and 
255 were connected in 2004.  Thirteen grantees connected to one 
another in the largest component in 1999, while 99 grantees 
connected in 2004. 
• By 2004, the densities of the two affiliation networks had halved, 
which indicates that the networks became more sparsely connected 
over time. 
 
There was a moderate (Pearson Correlation = .385, p<0.001), 
significant relationship between the number of ties among 
grantees and the overlap of those ties, indicating that the 
presence of weak ties had some influence on the structure of the 
network 
A Grantee’s USDHHS regional designation did not correlate 
strongly (although significantly) with the pattern of affiliations 






 A number of centrality analyses were performed on the data.  Betweenness 
centrality measures of individual nodes in the affiliation networks revealed some 
interesting patterns between 1999 and 2004.  Table 5.4 summarizes these results. 
 









 While few generalizations can be made about the findings, there is some evidence 
that the financial partner affiliation network changed in part due to mergers taking place 
in the 1999-2004 period.  This may not seem to be new or significant news, but it does 
highlight the degree to which changes in one sector (in this case the financial sector) can 
affect the structure of relations in another sector.  The implications of the study are 
discussed in the following sections. 
Implications for the IDA Movement and Asset Development 
This study’s findings have implications for identifying the longitudinal 
development of local IDA program partnerships and the network of the larger IDA 
movement; for understanding the institutions by which programs make financial partner 
• Of the ten grantees that had the highest scores for betweenness 
centrality, eight of them had been in the network since 1999.  
• Of the ten financial partners that had the highest scores for betweenness 
centrality in 2004, all but one had been in the network since 1999. 
• Five of the ten most central financial partners had merged with at least 
one other bank in the network.  In each case, the bank and its merging 
partner(s) had been present in the network since 1999. 
• In both the financial partner and grantee affiliation networks, one 
member stayed within the top three most central positions—each rising 
from third most central in 1999 to the most central by 2004 (US Bank, 






decisions and the processes that influence financial partners to participate in IDA 
programs; and for developing methods that can build capacity into future IDA projects.  
The following sections of the dissertation relate the implications of the study’s findings to 
a recent study of financial intermediary participation in IDA programs conducted by 
Stegman and Kim (2004) at the Center for Community Capitalism at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, as well as to ongoing research on small world networks. 
The findings of the present study focused on the development of a small world 
structure in a large multi-sector, interorganizational network.  Over time, the AFI 
demonstration project network nearly tripled in size.  However, as new programs and 
partners were added, the network became more sparsely connected—new partners and 
programs connected to few others.  The AFI network grew locally as new local AFI 
programs were funded and partners were added to existing local projects, as one might 
expect in a long-term demonstration project that emphasized the creation of new sites and 
the expansion of old sites with each year of successive funding.  Yet this was not always 
geographic local growth—many of the added partners were multinational banks that 
served multiple regions of the country.  With the bank mergers, more AFI grantees shared 
financial partners, and many of these larger banks formed the shortcut connections 
between clusters.  In many ways, the participation of larger banks, which served multiple 
US regions, was the driving force in the development of the network’s small world 
structure. 
This finding supports recent research that argues that isomorphic tendencies in the 





(Stegman & Kim, 2004).  The authors found that banks participating in multiple IDA 
programs were more likely to standardize their savings products and procedures across 
participation sites and that newer program partners were more likely to mimic the norms 
and standards developed by older financial partners.  Other normative pressures from the 
industry’s professional associations (e.g., the American Bankers Association) also 
provided standardizing guidance to financial intermediaries. 
Interestingly, Stegman and Kim also found that banks were more likely to pursue 
activities related to compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in serving 
low- and moderate-income populations before a merger or acquisition was to take place.  
However, the authors noted that few of these activities were related to IDA programs and 
that banks favored more traditional forms of CRA compliance activities, such as the 
offering of low rate mortgages and other “tested” products.  Nevertheless, the 
isomorphism described by DiMaggio and Powell (1983 in Stegman & Kim, 2004) plays a 
key role in bringing new financial partners to the IDA movement. 
Longitudinal Development of the Network 
How the local partnering decisions have affected the development of the AFI 
network should be an important next step in understanding the network’s longitudinal 
development.  Although the longitudinal analyses of networks is possible and has a long 
history (e.g., Katz & Powell, 1953 in Faust & Skvoretz, 2000), challenges emerge when 
the network under study has changed so dramatically in size and structure that 
comparisons of individual nodes provide little meaningful data.  Large network data sets 





analytic methods can represent the dynamical nature of networks over time (Suitor, 
Wellman, & Morgan, 1997; Willer & Willer, 2000; Zeggelink, 1994).  While the local 
developments in the AFI network can be seen to affect the larger network’s structure, the 
network’s size makes it difficult to isolate individual effects.  Nevertheless, such research 
could help us to understand how the AFI programs’ choices in financial partners have 
created and contributed to the isomorphic tendencies found by Stegman and Kim (2004). 
One method that has recently been proposed to capture local and global changes 
to a network comes from gene sequencing techniques, which have been applied to social 
science relationships; e.g., Abbott’s study of employment careers (1995) and Giuffre’s 
study of artists’ careers (1990, both in Stark & Vedres, 2003).  We have seen that small 
world analysis captures the dynamics of structure-actor interactions.  However, Stark and 
Vedres’ longitudinal study of the multi-sector interactions of foreign investment and 
Hungarian enterprises demonstrates that specific patterns in tie development can be 
analyzed over an entire network by comparing “typical pathways” (p. 13) instead of the 
average path lengths used in small world analysis. 
The authors argue that the meaning of ties must be understood both in a “temporal 
context,” as well as within the structural context of a network (p. 12).  For Stark and 
Vedres, local action must be understood in terms of changes happening in local network 
structure (at the neighborhood level of a node).  They explain that, in the network of 
Hungarian enterprises, it is not as important to know the tie paths beyond two steps 






To study typical pathways, the authors categorized local tie development by size 
of a node’s neighborhood and the neighborhoods of all ties to which the node was 
directly tied (its “alters”), and the “cohesiveness” of those neighborhoods as measured by 
the number of path lengths of two or fewer steps.  They then used the seven resulting 
categories of neighborhoods to map the development of local connections of enterprises, 
and to create “typical pathways” for network development (e.g., an enterprise starts as a 
single node, adds three partners, moves into a centralized hub scheme, and eventually 
develops into a well-connected cluster).  These typical pathways could then be analyzed 
statistically to develop models of tie development. 
Typical pathway analysis may be one way to capture the dynamic nature of local 
IDA networks and allow us to better understand the longitudinal development of their 
multi-sector partnerships.  Does securing a large, multinational bank as a partner ensure 
greater legitimacy for the program, and thus ensure that additional partners will want to 
participate?  Or do IDA programs develop gradually through partnerships with financial 
intermediaries, which eventually provide incentives for larger bank participation?  How 
do these individual partnership choices affect the development of standards that govern 
the participation of financial intermediaries in IDA programs?  Such research could 
identify common partnership arrangements and how such arrangements affect the 
institutional arrangements that standardize and create institutional isomorphic pressures 







Institutional Implications for Asset Development Policy 
This study focused on 157 IDA programs that receive federal funding through the 
Assets for Independence demonstration project.  For many of these programs, federal 
funds are their primary sources of financial support.  Similarly, Stegman and Kim (2004) 
found that a majority of the 302 IDA programs they studied were reliant on public funds.  
They found that 77 percent of the programs working with banks were likely to have 
public funds as their primary source of matching funds for IDA accounts (p. 26).  The 
authors argued that public funding plays a substantial role in the IDA movement’s 
legitimacy.  Moreover, they asserted that the more public policy options there were to 
fund IDA programs, the more likely there would be incentives for financial intermediary 
participation.  New incentives, such as the tax credits offered by the much-discussed but 
never-passing Savings for Working Families Act, would help to build the legitimacy of 
IDA programs as a legitimate option for banks and other financial intermediaries seeking 
to boost their CRA rating (Stegman & Kim, 2004). 
One could argue that, in general, public policies not only create wealth 
inequalities, by virtue of the advantage conferred to the wealthy over the poor in 
regressive asset-building policies, but they also support the institutionalized relationships 
that confer advantage to already powerful sectors: “[T]he Golden Rule of Capital (sic.) is 
that those who have the capital make the rules” (Sherraden, 2003, p. 106).  Certainly 
asset-building policies that expand savings opportunities for the poor—such as the Assets 
for Independence Act—are more progressive than traditional institutional structures; 





dominant institutional arrangements that disempower and impoverish people in the first 
place.  The consolidation of power (through network centralization) by larger financial 
intermediaries found in the present study seems to indicate that the structure of the AFI 
network mimics the power structure in the larger institutional environment.  In the short-
term of the five years studied by this research, the network appears to have moved toward 
dominant institutional structures. 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize the incremental approach of the asset-
building model.  Asset development is a long-term strategy, building wealth over 
generations, as Sherraden found in his review of asset-building policies in Singapore, the 
US, and the United Kingdom (2003).  Asset-building uses an incremental, pluralist 
approach to integrate economic classes rather than to revolutionize them.  As argued 
numerous times in this dissertation, the institutional environment exerts powerful 
influences on how changes can occur.  Therefore, an incremental approach makes subtle 
changes within policies and institutional arrangements that can eventually make 
significant changes in wealth-building opportunities for the poor.  However, a structural 
assessment of the institutional arrangements of asset-building policies reveals strong (and 
thus power-conferring and resource-maintaining) roles for the financial and public 
sectors.  Local stakeholders seem to be left out of the loop. 
To answer Sherraden’s (2003) question about the methods scholars should use to 
assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of asset-building policy choices, perhaps one 
way is to determine the degree to which policies support the development of local 





rural IDA program along the Texas-Mexico border, Nyman (2004) found that a key 
strength of the program was the involvement of grassroots groups in its development and 
implementation.  With grassroots participation, the assets built by individuals and 
families participating in the program contributed to the development of community 
assets, especially in the use of a community credit union as a financial partner.   
Future research on asset-building programs must ask how asset-building 
institutional arrangements create advantage and wealth within communities.  Which 
entities supply (and thus control) the resources?  Which entities hold the savings 
accounts?  Where are these funds invested?  Which entities benefit most from public 
sector incentives?  Asset-building policies should reduce dependence and build 
community interdependence.  Clearly, partnerships with outside resource-generating 
entities are critical to community development and to changing institutions (e.g., Ashman 
et al., 1998; Brown & Ashman, 1999; Lawrence et al., 2001).  However, those 
partnerships can be developed strategically so that the bridging advantages are conferred 
to local communities rather than to already powerful sectors. 
More research is needed to understand the development of power structures in 
local and national IDA networks.  The present study focused on the network relationships 
of those programs connected to the largest component of the AFI network.  However, 
many grantees and their partners within the 2004 sample were not connected to the 
largest component.  Nearly a quarter of all the AFI grantees and nearly a fifth of all 





studies should endeavor to identify how the development of these isolated programs 
differs from their more connected counterparts. 
 Studies of small world networks have been limited to a network’s largest 
components because of the requirement for full connectivity of the network.  However, 
real world networks are rarely fully connected.  Recent research by Latora and Marchiori 
(2001) has identified methods that could be used to include isolated dyads and 
components in small world analysis. 
Real world networks often encompass many different systems, which may offer 
alternatives to those relationship choices in the network.  The authors’ study of the ties of 
the Boston transportation system led them to see that while the underground system, 
alone, was not a small world network, the addition of the city’s bus transportation system 
did lead to small world properties.  Latora and Marchiori developed measures of local 
and global efficiency, which allowed ties to be weighted by additional small world 
conferring ties (e.g., an underground station is connected to a bus terminal).  This 
weighting allowed them to capture the clustering and path lengths of real world networks 
that might be denser than the small world ideal or even might be made up of unconnected 
components (Latora & Marchiori, 2001). 
The largest component of the AFI network studied in the present dissertation was 
found to be a small world network.  However, future studies using the Latora and 
Marchiori method may be able to identify how the larger network structure differs when 
isolated IDA projects are added into the analysis.  Additionally, their measures of 





legitimacy and power are consolidated or conferred within the network.  For the authors, 
efficiency within the network referred to the speed with which a message could be sent to 
each member of that network.  By including unconnected nodes in their study of the 
transportation network, they found that network efficiency could be increased.   
The institutional isomorphism found by Stegman and Kim (2004) in their study of 
banks and credit unions’ participation in IDA programs highlights the importance of 
institutional supports and communication on the development of local programs.  
Nevertheless, institutional isomorphism may not explain how small, isolated programs 
develop outside a larger institutional structure.  The literature on strategic bridging has 
shown through case studies that partner differences have meaning (e.g., Brown & 
Ashman, 1999; Lawrence & Hardy, 1999). 
An approach to measuring the flow of information in the AFI network similar to 
the efficiency measures of Latora and Marchiori may be able to identify how such 
information and legitimacy affect the financial partner choices of the isolated grantees.  
One might find different isomorphic processes among these isolated programs that, while 
contributing to the overall development of the IDA movement, follow different paths of 
local network development that are governed by a different set of norms, mimetic 
processes, and coercive pressures.  With such an understanding of the differing roles of 
institutional pressures in the development of local asset-building projects, policies can be 
crafted to address specific needs, e.g., the needs of small programs serving rural 
populations; issues for large, multi-regional and urban programs; and resources for 





Building Capacity in Asset Development Programs 
Given that the influences of the financial sector on asset development strategies 
are evident here in the most limited of samples, what are the broader implications on the 
larger array of multi-sector initiatives?  On the one hand, as seen in the previous sections, 
network analysis can be used to identify the structural differences within the network 
among programs that collaborate with a dominant core, and ones that collaborate with 
independent or local entities.  These may be related to structural changes in the network 
on the local level or related to institutional processes that influence local partnering 
decisions.  However, local processes related to practical aspects of collaboration are 
equally important.  As discussed in Chapter 2 of the dissertation, networks can be studied 
in terms of the structures of a network, the institutional norms and ideals that govern its 
relationships, and by the collaborative processes that create the network. 
Stegman and Kim (2004) found that many financial intermediaries identified the 
capacity of local partnering nonprofits as a major determinant of the scale of IDA 
projects, and thus of the level of participation of a bank or credit union.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2 of this study, much of strategic bridging literature focuses on the development 
of local capacities to create sustainable, scalable institutional change.  For the strategic 
bridging organization, this is a critical part of the collaborative process (Brown, 1993; 
Nyman, 2004).  Institutional pressures and network development will have little effect on 
a local project if a nonprofit organization is unable to meet the needs of its partners. 
 The banking partners interviewed by Stegman and Kim (2004) indicated that their 





more closely aligned with those of the financial intermediary.  Poor enrollment, in 
general, was a major issue for banks:  They identified the poor marketing strategies of 
their partners and inadequate capacities of the programs to increase and retain new 
participants as the largest factors for inhibiting IDA program expansion (pp. 38-39). 
 Norms and procedures for enrollment relate to the prior section’s discussion of 
institutional isomorphism within the IDA network.  It is interesting that the authors 
reported that banks wished these procedures to align more closely with the banks’ own 
procedures.  Clearly, as found in the strategic bridging literature, norms will develop as 
part of a negotiated process among partners representing different sectors.  For the 
bridging entity (in this case, the nonprofit organization), an important challenge is to 
define a common language and identify communication patterns among partners (Brown, 
1993)—in this case, how partners define and approach enrollment of participants. 
However, while the marketing of the program to potential participants can also be 
analyzed in relation to the gradual institutionalization of the IDA savings strategy for 
low- and moderate-income populations (see Beverly & Sherraden, 1999), it may also 
reflect important aspects of network development.  Network analysis methods are 
emerging as an important tool for understanding how community resources are linked 
and identifying which groups, organizations or resources remain unconnected (Davies, 
2003; Church et al., 2002).  Closer ties to these local groups may assist programs in 
accessing new participants. 
In a small world model, a network analysis of the linkages among a community’s 





built between a particular organization and a stakeholder group will form a shortcut, 
thereby making the network stronger or more efficient.  Stronger ties to grassroots groups 
on the local level may strengthen the IDA movement, in general, in its pursuit to scale up 
its services and influence. 
Burt (2000) would argue that the social capital derived through shortcuts confers 
advantages to the person (or organization) creating the tie.  However, these ties are not 
without their costs.  “Bridge relationships” that confer social capital advantages have also 
been found to decay much more quickly than other types of relationships because they 
span across diverse groups, which makes them more difficult and costly to maintain 
(Burt, 2002).  Similar findings were found by Ashman et al. (1998) and Lawrence and 
Hardy (1999) in their studies of bridging organizations seeking legitimacy from diverse 
constituencies and stakeholders.  Benefits gained in local legitimacy, as well as increased 
control and access to diverse resources, are difficult to sustain.  Moreover, as similar 
shortcuts are created in a small world network, the benefits of the original shortcut can 
diminish (Wilhite, 2001).  New institutional economics would argue that if those costs 
were too great, they would cancel out the incentives to create or maintain the ties (North, 
1991).  For the nonprofit organization, bridging the needs of local stakeholders and their 
financial partners may be challenging, especially if those financial partners represent 
powerful, dominant structures (as found by Lawrence & Hardy, 1999). 
Future research on interorganizational relationships in the IDA movement should 
include multiple participating sectors in its analysis.  The present study analyzed the 





partners.  The inclusion of grassroots groups and other local stakeholders, as well as 
public entity partners and other participating organizations, would yield a better 
understanding of the true capacity and potential capacity of the programs to scale up 
services.  
The small world model is also useful in determining potential areas where local 
and global networks are fragile or vulnerable.  For example, recent analyses of terrorist 
networks have identified methods for “destabilizing” networks by identifying critical 
individuals (central actors or bridges) and mapping patterns of communications and 
resource-sharing (Carley, Lee, & Krackhardt, 2002).  Similar analyses of the larger IDA 
network could identify the partnerships that need to be strengthened by forging additional 
relationships or by diversifying the existing relations (e.g., creating multiple relationships 
between the same organizations or people).  Future studies of the IDA movement’s 
network of local collaborations, and the intercluster linkages formed among the different 
partners of those local collaborations can identify strategic relationships that can boost 
the capacities of local programs and strengthen the IDA movement’s goals for scalable 
and sustainable programs. 
Clearly, the collection of meaningful network data will have a beneficial effect on 
the study of the AFI partner network.  The present study provided, as planned, a jumping 
off point for further study.  However, the findings here must be limited by the fact that 
the network, as structurally identified by grantee-financial partner relationships, reveals 
little in terms of meaningful data regarding how and why these ties developed, or what 





methods such as typical pathway analysis and efficiency measures that capture the small 
world properties of “real” networks can be used to elaborate the findings for this study, 
and thereby increase our understanding of the local influences on global structure. 
 The final section of this dissertation discusses the implications of the study for  
the field of social work. 
Implications for Social Work 
Perhaps the greatest implication of the present study on the field of social work is 
the connection it makes between local action and institutional change.  Small world 
analysis provides one mechanism for studying this relationship.  Social workers who 
endeavor to make social change a primary goal of their work can use the methods 
described in this dissertation to identify potential partners and assess the strength of the 
partnerships of the organizations within which they work.  Strategic bridging models, 
developed through qualitative research, indicate that an organization’s collaborative 
motivations and its position in the institutional environment will influence the types of 
legitimacy and resources it needs to facilitate programs.  Organizations must balance the 
need for institutional legitimacy and resources with the legitimacy and connections it 
must retain with its local stakeholders.  Could the small world model assist social 
workers in finding this balance?  If institutional change is one goal for collaboration, 
strategically forging partnerships—creating shortcuts—across diverse groups to 






 This dissertation report began with a discussion of the context in which 
contemporary social work takes place.  Relationships with social welfare institutions are 
increasingly privatized and contractual with emphases placed on bottom line efficiencies, 
demonstrated effectiveness, and multi-sector partnerships (e.g., Schmid, 2004).  
Simultaneously, there has been a rising trend in the involvement of local stakeholders in 
the planning, implementation, and evaluation of social welfare interventions (Ahmadi, 
2003; Lucas, 2001).  The involvement of local stakeholders, as well as the growing 
number of institutional partners, has created a complex, uncertain and dynamic 
environment within which social workers perform their work.  Moreover, our feelings of 
self-efficacy can be eroded when social change seems nearly impossible in light of the 
myriad institutional factors that influence the success or failure of social welfare 
interventions.   
If our social welfare strategies are to be synthesized into a larger institutional 
framework—instead of remaining as isolated and temporary interventions—social work 
relationships with new partners and sectors, such as the financial sector, will need to be 
explored with much more rigor and attention to the multi-institutional context.  
Institutional analysis themes from New Institutional economics and sociology reveal an 
interaction between local decisions and partnerships and the larger, overarching 
movement toward institutional development and change.  We can work to affect 
institutional change—however, institutional norms also affect our work.  With a growing 
number of alternative disciplines joining social workers in asset development and social 





the larger institutional mechanisms governing the behavior of our new collaborative 
partners. 
Rather than simply looking at the resource exchanges or legitimacy concerns on 
an interorganizational level—partnerships within sectors, for example—the small world 
perspective considers multiple interorganizational relationships.  Multi-sector 
partnerships forged by one organization can affect other organizations, even if those 
organizations are not directly tied to the first.  The small world model lets us think not 
simply in terms of multi-organizational or multi-sector relations but also in terms of 
multi-collaboration networks—while still focusing on those individual strategic ties. 
The findings of this dissertation highlight the need for social workers to think 
beyond the typical social welfare framework.  As multi-sector initiatives, such as those 
used in asset development approaches, become more frequent means to provide social 
services, social workers will play critical roles in ensuring that unrepresented groups and 
individuals are brought into the collaborative process. 
Social workers have long understood the value of identifying untapped resources 
(Kretzman & McKnight, 1993) and community strengths (Chapin, 1995).  In new models 
of social welfare, such as those developing in the field of social enterprise, the 
mobilization of existing community assets is also an essential component of successful 
projects (Alvord et al., 2002).  Research on social movements indicates that endogenous 
networks of relationships in communities can yield important resources for social change 
efforts, including local leadership, communication networks, and community gathering 





formally bridged from existing informal networks, can help to retain local resources 
within community (Nyman, 2004).  Kretzman & McKnight (1993) argued that often it is 
not that a community lacks resources but that these resources are not yet connected to the 
effort.  By focusing on the multi-institutional resources available to social welfare 
initiatives, social workers can broaden their practice influence and strengthen their social 
change efforts. 
Bridging Shortcuts to the Unrepresented 
Social workers play an important role in the interprofessional discussion of the 
changing nature of social welfare.  Because of our commitment to local stakeholders and 
the community settings in which we work, we can amplify the voices of those who are 
most affected by the current inequalities and socially unjust institutional arrangements of 
the dominant culture.  As network analysis becomes a more frequent method for 
understanding how large communities operate, this facilitation role will become 
increasingly important, and will be especially critical if programs such as asset-building 
initiatives are to be successful in restructuring dominant institutional arrangements. 
Even when data are available, local stakeholders may not be adequately 
represented because they are not formally organized.  One international example is that 
local stakeholder groups have only recently become formalized and legitimated partners 
in international development due in part to the failure of “structural adjustment 
programmes” (Lucas, 2001, p. 185) in alleviating poverty.  Implemented by large 
institutional entities such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the 





and control structures; institutional reforms in trade, labor markets, manufacturing and 
financial markets; and the privatization of former state-run services (SAPRIN, 2002)24.  
Recent research that focuses on understanding the effects of the programs on local 
stakeholders reveals such institutional strategies may actually increase poverty: 
More to the point, the economic policies that comprise the core of 
structural adjustment policies have failed to engender the healthy 
economies promised by their architects…Poverty and inequality are now 
far more intense and pervasive than they were 20 years ago, wealth is 
more highly concentrated, and opportunities are far fewer for the many 
who have been left behind by adjustment” (SAPRIN, 2002, p. 185). 
 
Social development strategies, in contrast, include local stakeholders and 
populations who are traditionally “left behind” by such initiatives (Ahmadi, 2003).  
Rather than focusing on organizational activities to determine outcomes, network 
analyses of social development strategies can identify the emerging relationships among 
the different partners in a project, including those of traditionally invisible stakeholders 
(e.g., Davies’ informal study of a multi-country network in Africa, 2003).  The 
amplification of local stakeholder voices is just as important an issue for domestic 
initiatives.  For example, Nyman’s (2004) study of a local IDA project underscores the 
importance of stakeholder participation in creating comprehensive and sustainable 
community development in rural U.S. communities. 
As social network analysis becomes a more frequent method for evaluating 
collaborative structures, social workers must not only be educated in network analytic 
                                                
24 SAPRIN stands for “Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network,” a global-level 






techniques, but we must also have a thorough enough understanding of those methods 
and the theories behind them to allow us to critique the findings of community studies 
using these methods and theories.  In much the same way that our own perceptions of 
community networks must broaden (i.e., understanding how the institutional 
arrangements of other sectors impact social welfare institutions), we can serve as critics 
of other perceptions of communities.  We must be able to ask: Which voices are missing?  
Which groups are not represented?  Which data are missing?  Which networks are 
invisible?  These questions not only capture the strengths of a community, which network 
analyses may miss, but they also critique how networks are operationalized, how they are 
evaluated, and how network ties are valued. 
Social workers can also help to disseminate their knowledge of networks to local 
communities.  Armed with this knowledge, local grassroots groups can take ownership of 
critical community data and thereby have a voice in policies and community-based 
strategies, as Batliwala (2002) found in her case studies of transnational grassroots 
movements: 
Data are used not only to increase visibility, but as a basis of both contestation 
and partnership with state and multilateral actors.  [T]he data are owned and controlled 
by the movement, and used strategically by its leaders—not by remote researchers or 
outside institutions.  This contests the assumption that grassroots actors are incapable of 
engaging sophisticated, complex policy debates without experts interceding for them in 
this capacity. (pp. 405-406) 
 
There are many opportunities for social workers to enter the dialogue on social 
networks and their analysis, as practitioners, researchers and students.  We can become 





communities.  Finally, we can incorporate the knowledge learned from the analysis of 
networks into our understanding of the institutional context of social welfare. 
Understanding the Institutional Context 
In whatever manner change develops or manifests, the current institutional 
structures that govern relations and exchanges, the emergence of norms, and the 
development of innovations and policies must be understood before changes are 
implemented.  The results of this dissertation study support the need for a multi-
institutional perspective of social change.  Large networks are informed not only by the 
institutional norms of social welfare, but they are also influenced by the institutional 
norms of other sectors.  What are the structures of those other sectors?  What are the 
institutional norms that affect institutional arrangements within and among those sectors? 
If social workers are to be change agents, then we must situate ourselves where 
change needs to take place.  Our dedication to the poor and to disenfranchised groups 
should be supplemented by an institutional perspective that reveals how social justice 
issues can be seen as part of a greater network of interrelationships.  Individuals and 
organizations operate in systems, as do institutions.  However, it is our ultimate concern 
with the well-being of individuals, whether as single persons or as groups, that makes us 
accountable to the stakeholders of our efforts.  Without this institutional perspective, our 
practice methods are incomplete.  With that perspective, we can assess our true impact as 
a profession. 
For those who want to make significant social change, the knowledge of current 





Social change cuts across disciplines.  No longer the solely the realm of social work, the 
design, delivery and evaluation of human services are discussed in schools of business as 
social entrepreneurs enter sectors that are traditionally staffed by social workers.  Asset 
development programs focus on economic models for changing communities (in part 
influenced by Sherraden’s 1991 work).  Economists argue that political institutions need 
to support contracts and private property rights in order for market systems to function 
properly (e.g., Harber et al., 2003).  A growing understanding of interconnectedness is 
changing our approaches to social welfare.  Therefore, our profession’s influence in the 
development of domestic social policy (including asset-building policy) and programs 
must also reflect an understanding of this multi-institutional context. 
In a small world, knowledge of social welfare is no longer enough to make 
significant and lasting change.  I suggest that one of the reasons why we feel 
disempowered to make social change happen is because we limit our professional roles to 
a few sectors, and thus we do not know where we sit in the global network of the small 
world.  However, in whatever manner social work is performed, in whichever setting it 
takes place, social workers abide by a code of ethics and a set of values that necessitate 
an ideology of social justice.  Whether this happens on the micro, interpersonal level, or 
on the macro level of social movements, we are moved to empower our stakeholders and 
ourselves toward social change.   
Social workers have the opportunity to become the strategic bridgers in social 
development and in social welfare.  By broadening our tools of intervention, and by 





strategies and theories of other disciplines to energize and empower communities for 
institutional change.  Along this line, strategic bridging presents a hopeful model for 
changing disempowering systems.  This and other models of collaboration should be 
investigated and tested in our practice settings; studied and developed through social 
work research; and disseminated and taught in social work programs.  By broadening the 
social work paradigm, and forging strategic shortcuts with other disciplines, we stop 
being passive recipients of institutional change and become institutional change agents. 
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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 
 
Actor [of a network] – An individual or organization serving as part of a network of relations. 
 
Adjacency data [of networks] – Relational data that represent the common partnerships or affiliations 
among a set of cases or common cases among a set of affiliations. 
 
Affiliations – Relationships or events by which network cases are related. An affiliation matrix (or 
affiliation-by-affiliation matrix) refers to a matrix of the specific adjacency data that represents the 
common cases among a set of cases.  An affiliation network refers to the resulting graph of the 
adjacency data from an affiliation matrix. 
 
AFI grantee – An organization or entity that has served as the grant recipient for an Assets for 
Independence (AFI) Demonstration Project grant from the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services to administer or implement an Individual Development Account program. 
 
Agency derived ties – Network ties which are created by network actors, but which are not 
determined by the existing structure of a network (for opp., see structure derived ties) (Watts, 2003, p. 
72). 
 
Altruistic bridges – Strategic bridging organizations which have been designed or mandated for the 
bridging role, which is problem-focused, and which seeks to transform the relations among the 
organizations of different sectors (Westley & Vredenburg, 1991). 
 
Alters [of network nodes] – The nodes to which a specific node is directly tied. 
 
Asset accumulation – In the context of asset development strategies, refers to the building of financial 
wealth through saving mechanisms and/or the purchase of high-return assets (also asset-building 
strategies). 
 
Asset development – Economic development strategies that help individuals to build or retain assets 
(as in asset accumulation) or the building of community assets and resources (such as small business 
development). 
 
Average minimum path length [of networks] – A statistic used in small world analysis (L), which 
measures the value of the shortest path between two nodes, averaged across the entire network. 
 
Border federation – A type of bridging organization that shares the values of organizations that are 
peripheral (i.e., border organizations) to a dominant institutional paradigm (from Lawrence & Hardy, 
1999, p. 59). 
 
Border entities – Organizations that operate peripheral to, contrary to, or in opposition of dominant 
institutional structures, entities, or paradigms (in the context of Border federations, see above). 
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Bridging organization – An organization, business, or other entity that serves as a non-neutral 
mediator of interorganizational, collaborative relations among entities and organizations that operate in 
different institutional sectors. 
 
Butterfly effect – Referring to a metaphor describing how small changes can have large effects, which 
was developed by Lorenz (1963) who described how a butterfly’s movements could affect weather 
patterns on the other side of the world. 
 
Capacity-building – The development of infrastructure, knowledge, services, techniques, and/or the 
funding of organizations, programs or groups so that they have the capacity to perform a service or 
function or to expand. 
 
Case-by-affiliation [network data] – Referring to network relational data wherein the data represents 
the relationships among a set of cases to the events or affiliations to which they are related or when 
they happen.  Also known as a two-mode or bipartite matrix. 
 
Case-by-case matrix – A matrix of network data that represents the common partnerships of a set of 
cases (similar to an affiliation-by-affiliation matrix, see affiliations). 
 
Center-extension – A type of bridging organization that shares the values of an organization centrally 
located within a dominant paradigm, and which thus attempts to communicate these values to the more 
peripheral organizations with which it collaborates (Lawrence & Hardy, 1999, p. 58) 
 
Centrality – Referring to the number of nodes to which another node is connected (point centrality), 
which can be measured by its degree centrality (see below).  Network or global centrality refers to the 
distances of a node to other nodes in a network, wherein globally central points are those that tie to 
many other points through short distances (Scott, 2000, pp. 85-86). 
 
Centralization – Centralization can be measured in multiple ways.  One measures the number of 
points to which a node is connected, with those points that are directly connected to more points being 
more central (degree centrality).  Alternatively, those points that are tied to other points by short 
distances reflect closeness centralization.  Nodes that most frequently lie on the shortest distances 
between other points reflect betweenness centralization. 
 
Change agents – Referring to the roles wherein social workers become facilitators or catalysts in 
communities to assist in social and economic change efforts. 
 
Civil Society Research Organizations (CSROs) – Grant-making organizations that fund and support 
grassroots groups and Non-Governmental Organizations in the developing world (Ashman et al., 1998) 
 
Clustering [in networks] – Referring to groups of points in a network that have more ties or stronger 
ties to one another than they do to other network points. 
 
Clustering coefficient (of networks) – A statistic used in small world analysis (C), which measures the 
probability that two points will be connected given that they are each connected to another, third point. 
 
 161
Clustering level (in dendrograms) – The measurement of the minimum number of ties a node will 
share with the other members of its clique (see network clustering and network cliques). 
 
Collaboration conveners – Organizations who initiate collaborative partnerships and groups (Wood 
& Gray, 1991). 
 
Community development bank – A type of Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI), 
to which the U.S. government has approved its CDFI status as a financial intermediary with the 
primary goal to facilitate the economic development of a low-income community or communities.  
Community development banks often provide targeted lending and financial capital for investment in 
small businesses and other economic development strategies. 
 
Community social capital – Social relationships that are built and which emerge among individuals, 
organizations, and institutions within a geographic community that strengthen the community and 
make it better able to address social, economic and political goals. 
 
Complete graph – A graph of a network of relations in which all points in the graph are connected to 
every other graph in the network. 
 
Component [of a network] – A group of points in a network that are connected to the group through at 
least one direct tie (see isolated) 
 
Connectivity – The distribution of the average number of ties per node in a network as a fraction of all 
nodes in a network or its largest component (Watts, 2003).  Full connectivity refers to a network 
wherein all members are tied to it by at least one tie. 
 
Context-dependence – The view that knowledge and meaning are constructed through the deliberate 
discussion of multiple groups, as opposed to context-independence, wherein knowledge and meaning 
are identified from an objective point that synthesizes the knowledge or meaning (Fitzpatrick, 2002, p. 
163). 
 
Density [of networks] – The extent to which a network is complete as measured by its density ratio: 
the number of ties a particular node has within a cluster of its network divided by all the number of all 
possible ties that could be had within the network. 
 
Devolution – Referring to the withdrawal of the public sector as the primary provider of social welfare 
services in favor of a role that funds nonprofit and for profit entities to provide, implement, manage, 
and administer those services through contracts. 
 
Domain – The analytical level at which organizations are categorized as groups of like entities, which 
allows the analysis and identification of interorganizational relationships, such as into institutional 
sectors (e.g., the public sector) or as organizations with similar goals (e.g., community-based health 
centers). Trist (1983) argued, “inter-organizational domains are concerned with field-related 
organizational populations” (p. 270). 
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Dyad [of a network] – Graphic representation of a network or a subnetwork component composed of 
one tie linking two points, or a specified two-node relation within a network. 
 
Egoistic bridges – Strategic bridging organizations which have volunteered for the bridging role, 
which focuses on the needs of the bridging organization, and which seeks to maintain the current 
relations among the collaborating organizations and sectors (Westley & Vredenbug, 1991). 
 
Efficiency [of networks] – The speed at which communication can be passed across a network.  Local 
efficiency is the “average efficiency of local subgraphs” (Latora & Marchiori, 2001, p. 2).  Global 
efficiency refers to the speed with which information can be passed across the entire network. 
 
Exogenous organization – An organization that serves a community but does not have its main 
location in the community and/or has not originated within the community (i.e., is not a grassroots 
organization). 
 
Financial education - Education and/or training and familiarization with basic banking and family 
finance methods given to participants of Individual Development Account programs or as a stand-
alone program.  Also known as financial literacy or financial training. 
 
Financial intermediary – An organizational entity that performs financial services.  This term is used 
to distinguish between the organizations that perform such services and the financial institutions—
which are norms, etc.—that govern financial services and transactions with such entities. 
 
Financial partner [of AFI grantees] – A bank, thrift, savings and loan, credit union, community 
development bank, or other financial intermediary that partners with a grantee of the Assets for 
Independence Demonstration Project for the purposes of holding participants and/or reserve accounts 
for the project. 
 
Fissioning – The breaking apart of a collaborative group of organizations (Lawrence & Hardy, 1999, 
p. 66) 
 
Fragmented network – A network that is composed of several small, unconnected components 
(Watts, 2003, p. 79). 
 
Geodesic – The shortest path length between two nodes of a network. 
 
Global effect [in networks] – An effect that has widespread and broad impact on the structure of a 
network.  Also global change. 
 
Global network (in network analysis) – Referring to an entire network under study, as opposed to a 
local network, which can refer to a specific cluster, subnetwork, or node neighborhood within a larger 
network. 
 
Grassroots – Local, endogenously-created groups of individuals and/or organizations created to 
advance and advocate for local goals and purposes; especially in terms of social justice, political 
enfranchisement, and social and economic development issues.  Grassroots institutions are norms and 
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standards, both informal and formal, that are derived from grassroots ideologies, and which inform and 
govern grassroots behavior, practices, structures and relationships.  Grassroots networks are informal 
and formal groups of grassroots organizations that are tied through mutual goals or other relations. 
 
Hierarchical [organizational structure] – In reference to the fluidity of organizational boundaries, is a 
tightly bounded organizational structure that is regulated by formalized rules and constraints, and 
which uses decision-making standards that determine the decision-making power of individuals in the 
organization (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982 in Lawrence & Hardy, 1999).  Contrast with market and 
sectarian. 
 
Homophily [in networks] – In a social network, the tendency of people to associate with like persons, 
i.e., the tendency toward the creation of clusters. 
 
Incidence data – Relational data that communicates the incidences of a particular case happening with 
a particular event, or a case related to a particular affiliation.  Also known as ‘two-mode’ data, 
referring to the two sets of data implied (e.g., cases and affiliations).  Incidence data may be 
represented in an incidence matrix, which is a case-by-affiliation matrix.  An incidence network is a 
graphic representation of the matrix, within which all cases and all affiliations (or events) are 
represented. 
 
Individual Development Account (IDA) – A matched savings account in which a person can save for 
a high-return asset, such as a home, a small business, or higher education.  In the context of this 
dissertation, the IDA is specific to those three uses, has specific match requirements, and is designated 
for low-income persons. 
 
Individual social capital - Social relationships that are built and which emerge among individuals that 
strengthen an individual’s position within a network or community by providing the individual with 
increased access to resources, improving the individual’s power within a social network, or conferring 
some other benefit to that individual in his or her network environment. 
 
Institutions – Persistent, replicable, and synthesizing norms and ideals (Fararo & Skvoretz, 1986) that 
characterize the interactions of individuals and larger social groups in social, economic, and political 
environments.  Dominant institutions are those institutions that exert powerful influence and govern a 
large majority of social behavior, practices, structures and relationships. 
 
Institutional arrangements – Persistent, replicable and synthesizing paradigms of relations (esp. 
among organizations or institutional sectors) in which exchanges, transactions and other relations 
between entities are expected to conform to, and be maintained and enforced by institutional norms. 
 
Institutional change – Changes to norms, ideals, and expectations for behavior and institutional 
arrangements that provide for a sustainable, participatory, and pluralistically beneficial movement 
from the current dominant culture of disengagement and disenfranchisement of the poor to one that 
supports opportunities for their sustained economic growth and social development. 
 
 164
Institutional environment – An abstract term denoting the level at which institutions are analyzed and 
which encompasses the institutions, their development, synthesis and interplay, as well as their 
mechanisms, structures, arrangements, sectors. 
 
Institutional mechanisms – Modes and instruments by which institutions affect human and 
organizational behavior (e.g., see isomorphic processes). 
 
Institutional movements – Changes and developments in institutions. 
 
Institutional sectors – Categories of institutions that encompass similar institutional types, structures 
or mechanisms (esp. pertaining to institutions governing behavior of organizations and 
interorganizational relations, e.g., the nonprofit and public sectors). 
 
Institutional structures - Persistent, replicable and synthesizing paradigms of a group of relations 
among organizations and institutional sectors to which they are expected to conform to, and be 
maintained and enforced by institutional norms. 
 
Interorganizational learning – The development of knowledge, skills, and understanding leading to 
sustainable and beneficial interorganizational relations (see organizational learning, program learning, 
and social learning). 
 
Intersectoral partnerships – Interorganizational relationships that span across institutional sectors, 
esp. related to the relations among organizational entities in the nonprofit, private, and public sectors. 
 
Isolated [nodes/dyads] – The state of node not being directly connected to another node within a 
network.  When a dyad is isolated, the dyadic nodes are connected to one another but are not directly 
connected to a third node in the network.  Isolated components may be small groups of connected 
nodes that are disconnected from a larger network component. (see node, dyad and component). 
 
Isomorphic processes – Institutional mechanisms by which organizations are led to conform to the 
structures of legitimised organizations (thus becoming isomorphic).  DiMaggio & Powell (1983) 
identified three isomorphic processes: 1) coercive isomorphism, which develops by way of pressures 
from the state and other powerful entities; 2) mimetic isomorphism, which develops when 
organizations that are faced with uncertainty seek to replicate institutionally legitimized forms; and 3) 
normative isomorphism, which develops when organizational structures are communicated through 
professional institutions (e.g., professional associations). 
 
k – a statistic used in small world analysis that measures the level of sparsity in a network, i.e., the 
average number of ties among network nodes compared to the number of network nodes.  When k is 
much smaller than the number of nodes in the network, the network is sparsely connected. 
 
Large-scale networks – Networks with a large number of nodes.  In many cases, the identification of 
a network as being ‘large-scale’ relates to how easily the network data are managed and analyzed by 
the software currently available for network analysis.  Typical examples from the real world, which 
can include thousands, if not millions, of nodes, include the Internet, neural networks, transportation 
systems and disease contagion maps. 
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Legitimacy – The act or state of being credible or conferring authority.  Institutional legitimacy refers 
to that credibility or authority conferred by institutional agreement or mandate. 
 
Local global culture – Homogeneity of cultures, especially those in large cities, despite cultural, 
political and ideological differences (Ahmadi, 2003, p. 16). 
 
Local network [in network analysis] – Subparts of a network that act as or can be distinguished as a 
discrete set of network relations, and which may affect the larger network (see global network). 
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Maintenance purposes – Organizational goals (esp. in interorganizational relations) to ensure that 
current interorganizational structures, roles and relations persist.  Westley & Vredenburg (1991) 
argued that egoistic bridges performed in this capacity. 
 
Market [organizational structure] – In reference to the fluidity of organizational boundaries, is 
permeable organizational structure determined by market institutional mechanisms (e.g., financial 
reward), and is thus flexible (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982 in Lawrence & Hardy, 1999).  Contrast with 
hierarchical and sectarian. 
 
Match rates [for IDAs] – In reference to Individual Development Accounts, an incentive to save that 
is a proportion at which a participant’s savings are complemented (matched) by funds from nonprofit 
organizations, foundations, public grants, and private businesses. 
 
Mediating entities –Organizations that facilitate the development and enforcement of institutions 
(e.g., rules, laws, standards) for the interaction of individuals and organizations or exchanges made in 
those interactions (esp. pertaining to New Institutional Economics, e.g., North (1993)). 
 
Microenterprise – A very small, privately-held, for-profit company, which is either a sole-
proprietorship or a business that employs very few employees, and which is able to be capitalized with 
small amounts of investment (e.g., less than $1,000). 
 
Multi-institutional dynamics – The development, persistence, change and intersection of institutions.  
Also termed multi-sector dynamics when specifically referring to the dynamical intersection of 
multiple institutional sectors. 
 
Multiplier effect – A metaphor for a large effect that successively builds on an initial intervention or 
change, which is based on the multiplier effect commonly associated with the expansion of the money 
supply through financial intermediaries lending more money than what they currently hold. 
 
Multi-sectoral – Pertaining to the interaction of multiple institutional sectors (usu. more than two 
sectors), especially when referring to interorganizational relations spanning such sectors (see 
intersectoral partnerships).  When such relations include partners representing more than two sectors, 
they comprise a multi-sectoral collaboration.  An economic or social welfare intervention, which 
requires the collaboration of organizations from multiple institutional sectors, is a multi-sectoral 




Mutual influence – In an interorganizational setting, the ability of all organizational partners to affect 
the decisions and/or decision-making processes of the other partners, regardless of differences in 
organizational power in the relationships.  
 
Neighborhood [of a node] – All nodes in a network that are directly connected to a specific node. 
 
Network cliques – A structural property of a network that categorizes neighborhoods or groups of 
nodes according to the number of structural ties that holds the group or neighborhood together.  
Network cliquishness refers to the degree to which a network can be divided into such groups. 
 
Network clustering – A qualified characteristic of a subpart of a network that categorizes 
neighborhoods or groups of nodes according to a qualified relation or qualified property of the node 
(e.g., a social network may have clusters of males and clusters of females, or a cluster may be defined 
by a type of relationship, acquaintances and family relationships). 
 
Nodes [of networks] – The points in a graphic representation of a network.  Node positions refer to the 
type of structure developed by a specific location of a node in a network, which, by virtue of that 
position, convey a node role, e.g., a node holding a ‘bridging position’ between two clusters of nodes.  
The mathematical notation (x, y), which indicates the position of the node on a graph is made up of 
two vertices, “x” and “y”. 
 
Non-market institutions – Institutions that guide economic behavior, but which do not derive from 
typical market mechanisms from which emerge institutions for economic exchange (Oberschall & 
Leifer, 1986).  These can be formal institutions, such as those emerging from political sectors, or 
informal institutions, such as those generated through social relationships. 
 
Order and randomness [in networks] – Types of network configurations based on the predictability 
of the ties linking nodes.  Ordered networks have predictable ties – a common example is a lattice.  
The ties of random networks are unpredictable.  Erds & Rényi (1960 in Watts, 2003) argued that each 
network tie was independent of every other tie.  The Hungarian mathematician, Rapoport (e.g., 1957 in 
Watts, 2003) argued that random-biased nets could be constructed using formula that obey certain 
rules, but are basically randomly generated.  Watts (2003) argued that in small world networks, 
ordered clusters of nodes could be connected by random, cluster-spanning ties. 
 
Organizational learning – The development of knowledge, skills, and understanding leading to 
sustainable and beneficial organizational structures, roles, and goal attainment (described by Brown & 
Ashman, 1999) (see interorganizational learning, program learning, and social learning). 
 
Participant Account [for IDAs] – The financial intermediary account (such as at a bank, thrift, credit 
union, savings & loan, community development bank, etc.) that holds the savings of an Individual 
Development Account program participant. 
 
Path length [in a network] – The number of steps, node-by-node, to get between two nodes in a 
network (see average minimum path length). 
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Problem domain – The intersection of institutional sectors wherein problems (e.g., social welfare 
problems) can be defined and shared cooperatively (Kalegaonkar & Brown, 2000).  Nyman (2004) 
termed this the opportunity domain to connote the positive opportunities multi-sectoral parties have for 
establishing sustainable multi-sector solutions to problems. 
 
Program learning – The development of knowledge, skills, and understanding leading to sustainable 
and beneficial development, implementation, maintenance, and/or evaluation of an organizational 
program (described by Brown & Ashman, 1999) (see interorganizational learning, organizational 
learning, and social learning). 
 
Proto-institutions – Defined by Lawrence et al. (2002) as “practices, technologies, and rules that are 
narrowly diffused and only weakly entrenched, but have the potential to become widely 
institutionalized” (p. 283). 
 
Pure bridge – A type of bridging organization that is ideologically centered between peripheral and 
central (dominant) organizations with which it partners (Lawrence & Hardy, 1999, p. 58). 
 
Reciprocity [in networks] – That a relationship between a pair of nodes is of equal value and weight 
for each of the nodes, i.e., a tie from point A to point B is also a tie from point B to point A.  A 
symmetrical relationship would be one that has equal value for both A and B or is one that is 
acknowledged by A and B.  
 
Referent organizations  – An organization that participates in an interorganizational relationship or 
collaboration, but which does not serve as a primary operating organization toward the partnership or 
collaborative goals.  Trist (1983) several types of referent organizations and related these types to 
categories of domain development. 
 
Relational data – Data that describe the relations among members of a network.  Scott (2000) 
distinguishes this type of data from attribute data that would define a set of variables.  Streeter & 
Gillespie (1992) classified relational data into the two types of properties they describe: 1) relational 
properties, which are explained through the types of relationships represented in a network; and 2) 
structural properties, which are the structures that are revealed in the analysis at the individual, group 
or global network levels. 
 
Reserve Account [for IDAs] – The financial intermediary account (such as at a bank, thrift, credit 
union, savings & loan, community development bank, etc.) that holds the operational, administrative, 
and matching funds of an Individual Development Account program. 
 
Roles [of network actors] – Functions of a node in the structure of a network as conveyed by its 
position in the network or within its local neighborhood. 
 
Scale [in networks] – Pertaining to the connectivity of a network.  Amaral et al. (2000) described 
different types of scale in networks.  In scale-free networks, the distribution of connectivity decays a 
power-law as the number of nodes increases, which makes it more likely for new ties to be added to 
well-connected nodes.  In broad-scale networks, the distribution of ties observes the power-law but has 
a sharp drop off at larger numbers of ties per node (p. 11150).  Single-scale networks have a “fast 
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decaying tail” (p. 11151), which means that at a certain limit of number of ties per node, the 
distribution of new ties drops off dramatically. 
 
Sectarian (organizational structure) – In reference to the fluidity of organizational boundaries, is a 
tightly bounded organizational structure that is regulated by formalized rules and constraints, and 
which uses decision-making standards that determine the decision-making power of individuals in the 
organization (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982 in Lawrence & Hardy, 1999).  Contrast with market and 
sectarian. 
 
Shortcuts [in networks] – Ties that connect clusters and/or distant nodes in a network, and which thus 
reduce the geodesic between a pair of nodes. 
 
Small world analysis – The testing of a network to determine if its average minimum path length and 
clustering coefficient conform to small world properties when tested against a randomly generated 
network of the same number of nodes and ties.  The small world network method includes tests to 
ensure the network under study meets the assumptions for size, sparsity, decentralization and 
clustering.  A small world network is one that meets these assumptions, and when a small world 
analysis is performed, is shown to have a much higher clustering coefficient than its random iteration 
but has a similar average minimum path length. 
 
Social capital – Following Burt (2000), a metaphor for a valued item exchanged or developed through 
a network relationship of individuals (e.g., resources, power, trust, values), which, when exchanged, 
can convey benefits or improve the positions of those who exchange the item, and can benefit a cluster 
or entire network in the exchange.  Such capital is socially-derived, i.e., through social relationships; 
and may also be social in nature (as opposed to financial capital, which specifically refers to monetary 
exchanges). 
 
Social change – A change in social institutions that improve the equality, power, opportunities, and 
circumstances of disenfranchised and/or impoverished peoples.  Social justice refers specifically to the 
building of power and improvement of power relations between disenfranchised groups and groups 
benefiting from dominant institutions. 
 
Social development – An improvement in circumstances of disenfranchised and/or impoverished 
people that combines economic development strategies and social change goals, and usually includes 
the participation and leadership of the persons affected by the problem, including political mobilization 
and other policy-related strategies.  A social development approach employs these diverse methods for 
the purpose of social change. 
 
Social enterprise – A broad term that encompasses a recent movement toward ethical investments by 
individuals and corporations, corporate social responsibility, a reframing of cooperative movements, 
and the development of business enterprises that address social change goals.  May also include the 
development of for-profit programs and services to supplement funding for nonprofit organizations. 
 
Social learning – The development of knowledge, skills, and understanding leading to sustainable and 
beneficial development of social relationships.  When performed on a multi-sector level, social 
learning supports multi-sector capacity-building, mutual influence in decision-making, and the 
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building of sustainable, multi-sectoral relationships (described by Brown & Ashman, 1999) (see 
interorganizational learning, organizational learning, and program learning). 
 
Stakeholder group – A group of individuals and/or organizations that are brought together through a 
common characteristic or interest, and which hold, by virtue of this common interest, one of several 
different stakes in a developing or changing program, project, movement or event.  Usually refers to 
groups that will benefit from the changes or developments, but can equally refer to a group that will 
not benefit. 
 
Strategic bridging – A type of collaborative, interorganizational partnership that is multi-sectoral and 
in which an organization or other entity serves as a mediator among the collaborating parties.  This 
organization is called a strategic bridging organization (SBO). 
 
Strategic choice – Referring to agency-derived ties that are strategically chosen by network actors to 
improve their position, power, or access to resources in a network, or to make changes to the structure 
of subparts or entire networks. 
 
Structural adjustment programmes – Economic development programs emerging in the late 20th 
century in which global entities, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
intervened in developing economies to control and reform the economies of lesser developed countries. 
 
Structural holes – An area of a network where two or more clusters within the network lack a 
connecting tie (e.g., a weak tie).  Burt (2000) explains that structural holes can confer advantage and 
power to those nodes that span the structural hole and connect clusters within a network. 
 
Structure-derived ties – Network ties whose development is influenced by the existing structure of a 
network (for opp., see agency derived ties) (Watts, 2003, p. 72). 
 
Sustainability – The purposeful and positive persistence of an organization, interorganizational 
structure or multi-sector collaboration in order to ensure that the services or programs it provides 
continue to positively serve a population. 
 
Ties [of networks] – The relationships between and among network nodes.  Network ties can be 
described by their relative strength to one another wherein strong ties are those ties that comprise the 
ties of network clusters, and are thus more similar to each other than to other ties in a network; and 
weak ties are ties that link network clusters, and are thus less-strongly associated with a particular 
cluster, and which may have similarities to other types of cluster ties in a network.  Ties may also be 
classified as weighted or unweighted.  Weighted ties indicate the level of reciprocity in a relationship, 
whereas unweighted ties simply reflect whether or not a relationship exists between a pair of nodes. 
 
Transactions – Relations among persons or organizations in which items of value are exchanged.  




Transformative purposes – Organizational goals (esp. in interorganizational relations) to seek 
changes to the current interorganizational structures, roles and relations persist.  Westley & 
Vredenburg (1991) argued that altruistic bridges performed in this capacity. 
 
Transitivity – The number of ties formed between triad groups in a network. 
 
Triadic closure [in networks] – The development of a triad (group of three, tied nodes in a network) 
over time.  Rapoport (e.g., 1957) argued that when an individual was a friend with two other 
individuals, it was likely that those two friends would develop a relationship (thus closing the triad). 
 
Unidirected [matrix] – A matrix representing the relations of a network in which each row/column 
and column row pair (usu. showing a “0” for a lack of a relationship and a “1” for a relationship 
between a pair of nodes or between a case and an affiliation or event). 
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X 2ndDist 2nd District Educational Charitable 
Development Project 
DC III  X 
X 5thAveComm Fifth Avenue Committee, Inc. NY II  X 
X ActFABC Action for a Better Community NY II  X 
X AffordHous Affordable Housing Partnership of Albany 
County, Inc. 
NY II X X 
X AidtoVics Aid to Victims of Domestic Abuse, Inc. FL IV  X 
X AllBright Allston Brighton Community Development 
Corporation 
MA I X X 
X AlternFCU Alternatives Federal Credit Union NY II  X 
X ALULike ALU Like, Inc. HI IX X X 
X AtlCoop Atlanta Cooperative Development 
Corporation 
GA IV  X 
X BethelNL Bethel New Life, Inc.. IL V  X 
X CAA Community Action Agency MI V  X 
X CAAB Capitol Area Asset Building Corporation DC III X X 
X CAAOKC Community Action Agency of Oklahoma City 
and OK/CN Counties 
OK VI  X 
X CACStaBarb Community Action Commission of Santa 
Barbara County 
CA IX  X 
X CACSTX Community Action Council of South Texas TX VI  X 
X CalebCDC Caleb Community Development Corporation LA VI  X 
X CamdenCo Camden County Council on Economic 
Opportunity, Inc. 
NJ II  X 
X CAPSonCo Community Action Partnership of Sonoma 
County 
CA IX  X 
X CAPSvcs CAP Services, Inc. WI V  X 
X CASA CASA of Oregon OR X  X 
X CathChar Catholic Charities of the Diocese of La 
Crosse, Inc. 
WI V  X 
X CathFamSvcs Catholic Family Services TX VI  X 
X CenVTCAC Central Vermont Community Action Council, 
Inc. 
VT I X X 
X CityofLA City of Los Angeles CA IX  X 
X CityofSA City of San Antonio Department of 
Community Initiatives 










X CityofTucs City of Tucson AZ IX  X 
X CityVision City Vision, Inc. MI V  X 
X CoastEnter Costal Enterprises, Inc. ME I X X 
X CommIMPACT Community IMPACT! Nashville TN IV  X 
X CommSvcNet Community Service Network, Inc. MA I  X 
X CoOpprty Co-Opportunity, Inc. CT I  X 
X CSA&DC Community Services Agency and 
Development Corporation 
NV IX X X 
X CTDOL State of Connecticut Dept. of Labor CT I  X 
X CTEInc CTE Incorporated CT I X X 
X CtrWomen&Fam The Center for Women & Families KY IV X X 
X Dist7MT District 7 Human Resources Development 
Council 
MT VIII  X 
X EBayALDC East Bay Asian Local Development 
Corporation 
CA IX X X 
X ElPasoCo El Paso County, Texas TX VI  X 
X ElPasoCollab El Paso Collaborative for Economic and 
Community Development 
TX VI  X 
X ElPuente El Puente Community Development 
Corporation 
TX VI  X 
X EmpRes Employment Resources, Inc. MA I  X 
X EnternED Enterprise Plus Economic Development CA IX X X 
X EOASav Economic Opportunity Authority for 
Savannah Chatham County Area 
GA IV  X 
X EOAWashCo Economic Opportunity Agency of 
Washington County 
AR VI  X 
X EOBClarkCo Economic Opportunity Board of Clark 
County 
NV IX X X 
X FamSvcs Family Services Woodfield CT I  X 
X FirstCoast First Coast Workforce Development, Inc. DL IV  X 
X FirstState First State Community Loan Fund DE III  X 
X FiveCap Five Cap, Inc. MI V X X 
X FoundComm Foundation Communities, Inc. TX VI X X 
X FreshMini Fresh Ministries, Inc. FL IV  X 
X GreatRivers Great Rivers Community Trust MO VII  X 










X HaciCDC Hacienda Community Development Center OR X  X 
X HeartofAm Heart of America Family Services KS VII X X 
X HIAlli Hawaii Alliance for Community Based 
Economic Development 
HI IX X X 
X HuntCtyMiss The Huntington City Mission, Inc. WV III  X 
X IIBoston International Institute of Boston MA I  X 
X ILCAA Illinois Community Action Association IL V  X 
X INDOC Indiana Department of Commerce, 
Community Development Division 
IN V X X 
X ISED Institute for Responsible Fatherhood & 
Family Revitalization 
MD III X X 
X ISED Institute for Social and Economic 
Development 
IA VII  X 
X JackCoCAC Jackson County Civic Action Committee, 
Inc. 
MS IV  X 
X JEDI Jefferson Economic Development Institute CA IX  X 
X KYRiverFoot Kentucky River Foothills Development 
Council, Inc. 
KY IV X X 
X LakotaFund The Lakota Fund SD VIII  X 
X LDCofENY Local Development Corporation of East New 
York 
NY II  X 
X LearnEx The Learning Exchange MO VII  X 
X LittleDixie Little Dixie Community Action Agency, Inc. OK VI X 
(ONLY) 
— 
X MercyHous Mercy Housing California CA IX X X 
X MesaCAN Mesa Community Action Network, Inc. AZ IX  X 
X MileHighUW Mile High United Way CO VIII X X 
X MINeighPart Michigan Neighborhood Partnership MI V X X 
X MOAssnCA Missouri Association for Community Action MO VII  X 
X Montachu Montachusett Opportunity Council, Inc. MA I  X 
X MountHope Mount Hope Housing Company, Inc. NY II X X 
X NCDOL North Carolina Department of Labor Wake 
County 
NC IV X X 
X NECommFCU Northeast Community Federal Credit Union CA IX  X 
X NELADelataCDC Northeast Louisiana Delta Community 
Development Corporation 
LA VI  X 










X NewarkPC Newark Preschool Council, Inc. NJ II  X 
X NewCDC New Community Development Corporation NE VII  X 
X NewEntFund New Enterprise Fund, Inc. VA III  X 
X NewVNewV New Visions, New Ventures, Inc. VA III  X 
X NHComLF New Hampshire Community Loan Fund NH I  X 
X NoDadeCDC North Dade Community Development 
Corporation 
FL IV  X 
X NPAssist Non-Profit Assistance Corporation NY II  X 
X NWMIHSA Northwest Michigan Human Services 
Agency, Inc. 
MI V  X 
X NWNMCDC Northwest New Mexico Community 
Development Corporation 
NM VI  X 
X OakLiv Oakland Livingston Human Services, Inc. MI V  X 
X OFANE Organization for a New Equality MA I  X 
X OHCDC Ohio Community Development Corporation OH V X X 
X OIC OIC of the Midwest MO VII  X 
X OwsleyCo Owsley County Action Team KY IV  X 
X PADCED Pennsylvania Department of Community 
and Economic Development 
PA III X X 
X PartAccts Partnership Accounts for Individual 
Development 
IL V  X 
X Peninsula Peninsula Community Foundation CA IX X X 
X Penquis Penquis Community Action Program ME I X X 
X PeopleInc People Incorporated of Southwest Virginia VA III X X 
X PeoplesCDC People’s Community Development 
Corporation 
MO VII  X 
X PortHous Portland Housing Center, Inc. OR X  X 
X RamseyAct Ramsey Action Programs, Inc. MN V X X 
X ReDevOpps Redevelopment Opportunities for Women, 
Inc. 
MO VII  X 
X RiverCo Riverside County Department of Community 
Action 
CA IX X X 
X SENDCAA Southeastern North Dakota Community 
Action Agency 
ND VIII  X 
X SFranFoun San Francisco Foundation community 
Initiatives Fund 
CA IX  X 










X SoFinPart Southern Financial Partners AR VI  X 
X SoMDTriCo Southern Maryland Tri-County Community 
Action 
MD III X X 
X SpokeNeigh Spokane Neighborhood Action Program WA X  X 
X StarkCo Stark County Out of Poverty Partnership, 
Inc. 
OH V  X 
X SteFamFou Steans Family Foundation IL V  X 
X StudAltern Student Alternatives Program, Inc. TX VI  X 
X SuffolkCDC Suffolk Community Development 
Corporation 
NY II  X 
X TotalAct Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke 
Valley 
VA III  X 
X TulEdFund Administrators of the Tulane Education Fund LA VI  X 
X TuscaHous Tuscaloosa Housing Authority AL IV  X 
X UniComCtrs United Community Centers, Inc. TX VI  X 
X UpETNHAD Upper East Tennessee Human 
Development Agency, Inc. 
TN IV  X 
X UrbLeague The Urban League of the Upstate, Inc. SC IV  X 
X UWCommSvcs United Way Community Services MI V  X 
X UWForsyCo United Way of Forsyth County NC IV  X 
X UWGtrLA United Way of Greater Los Angeles CA IX  X 
X UWGtrStLo United Way of Greater St. Louis, Inc. MO VII X X 
X UWKingCo United Way of King County WA X  X 
X UWMetroAtl United Way of Metropolitan Atlanta GA IV  X 
X UWSEPA United Way of Southeastern Pennsylvania PA III  X 
X UWTXGC United Way of the Texas Gulf Coast TX VI  X 
X WCarolCA Western Carolina Community Action, Inc. NC IV  X 
X WECOFund WECO Fund, Inc. OH V  X 
X WestEnt West Enterprise Center CA IX  X 
X WestHous Westchester Housing Fund NY II  X 
X WestPCDC West Perrine Community Development 
Corporation 
FL IV  X 
X WICAPAssn Wisconsin Community Action Program 
Association, Inc. 
WI V X X 
X WIWomBus Wisconsin Women’s Business Initiative 
Corporation 










X WomSelfEmp Women’s Self Employment Project IL V X X 
X YouthBuild YouthBuild USA MA I  X 
X YWCAGtrPitt YWCA of Greater Pittsburgh PA III X X 
X YWCARMC YWCA of Rochester and Monroe County NY II  X 
X — CHARO Community Development CA IX — — 
X — Community Action of Greene County NY II  — 
X — Douglas Community Development 
Corporation 
OR X  — 
X — John Lewis Coffee Shop, Inc. IA VII  — 
X — Mountain Association for Community 
Economic Development 
KY IV  — 
X — Neighborhood Housing Services of Fort 
Worth and Tarrant County 
TX VI  — 
Too late — New Jersey Department of Community 
Affairs 
NJ II  — 
X — People for People, Inc. PA III  — 
X — Prison Fellowship Ministries VA III  — 
X — St. Martin’s Child Center, Inc. MO VII  — 
X — Zion Non-Profit Charitable Trust PA III  — 
 — Banana Kelly Community Improvement 
Association, Inc. 
NY II  — 
 — Concord Community Development 
Corporation 
NY II  — 
 — Lower Eastside People’s Federal Credit 
Union 
NY II  — 
 — Mission of Mercy Empowerment Center, Inc. MD III  — 
 — Maryland Center for Community 
Development 
MD III  — 
 — After School Music Program, Inc. VA III  — 
 — South Carolina Association of Community 
Development Corporations, Inc. 







Appendix C: Financial Partner Information 
 
Acronym† Financial Partner Name* Holding Company (if applicable), Background and Other 
Information on Financial Partners 
A1FCU American 1 Federal Credit Union www.american1fcu.org A Michigan FCU formed by Jackson Co-op Services. 
AB American Bank (Fond du Lac) www.ambank.com A local state chartered bank/subsidiary of Main Street Financial 
Services Corp. 
ABCW1 AnchorBank Holding company: Anchor BanCorp Wisconsin, Inc. www.anchorbank.com Serves 
southern WI. 
ABI American State Bank (Sioux Center) www.ambankiowa.com Independent bank 
ABN2 LaSalle Bank Holding company: LaSalle Bank Corporation www.lasallebank.com Holds LaSalle Bank 
and Standard Federal Bank serving Chicago and MI.  Is a subsidiary of ABN AMRO, a 
Dutch banking company and the largest foreign bank in the US by assets.  ABN AMRO 
is a superregional bank serving more than 75 countries. 
ABOM Alliant Bank 
(was listed as Community 1st Bank 
of Miissouri) 
www.alliantbank.com Changed name in Dec. 2003 to "Alliant Bank."  Very small bank in 
Missouri serving Monroe City and Booneville.  Website, 
www.pjms.net/portfolio/web.html is not working yet.  (Source of information: 
www.parismo.org/MonroeCountyAppeal/2003Archives/20031218_wk51.htm) 
AFCU Alternatives Federal Credit Union www.alternatives.org A CDFI in Ithaca 
AFGECU AFG Employees Credit Union 
(Church Hill, TN) 
www.afgcreditunion.com In nearby Kingsport, TN.  Serves employees of AFG.  No 
information available on website, which is in development. 
AHI Arvest Bank & Trust 
(was listed as Springdale Bank and 
Trust) 
Holding company since 1989: Arvest Holdings, Inc. www.arvest.com/sbt/.  Serves AR, 
OK & MO and is looking to purchase Superior Financial.  Walton family (Wal-Mart) 
owns majority of holdings. 
AJB Andrew Johnson Bank Small bank serving local areas in Tennessee.  Website, www.andrewjohnson.com, not 
currently working. 
ALLE2 Allegiant Bank Holding company: Allegiant Bancorp www.allegiantbank.com.  Serves the St. Louis 
area.  To be bought by National City Corporation (NCC-NYSE). 
ALLE2 Allegiant Bank (was listed as 
Southside National Bank, St. Louis) 
Former holding company, Southside Bancshares Corp., was bought in 2001 by 
Allegiant Bancorp (see information for Allegiant Bancorp, above) (Source: 
www.media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/NSD/ALLE/reports/EDGAR9-30-01.pdf.) 
AMFI1 AMCORE Bank (Rock Falls) Holding company: AMCORE Financial, Inc. www.amcore.com  Serves northern IL and 
southern WI. 
ANB Amarillo National Bank Holding Company: Amarillo National Bancorp.  Independent bank. 
ART Artisans' Bank (from Artisans Bank) www.artisansbank.com Independent bank chartered in 1861 in Wilmington. 
ASB Asian Bank www.theasianbank.com Independent bank serving multilingual Asian customers in 
Philadelphia since 1999. 
ASBC1 Associated Bank Holding Company: Associated Banc-Corp www.associatedbank.com or 
www.assocbank.com  
ASO2 AmSouth Bank Main subsidiary of AmSouth Bancorporation www.amsouth.com 
ASO2 AmSouth Bank (was listed as First 
American Bank, Bristol, TN) 
Located in Bristol, a dual-state city.  Bought by AmSouth Bancorporation, Inc. in 1999 
(see above info) (source: 
www.bizjournals.com/memphis/stories/2000/05/01/story8.html) 
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Acronym† Financial Partner Name* Holding Company (if applicable), Background and Other 
Information on Financial Partners 
AZFCU South Park/Pueblo Gardens Comm. 
CU (Division of AZ FCU) 
www.azfcu.org/about_afcu/history.htm  -- Organized in 1936 as the Phoenix City 
Employees Federal Credit Union.  Has merged with eight other credit unions since 
1981, including one listed in 2001. 
BAC2 Bank of America Holding company: Bank of America Corporation www.bankofamerica.com.  Third 
largest bank in US (behind Chase Morgan and Citibank).  Merged with FleetBoston as 
of 4-1-04, which will expand its holdings into Latin America. In 1998, NationsBank 
merged with BankAmerica, becoming Bank of America. (Merger not reflected in 
analysis). 
BACCU Bethel AME Church Credit Union 
(Saginaw) 
No information available over the internet on this credit union, except for the fact that it 
exists.  The AME church has several credit unions throughout the US (and in MI). 
BBP Bank of Brookfield-Purdin Once called "Bank of Purdin", now serves both Purdin and Brookfield communities in its 
four MO branches.  Independent bank. 
BBT2 BB&T Holding company: BB&T Corporation www.bbandt.com  Branch Banking and Trust is 
one of North Carolina's oldest banks. 
BBT2 BB&T (was listed as First Virginia 
Bank Southwest) 
Acquired by BB&T in October 2003 (see above information). 
BBT2 BB&T (was listed as First Vantage 
Bank/Tri-Cities) 
First Vantage Bank was bought by BB&T in 2003 (see above information).  Originally 
owned by First Virginia Banks, Inc. (when it was listed as FVB on the NYSE). 
BCAR3 Bank of the Carolinas www.bankofthecarolinas.com  Serves central NC. 
BCFCU Bar-Cons Federal Credit Union www.barcons.org/800/default.htm  Established in 1965 for the teachers of Bartholomew 
Consolidated School Corporation.  Now membership includes teachers in surrounding 
counties, county employees and other employees of area businesses. 
BFC Bremer Bank Parent corporation: Bremer Financial Corporation www.bremer.com  Has banks in 
Minnesota, North Dakota and Wisconsin.  Privately held by employees (no public 
stock), Otto Bremer Foundation and directors.  Independent bank. 
BFCU Bethex Federal Credit Union (Bronx) www.bethexfcu.org/  A community development credit union 
BFSB Bedford Federal Savings Bank www.bedfed.com  -- Mutually owned thrift in IN, serving Lawrence County since 1937. 
BK2 The Bank of New York Holding company: The Bank of New York Company, Inc. www.bankofny.com serves 
NY metro areas. 
BLUG3 BlueRidge Bank (Floyd) No website listed.  Large community bank based in Floyd and serving VA. 
BMO2 Harris Bank Harris Bankcorp, Inc., serves Chicago, Arizona and Florida www.harrisbank.com. 
Holding company: Bank of Montreal, aka BMO Financial Group www.bmo.com, 
Canada's oldest and 5th largest. 
BNCC1 BNC National Bank (Bismark) Holding company: BNCCORP, Inc. www.bnccorp.com  Operates BNC National Bank in 
ND, MN, and AZ. 
BNK2 People's Heritage Bank (Portland) Holding company: Banknorth Group, Inc. www.banknorth.com/default_banknorth.aspx 
Does business in NY as "Evergreen Bank", and has merged with several other 
companies in the Northeast, including Bancorp Connecticut, American Financial 
Holdings, Ipswich Bancshares, and Warren Bancorp.  Also includes Bank of New 
Hampshire, People's Heritage Bank (in ME) (since 1999), and plans to buy CCBT 
Financial Companies (in MA). 
BOAB3 Green Lake State Bank (Green 
Lake) 
Holding company: The Baraboo Bancorporation, Inc., which holds several other small 
banks and is traded OTC.  Bank website: www.glsb.com a one-branch bank serving 
Green Lake, Wisconsin since 1902. 
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BOH2 Bank of Hawaii (Honolulu) Holding company: Bank of Hawaii Corporation www.boh.com.  Once a vast 
international company (e.g., Asia and other countries) as Pacific Century Financial, the 
now BOH Corporation focuses on HI. 
BOKF1 Bank of Oklahoma Holding Company: BOK Corporation www.bokf.com, which also owns, Bank of Texas, 
Bank of Arkansas, Colorado State Bank and Trust, and Bank of Albuquerque. 
BOM The Bank of Marion (Marion) www.bankofmarionva.com  Serving SW VA. Chartered in 1874, is an independent 
bank. 
BOOM Bank of Old Monroe Very small bank serving Missouri areas.  No website available. 
BPSB Bippus State Bank www.bippusbank.com  Small bank serving Indiana. 
BSB Bangor Savings Bank (Bangor) www.bangor.com  Serves ME areas. 
BSI Bath Savings Institution www.bathsavings.com  Small bank serving Maine since 1852. 
BT Bankers Trust Holding company: BTC Financial Corporation www.bankerstrust.com  Serves Des 
Moines and Cedar Rapids, IA.  Has a "name change guarantee" that will give 
customers $100 if they change their name through a merger   (Source: 
https://www.bankerstrust.com/terminal.cfm?category_id=20&sub_id=71&term_id=128).  
Assumed to not be "Bankers Trust Corporation", which merged with Deutsche Bank AG 
in 1999, which then became the largest bank in the world and is now being charged 
with securities fraud. 
BTC Bank of Tennessee "BancTenn Corp" subsidiary Bank of Tennessee www.happybanking.com/default.asp  
C2 Citibank (also listed as Citibank, 
F.S.B., Washington, DC; Citibank 
F.S.B., Fairfield; Citibank, N.A., New 
York) 
Citibank, N.A. (Citibank (West)), Citibank, F.S.B.) is banking arm of Citigroup, Inc. and 
is the largest multinational financial company in the world (rising above the Japanese 
Mizuho Financial in 2003). (www.citigroup.com and www.citibank.com ) 
C2 California Federal Bank (also listed 
as Cal Fed Bank) 
Recently purchased by Citibank in 2002 www.citibank.com, itself an arm of Citigroup, 
which provides financial services, etc. (see above). 
CAC4 Camden National Bank (was listed 
as Camden Federal) 
Holding company: Camden National Corporation www.camdennational.com Serves 
ME. 
CACB5 Bank of the Cascades (Bend) Holding Company: Cascade Bancorp www.botc.com 
CAPFCU Appalachian Federal Credit Union 
(was listed as Central Appalachian 
Peoples Federal Credit Union) 
Dropped "Central" and "Peoples" (Source: August 2003 
www.wkkf.org/Programming/RenderRes.aspx?CID=160&ID=3765). No website found. 
CATC3 Cambridge Trust Co (Harvard 
Square) 
Holding company: Cambridge Bancorp www.cambridgetrust.com 
CB Citizens Bank Holding Company: Citizens Bancorp www.citizensebank.com Serves Oregon. 
CBB Community Bank of the Bay www.communitybankbay.com/index.html 
CBC2 Elkhart Community Bank Holding company: Capitol Bancorp Ltd. www.capitolbancorp.com/comppro.html  Holds 
several one-branch community banks in MI, AZ, IN, NV, NM, CA, and TX.  Elkhart was 
started in 1999, bank website: www.elkhartbank.com  
CBCF1 Citizens Bank (Saganaw) (also listed 
as F&M Bank) 
Holding company: Citizens Banking Corporation www.citizensonline.com Owns F&M 
Banks in Wisconsin and Iowa (since Nov. 1999), and also owns Citizens Bank in 
Michigan and Illinois.  Bank website: www.fmbanks.com  (CBCF sold its Minnesota 
F&M locations in 2001.) 
CBI Centier Bank www.centier.com Small bank serving Indiana since 1895 
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CBIN5 Community Bank of Southern 
Indiana 
Holding company: Community Bank Shares of Indiana, Inc. www.communitybanksi.com 
(website is not currently working).  Also holds Community Bank of Kentucky. 
CBK Central Bank www.mycentralbank.com/main.html Founded in 1947, serves the Howard County area 
in Indiana.  Privately owned. 
CBKC Central Bank of Kansas City 
(Missouri) 
www.centralbankkc.com A family-owned community bank serving Kansas City area of 
Missouri, open since 1950. Specializes in economic development community 
involvement. 
CBPA Community Bank www.commbankna.com Serving Allegheny, Washington, and Greene Counties in PA.  
Started in 1904.  Used to be known as the "First National Bank of Carmichael, 
Pennsylvania". 
CBSS1 Compass Bank Holding company Compass Bancshares, Inc. www.compassweb.com Operates in the 
south and southwest. 
CBU2 Grange National Bank Formerly owned by Grange National Bank Corp., the holding company was purchased 
by Community Bank System, Inc. in 2003.  It was merged into the corporation's 
subsidiary, Community Bank (Source: www.mergerstat.com/bookstore/tsearch.htm).   
Although NY-based, the corporation also serves PA through its acquisitions. Bank 
website: www.communitybankna.com. 
CBY Central Bank (also First National 
Bank) 
Holding company: Central Bancompany, Inc. www.centralbancompany.com Owns 
several different banks serving MO, including Central Bank, several First National 
Banks, Empire Bank, etc.  Independent Bank.  Assumed to be this company because 
both grantee and corporation are based in Jefferson City, MO. 
CCB Carter County Bank www.cartercountybank.com Started in the early 40's, serves Carter County, TN. 
Locally-owned. 
CCBT Capitol City Bank and Trust www.capitolcitybank-atl.com Open since 1994, serves a primarily African-American 
customer base in Atlanta and other Georgia areas. 
CCFCU Community Choice Federal  Credit 
Union 
Changing its name from Near Eastside Community Federal Credit Union to the current 
name in 2003 (Source: http://www.incuplace.org/nr20030220.asp), it is Indiana's only 
CDCU, located in Indianapolis.  Started in 1981. No website found. 
CCOFCU City-County Federal Credit Union 
(was listed as Wendell Phillips FCU, 
Minneapolis) 
Purchased by City-County Federal Credit Union www.ccfcu.org in 2001 (source: 
www.mcda.org) serves MN. 
CCU Capital Credit Union www.capitalcu.com Opened in 1934 and serves persons living or working in 
Outagamie, Calumet, Winnebago or Brown Counties in Wisconsin. 
CDBK3 Bank of Floyd Holding company: Cardinal Bankshares Corporation www.bankoffloyd.com  Serves SW 
VA. 
CENCU Centra Credit Union www.centra.org Serves people who live or work in 16 Indiana counties.  Started in 1940 
as “Cummins Employees Federal Credit Union” in Columbus, IN. 
CF2 Charter One Bank Holding company: Charter One Financial, Inc. www.charterone.com, of which Charter 
One Bank is its main subsidiary. 
CFB2 Commercial Federal Bank Holding company: Commercial Federal Corporation www.comfedbank.com, which 
serves several states in the midwest & southwest. 
CFBX1 Community First National Bank Holding company: Community First Bankshares www.communityfirst.com Serving 
western and midwestern states.  Soon to be bought by BNP Paribas. 
CFCU Community First CU www.communityfirstcu.org Serves persons living and working in five counties of 
northeastern WI. 
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CFFG Community First Bank Holding company: Community First Financial Group, headquartered in Indianapolis.  
People's Trust Bank recently become Community First Bank.  The bank serves 
Corydon, IN.  Its former website www.peoples-corydon.com is not working.   
CFR2 Frost National Bank (was listed as 
Frost Bank) 
Holding company: Cullen/Frost Bankers www.frostbank.com 
CITCU Citadel Credit Union http://pcu.citadelfcu.org/default.asp Started in 1937 as the “Lukens Steel Company 
Employees Credit Union”, and now serves 200 different employee groups and residents 
of Chester County and Lancaster, PA. 
CITFCU CitizensFirst Credit Union www.citizensfirst.com Started in 1937 in Oshkosh, WI.  Now serves six counties in WI. 
CMA2 Comerica Bank (Detroit) Holding Company: Comerica Incorporated www.comerica.com/cma/cda/stateLogin with 
HQ in Detroit. 
CMCU Cory Methodist Church CU No website available.  Located in Cleveland, OH and presumably started by the Cory 
United Methodist Church. 
CNBC City National Bank of New Jersey Holding company: City National Bancshares Corporation www.citynatbank.com -- 
Grantee oversees community projects www.state.nj.us/dca/dhcr/ida.htm and 
www.state.nj.us/dca/dhcr/idacontact.doc 
CNBKA1 Century Bank Holding company: Century Bancorp, Inc. www.century-bank.com Serves small and 
medium-sized businesses in MA. 
COAT Coatsville Savings Bank (was listed 
as Coatesville Federal Savings) 
www.coatesvillesavings.com Changed name in 1991 to "Coatesville Savings Bank". 
Established in 1919, serves the Coatesville and Oxford areas of PA, independently 
owned. 
COFCU Choice One Federal Credit Union www.choiceone.org/default.asp Started in 1941 by Bell Telephone employees.  Now 
serves over 200 different employee groups in PA. 
COI6 Co-Opportunity, Inc. Organization holds IDAs through its "limited equity co-operatives" 
www.volunteersolutions.org/uwcact/org/218599.html 
COMCU Community Credit Union www.communitycreditunion.com  
COMN Community National Bank www.cnb1.com/home.htm Locally owned, serving northeast IA, held by Community 
National Bancorporation (not related to company with same name in GA).  Opened in 
1997. 
CSB Carver State Bank www.carverstatebank.com Established in 1927, the bank is a cornerstone of the African 
American community in Savannah, GA.  
CUNACU CUNA Credit Union (Madison) www.cunacu.org Formed in 1935 by the Credit Union National Organization, Inc. 
serving south central WI.  In 2002, Portage Credit Union merged with the company, and 
in 2003, the WI Farm Bureau Credit Union merged with the company. 
CVAL1 First Financial Bank Holding company: Chester Valley Bancorp, Inc. www.ffbonline.com Serves Chester 
County and western PA.  While the corporation has been around since 1989, the bank 
was founded in 1922. 
CVLY1 PeoplesBank Holding company: Codorus Valley Bancorp, Inc. www.peoplesbanknet.com Started in 
1864, operates in York County, PA. 
CVNB&T Cumberland Valley National Bank 
(Richmond) 
Cumberland Valley National Bank & Trust www.cvnb.com  Merged with Corbin Deposit 
Bank & Trust (also of KY) 
CYN2 City National Bank Subsidiary of City National Corporation www.cnb.com, which serves CA 
CZBS3 Citizens Trust Bank Holding company: Citizens Bancshares Corporation, one of the largest minority-owned 
financial companies in the US. Serves Georgia and Alabama, headquartered in Atlanta 
www.ctbatl.com/frame_set/home.html. 
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CZFS3 First Citizens National Bank Holding company: Citizens Financial Services, Inc. www.firstcitizensbank.com Serves 
three counties in PA. 
CZNC3 Citizens & Northern Bank Holding company: Citizens & Northern Corporation www.cnbankpa.com Serves 
northern PA. 
CZPY3 Citizens Trust Company Holding company: Citizens Bancorp, Inc. www.citizenstrustcompany.com Serves three-
county area in PA. 
DB Dollar Bank (Pittsburgh) Dollar Bank, FSB www.dollarbank.com Founded in 1855, strongly independent bank 
serves Pittsburgh and Cleveland areas. 
DCOM1 Pioneer Savings Bank Holding company: Dime Community Bancshares, Inc. www.dsbwdirect.com The bank 
branch of Dime Savings Bank of Williamsburg is known as "Pioneer Savings Bank."  
Operates in NYC and Long Island. 
DFC Bank Midwest Parent company: Dickinson Financial Corporation www.bankmw.com Serves St. Louis 
and Kansas City areas of MO.  Also owns financial entities serving military employees.  
Privately owned by Dickinson family. 
DNBF3 Downingtown National Bank Holding company: DNB Financial Corporation www.dnb4you.com Operating in PA. 
EB Enterprise Bank Holding Company: Enterprise Bancorp, Inc. www.ebtc.com Serving MA, has 
shareholders but is not publicly traded 
ECFCU Episcopal Community Federal Credit 
Union (was listed as Episcopal 
Federal Credit Union) 
www.ladiocese.org/creditunion/ Members are members of Los Angeles diocese or 
program participants. 
EXSR3 Exchange Bank of Sonoma County 
(Santa Rosa) 
www.exchangebank.com Serving Sonoma County, CA. 
F&MB Farmers & Merchants Bank of Craig 
County 
Small Bank serving VA Craig County (no website) 
F&MBS Farmers & Merchants Bank Stuttgart Holding company: Farmers & Merchants Bankshares, Inc. (locally owned) 
www.fmbarkansas.com  
FBF2 Fleet Bank (also Listed as Fleet 
National Bank) 
Holding company: FleetBoston Financial Corporation www.fleetboston.com one of the 
10 largest banks in the U.S. and operates in about 25 other countries.  Prime subsidiary 
is Fleet National Bank.  Merged with Bank of America 4-1-04 (merger information not 
reflected in analysis). 
FBF2 Progress Bank Formerly a subsidiary of Progress Financial Corporation, headquartered in Blue Bell, 
PA (founded in 1878), the company merged with Fleet Bank in 2004 (see information 
above). 
FBF2 Summit Bank Acquired by FleetBoston in 2001 (see information above).  Before that time, the 
company was held by Summit Bancorp (SUB on the NYSE). 
FBNKO1 First Bank  Holding company: First Banks, Inc. www.firstbanks.com Has banks in IL, MO, TX, and 
CA. 
FBOPC First Bank of Oak Park (Chicago) Holding company: FBOP Corporation www.fbopcorporation.com has subsidiaries in IL, 
TX, AZ & CA. Bank website: www.1stbankofoakpark.com  
FBOT First Bank www.firstbanktn.com Started in 1890, First Bank of Tennessee serves Rhea and Roane 
Counties in TN. 
FCBM First Citizens Bank www.fcbmaine.com/info.html Locally owned and managed bank in Aroostook County, 
Maine since 1990. 
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FCBOK First Commercial Bank Headquartered in Edmond, OK and also serves OKC.  Requested State Charter from 
National Bank status in 2002 (Source: 
http://www.osbd.state.ok.us/Banks/Agenda/agd02jun.pdf).  No website found. 
FCCU Fox Communities CU www.foxcommunitiescu.org Created in 1937 to serve Locks Mill employees.  Through 
various mergers, it now serves people in six WI counties, as well as selected company 
employees. 
FCEN First Century Bank www.fcbtn.com Started in 1899 as Clairborne National Bank to serve the Appalachian 
area. Was renamed in 2000 as First Century Bank. Family owned.  
FCFCU Fergus County Federal Credit Union www.ferguscountyfcu.com 
FC-FCU First Community FCU www.1stcomm.org Serves Kalamazoo County, started 1938 as the Parchment 
Employees FCU. 
FCNCA1 First Citizens Bank Parent company: First Citizens BancShares, Inc. www.firstcitizens.com of First-Citizens 
Bank & Trust operating in NC, VA, & WV, as well as Atlantic States Bank in GA and FL.  
IronStone Bank (the new name for Atlantic States Bank) has branches in TX, CA, & AZ 
with others planned in NM & CO. 
FCUCU Faith Community United CU Organized by Mt. Sinai Baptist Church www.faithcommcu.com/aboutus.htm 
FDEF1 First Federal Bank of Defiance 
County 
Holding company: First Defiance Financial Corporation www.first-fedmidwest.com 
Name is actually First Federal Bank of the Midwest.  Serving Ohio counties. 
FDFCU FirstDay Financial Federal Credit 
Union (was listed as Dayton Area 
School Employees CU) 
www.firstdayfinancial.org/aboutusHistory.htm Changed name to FirstDay Financial. 
Was called "Dayton Ohio Teachers Federal Credit Union," although the web page did 
list the other name at the top.  Served Dayton since 1935. 
FEBB Farmers Exchange Bank Located in Neshkoro, WI, Farmers Exchange Bank serves Marquette and neighboring 
counties.  Its former holding company, Golden Sands Bankshares, Inc. was bought by 
FEB Bancshares, Inc. in 1999 (completed 2002) and shortened its name from Farmers 
Exchange Bank of Neshkoro (Source: Federal Reserve: 
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/200
2/02-30973.htm). 
FFBC1 Sand Ridge Bank First Financial Bancorp purchased Sand Ridge Financial Corporation in 1999 (although 
Sand Ridge Bank still goes by that name).  Serves several communities throughout IN.  
Bank’s website does not discuss the merger per se, however, First Financial Bancorp's 
site does www.ffbc-oh.com/sandridge.html. 
FFBNF First Federal Bank of North Florida Website (as provided by contact) www.ffbnf.com does not work currently, but bank was 
confirmed by contact.  Bank has been serving FL areas since 1922. 
FFBT First Farmer's Bank & Trust www.ffbt.com Small, privately held bank in Indiana since 1885. 
FFSN First Federal Savings of Newark 
(was listed as First Federal Savings 
& Loan, Newark) 
www.firstfederalsandl.com Chartered in 1934, is a mutually-owned company. 
FHLB-SF Federal Home Loan Bank of San 
Francisco (with Citibank) 
www.fhlbsf.com One of 12 banks established by Congress in 1930s, owned by member 
financial institutions in CA, NV, and AZ. Membership in CA listed here: 
www.fhlbsf.com/membership/dir/memberlistb.asp  
FIB First Interstate Bank www.firstinterstatebank.com Serves MT & WY.  In 1984, purchased franchise of First 
Interstate Bancorp, and when that CA-based bank was merged with another, First 
Interstate kept its name. 
FINB First Independence National Bank www.finb.com Independent bank serving Detroit. 
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FITB1 Fifth Third Bank Holding company: Fifth Third Bancorp www.53.com operating in midwest, AZ and FL.  
Name comes from 1908 merger of Cincinnati’s Fifth National Bank and Third National 
Bank (per Hoovers). 
FITB1 Fifth Third Bank (was listed as Old 
Kent Bank) 
www.oldkent.com Owned by Fifth Third Bancorp since 2001. 
FKFS1 First Keystone Federal Holding company: First Keystone Financial, Inc. www.firstkeystone.com Serves 
Chester, Delaware and Montgomery Counties in PA. 
FMB Farmers and Merchants Bank of 
Rockford (was listed as Farmers and 
Merchants Bank) 
www.e-fmbank.com Small bank serving WA. 
FNBH The First National Bank of 
Hebbronville (was listed as 1st 
National Bank of Hebbronville) 
www.fnbhebb.com Small bank serving SW Texas 
FNB2 First National Bank of Pennsylvania Holding company: F.N.B. Corporation www.fnbcorporation.com Having moved its 
headquarters to FL in 2001, it spun off its FL assets and moved back to PA in 2004.  
Federal Reserve document notes that FNBPA works with the Greater Erie Community 
Action Committee to implement the state's Family Savings Account program (Source: 
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/craeval/mar02/249.pdf).   
FNBP1 First National Bank Holding company: FNB Corporation www.fnbonline.com (Grantee in Christiansburg, 
VA), which also holds FNB Southwest and Salem Bank & Trust. 
FNEX First National Exchange Bank 
(Roanoke) 
Small bank serving Roanoke, VA (two branches).  No website available. 
FNFG1 First Niagara (was listed as Troy 
Savings Bank) 
Holding company: First Niagara Financial Group, Inc. www.fnfg.com The company 
serves NY.  It acquired Troy Financial Group in 2004. 
FNSB Franklin Savings Bank www.fsbme.com Small bank serving western Maine since around 1868. 
FRBK1 Republic First Bank (was listed as 
First Republic Bank) 
Holding company: Republic First Bancorp, Inc. www.rfbkonline.com Serves 
Philadelphia and NJ areas.  Also owns First Bank of Delaware, serving Wilmington, DE.  
Changed name from First Republic Bank. 
FSB First Sentry Bank www.firstsentry.com Small independent bank 
FSBI1 Fidelity Bank Holding company: Fidelity Bancorp, Inc. www.fidelitybancorp-pa.com Bank website: 
www.fidelitybank-pa.com Serving Pittsburgh since 1927.   
FSBK Farmers State Bank www.fscbank.com Open since 1878, it is a three-branch bank in MO (locally owned). 
FSBM First State Bank of Middlebury www.fsbmiddlebury.com  -- Locally owned, serving areas of Indiana since 1910. 
FSBSD First State Bank of San Diego, TX Small bank serving South TX.  Is Duval County's depositor (Source: 
www.caller2.com/2000/august/26/today/local_ne/2830.html ).  No website available. 
FSFF1 First Security Federal Savings Bank Holding company: First SecurityFed Financial, Inc. Serves Eastern European 
immigrants (e.g., Ukrainian) in the Chicago and Philadelphia areas.  No website 
available.  To be purchased by MB Financial, Inc. (MBFI-NASDAQ) (Source: 
www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/2004/030403.shtml ).   
FTB Firstrust Bank www.firstrust.com/fr/aboutus_index.htm Started in 1934 to serve Philadelphia, now 
serves several PA counties and Burlington County in NJ.  Family owned. 
FTFC1 First Federal (also listed as First 
Federal Savings, La Crosse) 
Holding company: First Federal Capital Corporation www.firstfed.com Although the 
bank still retains the "Savings" in its name in some areas, it commonly goes by First 
Federal Capital Bank.  Serving Minnesota, Wisconsin and Illinois.  Headquartered in La 
Crosse. 
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FTN2 First Tennessee Bank Holding company: First Tennessee National Corporation www.firsttennessee.com 
Owns First Tennessee Bank, and other subsidiaries operate in MS, AR, & TN.  Also 
owns First Horizon Home Loans, which serves 35 states.  Looking to change name to 
First Horizon. 
FULT1 Fulton Bank Holding company: Fulton Financial Corporation www.fult.com Multibank corporation 
serving PA, MD, NJ, and DE.  Not to be confused with the Fulton County National 
Bank, which is a much smaller bank serving portions of PA, but which uses its full name 
to identify itself. 
FULT1 Swineford National Bank www.swineford.com Bought in 1996 by Fulton Financial Corporation (see above). 
GABC1 First American Bank www.firstamericanbankfab.com/fab/index.htm Serving Knox County since 1888, First 
American joined German American Bancorp in 1999 (thus joining other IN community 
banks: First State Bank, Peoples Bank, and German American Bank -- 
www.germanamericanbancorp.com 
GB Guaranty Bank  www.guarantybanking.com/about/gbstory.asp Serving SE Wisconsin areas and parts of 
IL. Founded in 1923. 
GCB Greenfield Co-operative Bank www.greenfieldcoopbank.com Three locations in MA. 
GCSB Grant County State Bank Holding company: Grant County State Bancshares, Inc. (headquartered in Swayzee, 
IN), is increasingly becoming employee-owned (source: 
www.chicagofed.org/publications/applicationsbulletin/march_6_2004.pdf).  No website 
available. 
GHCCU Greater Harrisburg Community 
Credit Union 
www.ghccu.com Serves persons who live, work, worship, and volunteer in the city of 
Harrisburg, PA.  Started in 2001. 
GMB Great Midwest Bank www.greatmidwestbank.com/default.htm Serves WI areas. 
GSI Gardiner Savings Institution (was 
listed as Gardener Savings Bank) 
Small bank serving Maine areas -- no website. 
HBAN1 Huntington Bank (also listed as 
Huntington National Bank (Toledo) 
and The Huntington National Bank 
Parent company: Huntington Bancshares Inc. www.huntington.com Has bank offices in 
OH, MI, KY, IN & WV and plans to purchase Unizan Financial (OH) 
HBC2 HSBC Bank USA Holding company: HSBC Holdings, plc www.us.hsbc.com Is the UK's largest banking 
company—superregional.  HSBC Bank USA is held by its US subsidiary, HSBC USA, 
and serves NY, CA, PA, FL, OR, and WA. 
HBEK1 Humboldt Bank Holding company: Humboldt Bancorp www.humboldtbancorp.com Liquidated its 
subsidiary, Bancorp Financial Services, and merged subsidiaries Capital Valley Bank 
and Tehama Bank.  Recently acquired California Independent Bancorp. 
HBEK1 Feather River State Bank Was held by California Independent Bancorp until it was acquired by Humboldt Bancorp 
(see above). 
HBKA3 Highlands Union Bank Holding company: Highlands Bankshares www.hubank.com Serves VA, NC, and TN. 
HBNC5 Horizon Bank Holding company: Horizon Bancorp, Inc. www.horizon-bancorp.com  Headquartered in 
Indiana, serves NW IN and SW MI. 
HCB Heritage Community Bank Operates in Greeneville, TN.  Opened in 2004 (Source: Greenville Sun, 1-16-04). 
HCCU Hacienda Community Credit Union  Just recently formed, HCCU will be holding the participant IDAs (per grantee contact).  
HCU Heartland CU www.heartlandcu.org: Based in Madison, WI, it serves SW WI and eastern OH. 
HE2 American Savings Bank www.asbhawaii.com Subsidiary of Hawaiian Electric Industries and is third-largest bank 
in Hawaii. 
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HIB2 Hibernia National Bank Holding company: Hibernia Corporation www.hibernia.com Louisiana's largest bank 
with branches in Texas and Mississippi. Also plans to purchase TX's Coastal Bancorp. 
HOMF1 Home Federal Savings Bank Holding company: Home Federal Bancorp www.homf.com Founded in 1908, the bank 
converted from a thrift to a commercial bank and serves southern IN. 
HRBT1 Hudson River Bank & Trust 
Company 
Holding company: Hudson River Bancorp, Inc. www.hudsonriverbank.com Serves 
upstate NY's "Capital District". 
HTBP Clyde Savings Bank Holding company: www.hometrustbanking.com Started in 1926, Clyde Savings Bank is 
one of three community bank affiliates of HomeTrust Bank.  Changed its name in 2003. 
HTHR1 Hawthorne Savings Holding company: Hawthorne Financial Corporation www.hawthornesavings.com 
Serves SE CA.  Commercial Capital Bancorp (CCBI-NASDAQ) plans to purchase the 
holding company. 
HU2 Hudson United Bank Holding company: Hudson United Bancorp www.hudsonunitedbank.com Serving CT, 
NJ, NY, and PA.  It bought the assets of the failed Connecticut Bank of Commerce. 
Caters to small and medium-sized businesses. 
IBCB Community Bank of Lawndale www.cblbank.com Holding company is Sable Bancshares, Inc., which was bought by 
International Bank of Chicago (IBC Bancorp, Inc.) www.inbk.com in 2003 (source - 
Bank Mergers & Acquisitions, Vol 18, No. 12 -- 
http://www.snl.com/products/samples/MMA/sample1.pdf ) No info available on IBC 
Bancorp on Hoovers. 
IBCP1 Independent Bank West Holding company: Independent Bank Corporation www.ibcp.com Serves throughout MI 
areas with its subsidiary (similarly titled) banks. 
IBOC5 International Bank of Commerce Holding company: International Bancshares Corporation http://www.iboc.com Serves S. 
Texas with International Bank of Commerce and Commerce Bank. Majority shareholder 
is Tony Sanchez, former TX gubernatorial candidate. To buy OK Local Financial. 
ICB Independence Community Bank 
(was listed as Independence 
Savings Bank) 
Parent company: Independence Community Bancorp www.myindependence.com 
Serves Brooklyn.  Plans to purchase Staten Island Bancorp, parent of SI Bank & Trust. 
IFC2 Irwin Union Bank & Trust Holding company: Irwin Financial Corporation www.irwinfinancial.com Is primarily a 
mortgage company, but has two subsidiaries: Irwin Union Bank & Trust, which provides 
banking services to IN, MI, and NV; and Irwin Union Bank, which serves AZ, KY, MO, 
NV, and UT. 
INB Inter National Bank www.inbweb.com Founded in 1985, the bank is expanding throughout south and south-
central Texas, as well as in El Paso. 
INVN Investors National Bank Three-branch bank in Missouri, headquartered in Chillicothe.  aka Investor's Federal 
Bank.  No website available. Held by IFB Holdings, Inc. (Source: 
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/craeval/aug03/23232.pdf) 
JCB Johnson County Bank Has just created new website www.johnsoncountybank.com, but it is not fully functional.  
Located in Mountain City, TN. 
JPM2 Chase Bank of Texas (also listed as 
Chase Manhattan Bank, Stamford, 
CT) 
www.jpmorganchase.com Second largest financial services firm in US with 2001 
merger of JP Morgan and Chase Manhattan.  Seeking purchase of Bank One (waiting 
for regulatory approval). 
KEY2 Key Bank (Portland) Holding company: KeyCorp www.key.com Interstate bank. 
KSB Kennebec Savings Bank www.kennebecsavings.com Started in 1870, serves small area of Maine 
LARL5 Laurel Savings Bank Holding company: Laurel Capital Group, Inc. www.laurelsb.com Serves Pittsburgh, as 
well as Allegheny and Butler Counties in PA. 
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LB Legacy Bank Holding company: Legacy Bancorp. Chartered in 1999, Legacy Bank was recently 
awarded the third largest CDFI grant by the Treasury Department, and is the only CDFI 
in Wisconsin (Source: 
www.thewheelerreport.com/releases/Oct03/Oct8/1008legacydistressed.PDF).  It is also 
the first bancorp in the US to be organized by African-American women.  Located in 
Milwaukee. No website found. 
LBT Lafayette Bank & Trust www.lbtbank.com Small bank serving areas in Indiana since 1899. 
LFC Scott Valley Bank Holding company: Learner Financial Corporation www.scottvalleybank.com Provides 
banking services to northern CA areas. 
LKFN1 Lake City Bank Holding company: Lakeland Financial Corporation www.lakecitybank.com Founded in 
1872, serves northern IN. 
LOSB Lake Osceola State Bank (Scottville) www.losb.com (Website for customers only) Emerged from West Shore Corp., a 
grouping of local banks to get computer services.  In business since 1969. 
LXBK1 Lexington State Bank Holding company: LSB Bancshares, Inc. www.lsbnc.com Serves north central NC. 
MBVT1 The Merchants Bank Holding company: Merchants Bancshares, Inc. www.mbvt.com Serves the VT area. 
MCBC1 Macatawa Bank Holding company: Macatawa Bank Corporation www.macatawabank.com Purposely 
local community bank serving the Michigan area (although merged with Grand Bank in 
2001). 
MCFCU Midwest Community FCU (Defiance) www.midwestcommunity.org Serves seven counties in Ohio.  No history on website. 
MCGB McGehee Bank (McGehee) www.mcgeheebank.com A four-branch bank in SE AR, was started in the early 40's. 
MCU Marine Credit Union www.marinecu.com Serves certain counties and employees of Wisconsin. 
MFBD Merchants & Farmers Bank of 
Dumas (Dumas) 
www.mfbanknet.com Serves SE AR, started in 1909, and is subsidiary of M&F 
Financial Corporation (a two-branch bank holding company). 
MFC MidFirst Bank Holding company: Midland Financial Company www.midfirst.com Started in 1982 and 
serves OK. 
MFFCU Mennonite Financial FCU www.mennonitefinancial.com Serves Mennonites, Amish, Brethren in Christ, and 
Anabaptists in the US.  Chartered in 1955.  Located in PA and OH. 
MI2 M & I Mid-State Bank (also listed as 
M&I Bank of Southern Wisconsin, 
Dodgeville and M&I Marshall & 
Illsley Bank)  
Holding company: Marshall & Ilsley Corporation www.micorp.com Bank subsidiary is M 
& I Marshall & Ilsley Bank (www.mibank.com ) locations in WI, MN, MO, AZ, NV, IL & 
FL. Certain locations were merged with M&I Corp in 2001 and other dates. 
MMBI3 Fortress Bank (Westby) Holding company: Merchants and Manufacturers BanCorp www.mmbancorp.com 
(since 2002), which is itself a member of Community BancGroup 
www.communitybancgroup.com. Bank website: www.fortressbanks.com 
MNBI Mercantile National Bank of Indiana www.mercantileweb.com Started in 1932, the bank is family-owned.  It is based in 
Hammond, IN and serves NE IN. 
MORE1 
Monroe Bank 
www.monroecountybank.com Holding company is Monroe Bancorp, headquartered in 
Bloomington, IN, since 1892 
MRBK1 Bank of Southern Maryland Holding Company: (since 1971) Mercantile Bankshares Corporation 
www.mercantile.net Recently bought F&M Bancorp, which owned Farmers and 
Merchants Bank.  Holdings include Mercantile Safe Deposit and Trust, Annapolis Bank 
and Trust, Baltimore Trust, Calvert Bank, Chestertown Bank, Citizens National Bank, 
County Bank, Farmers and Mechanics Bank, Fidelity Bank, First National Bank of St. 
Marys, Forest Hill Bank, Marshall National Bank and Trust, The National Bank of 
Fredericksburg, Peninsula Bank, Peoples Bank, Potomac Valley Bank, St. Michaels 
Bank, and Westminster Union Bank. Bank website: www.bankofsouthernmd.com 
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MRBK1 Calvert Bank and Trust (Prince 
Frederick) 
Community Bank, but an affiliate of Mercantile Bankshares Corporation since 1982 (see 
above).  Bank website: www.calvertbank.com 
MRBK1 First National Bank of St. Mary's 
(Leonardtown) 




Holding company: MainSource Financial Group www.mainsourcefinancial.com Serves 
“Kentuckiana.” Bank website: www.regionalbank.com 
MSTI3 BankIllinois  Holding company: Main Street Trust, Inc. www.bankillinois.com (bank website) Other 
subsidiaries include The First National Bank of Decatur, and FirsTech. 
MTB2 M & T Bank Holding company: M&T Bank Corporation (Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company) 
www.mandtbank.com.  In 2003, bought Allfirst and Allied Irish Banks.  Serves NY, PA, 
VA, MD, WV & DC. 
NATCOM National Bank of Commerce in 
Superior 
Holding company: NATCOM Bancshares, Inc. www.nbofc.com Serves Wisconsin areas 
NBI The National Bank of Indianapolis Holding company: The National Bank of Indianapolis Corporation www.nbofi.com 
Serves Indianapolis area.  Privately owned. 
NCC2 National City Bank (also listed as 
National City Bank of Michigan) 
Holding company: National City Corporation www.nbronline.com Serves IL, MI, IN, OH 
(base), KY & PA 
NCF2 Central Carolina Bank & Trust 
Company 
Holding company: National Commerce Financial Corporation www.ncfcorp.com Serves 
the SE also holding National Bank of Commerce (aka NBC Bank) (in the SE), Central 
Carolina Bank & Trust, and half of First Market Bank 
NCF2 NBC Bank Holding company: National Commerce Financial Corporation (see above) 
NCFCU NorthSide Community Federal 
Credit Union 
http://collaboratory.nunet.net/itrc/ncfcu/ Serves persons living or working in the 
Northside Chicago area. 
NECFCU Northeast Community FCU www.necfcu.org (is updating website) Located in San Francisco, CA.  Collaborates with 
the Asian and Pacific Islander Business and Information Services (apiBIS). 
NHCFCU New Horizons Community FCU Serves the Kensington and Fishtown areas of Philadelphia, founded through the New 
Kensington Neighborhood Advisory Committee in the 1980s (Source: 
www.ncua.gov/org/orgchart/ocud/CreditUnionPartnerships.pdf). 
NKSH5 The National Bank of Blacksburg Holding company: National Bankshares, Inc. www.nbbank.com Started in 1891, the 
corporation holds this bank and Bank of Tazewell County.  Serves SW VA. 
NPBC1 National Penn Bank Holding company: National Penn Bancshares, Inc. www.natpennbank.com Serves SE 
PA.  Plans to buy Peoples First (holding company for Peoples Bank of Oxford). 
NSBM Norway Savings Bank Holding company: Norway Bancorp, Inc. www.norwaysavingsbank.com Serves western 
and southern Maine since 1866. 
NSBV Northern State Bank of Virginia www.nsbov.com Locally owned bank in Virginia, MN 
NSBVT Northfield Savings Bank www.nsbvt.com Started in 1867, the bank became a mutual holding company in 2001.  
Serves central VT.   
NWIN3 
Peoples Bank SB 
Holding company: NorthWest Indiana Bancorp. Small bank serving areas of Indiana 
since 1910. Bank website: http://www.peoplesbanksb.com 
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NWSB1 Northwest Savings Bank Holding company: Northwest Bancorp, Inc. www.nwsb.com Holds Northwest, serving 
PA and NE OH, and Jamestown Savings Bank, serving SW NY.  The Bancorp is three-
quarters owned by a mutual holding company. 
ONB2 Old National Bank Holding company: Old National Bancorp www.oldnational.com Serves IN, IL, KY, OH, 
and TN. 
ONE2 Bank One Holding company: Bank One Corporation www.bankone.com Is the sixth largest US 
Bank and serves southern and midwestern states.  To be purchased by JP Morgan 
Chase. 
OSUFCU OSU FCU www.osufederal.com/about_us Started in 1954 as the “Oregon State College Federal 
Credit Union”.  When the school changed its name to Oregon State University, so did 
the credit union. 
OURCU O.U.R. Credit Union O.U.R. FCU is situated in Eugene Oregon (Source: Credit Union Association of 
Oregon) serving low-income populations.  No website listed. 
PBCT1 People's Bank (also was listed as 
Peoples Savings Bank, Bridgeport) 
www.peoples.com Founded in 1842, operates in CT and is the largest state-chartered 
bank in that state.  Operates as a mutual holding company. 
PBIX1 Patriot Bank Holding company: Patriot Bank Corp. www.patriotbank.com Serves Philadelphia.  To be 
bought by Susquehanna Bancshares. 
PCBC1 Santa Barbara Bank & Trust Holding company: Pacific Capital Bancorp www.pcbancorp.com Holds Pacific Capital 
Bank, which operates as several subsidiaries, including Santa Barbara Bank & Trust.  
Serves central CA coast. 
PCPFCU People's Community Partnership 
FCU 
www.pcpfcu.org  (website not working) Started in 2001 to serve Oakland. 
PCU Patelco Credit Union www.patelco.org San Francisco-based, started by the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph 
Company to serve its employees, now the 10th largest CU in the US 
PFBT Phoenixville Federal Bank & Trust www.phoenixfed.com Open since 1912, in 1939 it was given a federal charter as the 
Phoenixville Federal Savings & Loan Association.  Serves Phoenixville, Collegeville, 
Royerford, and Pikeland, PA. 
PFSB People's Federal Savings (Allston) www.pfsb.com Local bank serving MA areas 
PMGB Planters & Merchants (Gillett) Planters and Merchants Bank is a one-branch bank in Gillett, AR.  It is not to be 
confused with the much larger Merchants and Planters' Bank, also serving AR areas.  
No website found. 
PNBL The Pioneer National Bank of 
Ladysmith 
Local bank (no website could be found) 
PNC2 PNC Bank (also listed as Pittsburgh 
National Bank) 
Holding company: The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. www.pnc.com The PNC 
Bank serves DE, KY, NJ, OH & PA.  Pittsburgh National Bank was formerly owned by 
Pittsburgh National Corporation until a merger in 1983. 
PPFR3 Peoples Bank of Oxford Holding company: Peoples First, Inc. www.peoplesoxford.com Serves SE PA and NE 
MD.  To be bought by National Penn Bancshares. 
PRWT5 PremierWest Bank (also listed as 
Mid Valley Bank) 
Holding company: PremierWest Bancorp www.premierwestbank.com for PremierWest 
Bank and CA-based Mid Valley Bank (as of 2004) 
PSBM PeoplesBank www.bankatpeoples.com Started in 1885, now is PeoplesBank.  Serves several 
communities in MA. 
PVSA1 Parkvale Savings Bank Holding company: Parkvale Financial Corporation www.parkvale.com Serves Pittsburgh 
areas. 
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QCRH5 Quad-City Bank and Trust Holding company: QCR Holdings, Inc. www.qcbt.com Formerly Quad City Holdings, the 
holding company operates the bank in IA and in Moline, IL.  The company also owns 
Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust Co., which opened for business in 2001. 
RB Community First Bank Community First Bank of Glendive, which was held by the Community First 
Bancorporation, which was slated in 2002 to be bought by Richey Bancorporation – 
Grantee website: www.hrdc7.org/idas.htm  
RBCAA1 Republic Bank & Trust Company Holding company: Republic Bancorp, Inc. www.republicbank.com Serves KY and IA, as 
well as nationwide internet customers. 
RBOA Reliance Bank www.reliancebank.com A mutual savings bank, has been in business for "200 years".  
Has seven branches in PA. 
RBS7 Commonwealth Bankitizens Bank 
(also listed as Citizens Bank, 
Citizens Bank of Massachusetts and 
Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania) 
Commonwealth Bank became a part of the superregional The Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group in 2003 through the large US subsidary, Citizens Financial Group, Inc.'s 
purchase of Commonwealth Bancorp in 2003.  RBS trades on the FTSE.  Citizens 
Financial Group www.citizensbank.com serves New England, and is the U.S. retail 
banking arm of the Royal Bank of Scotland 
RCCU Riverside County's Credit Union www.rccu.org Serves residents and employees of Riverside County, CA.  Originally 
founded to serve area teachers. 
RCU Royal Credit Union (RCU) www.rcu.org Started in 1964 by the employees of the UniRoyal plant in WI, but has 
expanded membership to 27 other WI groups. 
REBC1 National Bank of the Redwoods  Holding company: Redwood Empire Bancorp www.nbronline.com Serves CA areas. 
RY2 RBC Centura Bank (was listed as 
Centura Bank) 
Bought by the Royal Bank of Canada 2001 www.rbccentura.com The formerly named 
Centura Banks serves the southeast US.  Through RBC Centura, it also owns Eagle 
Bancshares (GA), Admiralty Bancorp (FL) and Provident Financial Group (FL). 
SB StonehamBank (was listed as 
Stoneham Savings Bank) 
www.stonehambank.com Small local bank once known as Stoneham Co-Operative 
Bank  
SB&T Salin Bank & Trust Holding company: Salin Bancshares, Inc. www.salin.com A family-owned bank serving 
Indiana. Has bought various individual and small group purchases (leftovers from larger 
mergers, e.g., BankOne). 
SCICAPCU SCICAP Credit Union (Leon) Stands for South Central Iowa Community Action Program Credit Union 
(http://www.iowacommunityaction.com/SCICAPprograms.htm )  
SDC Delta Southern Bank (Ruralville) Changed to current name in 2002.  Was "Bank of Ruleville," merged with Southern 
Development Bancorporation in 2001 www.southerndevelopmentbancorp.com, and 
combined with Delta Bank & Trust.  Open since 1902 (Source: 
http://www.msbusiness.com/archives/24v39n/Metro/13738.php ).   
SDC First National Bank of Phillips Co. www.fnbpc.com  -- Holding company is Southern Development Bancorporation (see 
above).  Holding company also owns The Good Faith Fund, Delta Southern Bank, the 
grantee, Southern Financial Partners (the grantee), and other development 
corporations & companies 
SEFCU State Employees FCU www.sefcu.com/membership/history.html Started in 1934 to serve state employees in 
Albany, NY, the CU recently changed its name to "SEFCU".  Has merged with several 
credit unions since its inception. 
SENFCU Sentry FCU www.sentryfcu.org/sentryfcu Founded in 1969 for the employees of Scott Paper 
Company, it now serves all of Delaware County, PA. 
SF Security First (Rushville) www.security1stbank.com/aboutus Bank & other financial services serves NE & SD 
(branch listed is in NE).  Formerly Stockmens National Bank. 
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SFC Stockman Bank of MT Holding company: Stockman Financial Corporation www.stockmanbank.com Originally 
started from Miles City Bank in 1953, has grown through acquisition to serve MT and 
WY. 
SFCU Schuylkill Federal Credit Union www.schuylkillfcu.com/index.html Chartered in 1958 as the “Pottsville Belco Employees 
Federal Credit Union” and changed name in 1983.  Serves several employee groups in 
the Pottsville, PA area. 
SFNC1 Simmons First National-Pine Bluff Holding company: Simmons First National Corporation www.simmonsfirst.com One of 
the largest in AR.  Includes community banks under the brand name and is buying six 
more AR banks from Union Planters. 
SFSB Security Federal Savings Bank www.secfedbank.com A mutual financial institution serving Cass and Howard Counties 
of IN. 
SIFS Sanford Institution for Savings No website available.  Depositor-owned, mutual savings bank serving York County 
areas in Maine.  Chartered in 1933 (source: 
http://www.seacoastonline.com/2003news/yorkweekly/12242003/business/67210.htm )  
SKYF1 Sky Bank Holding company: Sky Financial Group, Inc. www.skyfi.com Serves OH, MI, IN, PA, 
and WV.  Plans to buy Ohio's Second Bancorp. 
SOTR1 SouthTrust Bank Holding company: SouthTrust Corporation www.southtrust.com is the largest in AL and 
has 700 branches in the SE and Texas.  It is buying FloridaFirst Bancorp. 
SOV2 Sovereign Bank Holding company: Sovereign Bancorp, Inc. www.sovereignbank.com One of the largest 
US thrifts, has over 500 branches throughout the Northeast.  It bought First Essex 
Bancorp in 2004 and is looking to purchase Seacoast Financial Services (of MA). 
SRCE1 
1st Source Bank 
Holding company: 1st Source Corporation www.1stsource.com Serves N Indiana and 
SW Michigan. 
SSB Seattle Savings Bank Holding company: Seattle Financial Group www.seattlesavingsbank.com Has several 
mortgage subsidaries and operates in WA, AK, AZ, CA, FL, HI, ID, MI, MN, NV, OK, 
OR, PA and TX.  The bank was created in 1999.  Locally owned through company. 
SSBMO Senath State Bank A very small bank serving Kennett, Arbyrd, and Senath, MO.  No website found for 
bank. (Source: www.thebuzz.semissourian.com/main.wsi?group_id=174) 
SSFCU Security Service FCU (San Antonio) www.ssfcu.org Worldwide credit union started in 1956 in San Antonio to service the 
USAF Security Service Command. 
STAR 
STAR Financial Bank 
Holding company: STAR Financial Group, Inc. www.starfinancial.com Serves central 
and northeast Indiana since 1943. Name is based on the first letters of the founders' 
names. 
STBA1 S&T Bank Holding company: S&T Bancorp, Inc. www.stbank.com Operates in western PA. 
STI2 SunTrust Bank Holding company: SunTrust Banks, Inc. www.suntrust.com Operates throughout FL, 
GA, MD, TN, VA & DC. 
STSA1 Sterling Savings Bank Holding company: Sterling Financial Corporation (unrelated to PA company) 
www.sterlingsavingsbank.com  Has branches in WA, OR, ID, MT.  Bought Empire 
Federal Bancorp (MT) in 2003 and Klamath First Bancorp (OR) in 2004. 
SUBI1 SunBank Holding company: Sun Bancorp, Inc. www.sunbancorp.com Serves central and 
northeastern PA.  Unrelated to NJ corporation of the same name that serves 
Philadelphia, but operates under the name Sun National Bank. 
SUM Summit Bank www.summitbankdirect.com Serving AR areas and appears to be a local bank 
SUMSC Summit National Bank Holding company: Summit Financial Corporation www.summit-bank.com/home.html 
Serves upstate SC. 
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SUSQ1 First Susquehanna Bank & Trust Holding company: Susquehanna Bancshares, Inc. www.susqbanc.com Serves PA, MD, 
and NJ with various subsidiary banks. Bank website: www.thefirst.com 
SVB Siuslaw Bank (was listed as Siuslaw 
Valley Bank) 
Holding company: Siuslaw Financial Group, Inc. www.clicksvb.com Chartered in 1964, 
changed name in 2002 to Siuslaw Bank. Serves Lane County, primarily.  
SWBT1 Southwest Bank of TX, NA Holding company: Southwest Bancorporation of Texas, Inc. www.swbanktx.com Serves 
the Houston-Galveston area, and as of 2004 the Dallas area with its purchase of Lone 
Star Bank. 
SWFCU School Workers FCU www.schoolworkersfcu.org Founded in 1941, serves selected school workers and 
members of various churches, and residents of various counties in NC. In 2002, 
merged with Rowan-Iredell Area CU. 
TCFCU T&C Federal Credit Union (Pontiac) https://www.tcfcu.org/newhome/home.php3 Started in 1936, to serve employees of 
General Motors Truck Corporation in Pontiac, MI.  It now serves Oakland County as 
well as several other employee groups in MI. 
THSB Terre Haute Savings Bank www.thsbank.com Since 1869 locally owned and operated in the Wabash Valley of IN. 
TIN2 Guaranty Bank  Holding company: Temple-Inland Financial Services, Inc. (dba Guaranty Financial 
Services) provides banking [loan] services to CA and TX. Indirect subsidiary of Temple-
Inland, Inc. (TIN) Websites: www.guarantygroup.com & www.bank.guarantygroup.com  
TOFC1 Tower Bank & Trust Holding company: Tower Financial Corporation www.towerbank.net Formed Tower 
Bank & Trust in 1999 to serve as a community bank institution where many local banks 
had been merged into larger ones.  Serves Fort Wayne with three branches. 
TRBS1 Texas State Bank Holding company: Texas Regional Bancshares, Inc. www.trbsinc.com Serves Rio 
Grande Valley, Corpus Christi and Houston areas of TX.  Second-tier holding company, 
Texas Regional Delaware, owns the bank. 
TSI The Savings Institute http://savingsinstitute.com Incorporated in 1842 as the Willimantic Savings Institute.  
Serves MA areas 
TUFCU The United FCU www.tufcu.com Serves Morgantown, WV and Mt. Pleasant & Uniontown, PA.  No 
information available on history from website. 
UB2 Union Bank of California Holding company: UnionBanCal Corporation www.uboc.com Operates in CA, OR, WA 
and the Pacific Rim.  Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, one of Japan's largest banking 
companies, owns two-thirds of the corporation. 
UB&TC United Bank and Trust Company 
(was listed as United Bank and 
Trust) 
No website listed, but bank is located in New Orleans and is a CDFI, among other 
community development titles. 
UBI United Bank of Philadelphia Holding company: United Bancshares, Inc. www.unitedbankofphila.com Is an African-
American, privately controlled holding company serving Philadelphia since 1992.  Not to 
be confused with United Bancshares, Inc. of OH, or with United Bankshares in WV. 
UCBH1 United Commercial Bank Holding company: UCBH Holdings, Inc. www.ibankunited.com Caters to Chinese-
American community in California with multi-lingual service,  
UMPQ1 Umpqua Bank Holding company: Umpqua Holdings Corporation www.umpquabank.com Serves OR 
and SW WA.  Bought Centennial Bancorp in 2002. 
UNB4 Union Bank (Morrisville) Holding company: Union Bankshares, Inc. www.unionbankvt.com Also holds Citizens 
Bank & Trust and Union Bank serving VT. 
UNIZ1 Unizan (also listed as UNB and 
United National Bank) 
Holding company: Unizan Financial Corp. www.unizan.com Created through a 2002 
merger of BancFirst Ohio and UNB Corp (www.united-bank.com leads to unizan.com).  
Huntington Bancshares is purchasing the holding company. 
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USB2 Bay View Bank (San Leandro) Holding company: U.S. Bancorp www.usbank.com Operates mainly in western and 
mid-western states. 
USB2 US Bank (was listed as Firstar Bank) Firstar acquired US Bancorp (holding company for US Bank) in 2001, but took its name 
(see above). 
USB2 US Bank (was listed as Mercantile 
Bank, Firstar) 
Mercantile Bancorporation merged with Firstar in late '90s.   Firstar acquired US 
Bancorp (holding company for US Bank) in 2001 (see above). 
USFCU Ukrainian Self-Reliance Federal 
Credit Union 
The Ukrainian SelfReliance of Western Pennsylvania Federal Credit Union serves the 
southeast PA areas since 1973 (started in Pittsburgh).  Ukrainian Selfreliance is a 
nonprofit group www.samopomich.com 
UVSP1 Univest National Bank & Trust (was 
listed as Union National Bank & 
Trust Company) 
Holding company: Univest Corporation of Pennsylvania www.univest-corp.com Formed 
the bank in 2003 with a merger of Union National Bank and Pennview Savings Bank.  
Serves SE PA. 
VDCU Vermont Development Credit Union www.vdcu.org Founded in 1989 by Burlington Ecumenical Action Ministry.  In 2002, 
VDCU partnered with Banknorth Vermont to create the Vermont Affordable Lending 
Partnership. 
VOCU Valley Oak Credit Union (Clovis) www.valleyoak.org Serves Tulare & Madera counties in CA, as well as selected groups 
in other CA counties. 
VYFC3 Valley Bank Holding company: Valley Financial Corporation (no website listed). Serves the 
Roanoke, VA area. 
WAIN1 Wainwright Bank Holding company: Wainwright Bank & Trust Company www.wainwrightbank.com 
Founded in 1987, the bank serves the Boston area. 
WBC Peoples Bank of Madison County 
(was listed as Peoples Bank and 
Trust Co of Madison County, 
Richmond) 
www.whitakerbank.com Chartered as Peoples Bank & Trust in 1970.  Together with 
several other KY banks, they now form Whitaker Bank Corporation of Kentucky to serve 
E. KY. 
WB2 Wachovia Bank (was listed as First 
Union and as Merchant’s National 
Bank) 
Holding company: Wachovia Corporation www.wachovia.com Formed in 2001 when 
First Union took over Wachovia and took smaller corp.'s name. Now the 4th largest 
bank in US. First Union bought Merchant’s National Bank. 
WBK The First National Bank (Cass Lake) Federal Reserve document (www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h2/20010825/h2.pdf ) 
cites decision to allow Western Bancorporation to buy bank in 2001.  Formerly owned 
by Cass Lake Company, a one-bank holding corporation. 
WBNK5 Waccamaw Bank Holding company: Waccamaw Bankshares, Inc. www.waccamawbank.com Started in 
1997, and became a one-bank holding company in 2001.  Serves southeastern NC. 
WBS2 Webster Bank  Holding company: Webster Financial Corporation www.websterbank.com Serves CT. 
WCBO1 West Coast Bank Holding company: West Coast Bancorp www.westcoastbancorp.com Unrelated to CA 
company, serves OR & WA. 
WCCU WESTconsin Credit Union 
(Menomonie) 
www.westconsincu.org. Started as Menomonie Farmers Credit Union in 1939.  Serves 
western Wisconsin counties. 
WFC2 Wells Fargo Bank (also listed as 
Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A.; 
Norwest Bank WI, Milwaukee; 
Norwest Bank Minnesota South, 
Bermidii; and Norwest Banks 
Nevada, Reno 
Holding company: Wells Fargo & Company  www.wellsfargo.com Is 5th largest in US, 
and doing international trade with HSBC.  Bought Pacific Northwest Bancorp in 2003. 
WFC2 Marquette Bank Marquette Bancshares, Inc., based in Minneapolis, was purchased by Wells Fargo in 
2002 (see above) (source: 
http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/stories/2001/10/01/daily44.html?jst=s_rs_hl)  
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WFSB Washington Federal Savings Bank Holding company: WFSB Mutual Holding Company www.washfed.com Serves PA 
areas. 
WL2 Wilmington Trust Holding company: Wilmington Trust Corporation www.wilmingtontrust.com Operates in 
DE, MD & PA.  Growing into other states and countries through acquisition. 
WM2 Washington Mutual Bank Holding company: Washington Mutual, Inc. www.wamu.com Is the largest thrift in the 
US and operates nationwide.  Is selling its Washington Mutual Finance Division 
(consumer loans) to CitiFinancial . 
WPBT West Plains Bank & Trust Co. www.westplainsbank.com Serves West Plains, MO and surrounding areas. 
WTCU West Texas Credit Union (El Paso) http://westtex.cuportal.com/portal.asp Founded in 1964, was chartered to serve state 
employees in the West Texas area.  Now serves many different employee groups and 
residents of the area through mergers with other employee credit unions. 
WTNY1 Whitney National Bank Holding company: Whitney Holding Corporation www.whitneybank.com Serves LA, AL, 
FL, MS & TX. 
WVFC1 West View Savings Bank Holding company: WVS Financial Corp. 
www.westviewcc.net/westviewsavingsbank.htm Serves Pittsburgh, PA. 
WYPT1 Waypoint Bank Holding company: Waypoint Financial Corporation www.waypointbank.com Serves PA 
and MD.  To be bought by Sovereign Bancorp. 
ZION1 California Bank & Trust Subsidiary of Zions Bancorporation since 1998 http://www.zionsbancorporation.com 
ZION1 National Bank of Arizona www.nbarizona.com Subsidiary of Zions Bancorporation since 1994 
 
Notes: 
* Duplicate names are for information purposes only to indicate name changes, mergers, or other pertinent information. 
† Unless noted otherwise (see below), acronyms were created by the researcher. 
1 Acronym as listed on the National Association of Secuities Dealers Automatic Quotation System (NASDAQ). 
2 Acronym as listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
3 Acronym as listed in “Over the Counter” (OTC) public stock offerings. 
4 Acronym as listed on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). 
5 Acronym as listed on the NASDAQ SC (“Small Cap”) stock offerings. 
6 Organization holds its own accounts. 
7 Acronym as listed on the London Stock Exchange (FTSE).  “FT” stands for “Financial Times,” the name of a financial 




Appendix D: Data Language (DL) Files 
 




row labels embedded 
column labels embedded 
format = nodelist2 
data: 
AffordHous HBC PSB SEFCU TROY 
AllBright CCFC EBTC PFSB PSBM SOV 
ALULike BOH HE 
CAAB C 
CenVTCAC MBVT NSBVT UNB VDCU 
CoastEnter BSB BSI CAC CCU GSI KSB NSBM SIFS 
CSA&DC PNB USB 
CTEInc CMB SUB TSI 
EBayALDC CALFED CBB USB ZION 
EOBClarkCo ZION 
Enter+ED VOCU 




INDOC BPSB CBI FFBT FITB FSBM LBT MORE MSFG NWIN ONE SB&T SRCE STAR  
ISED ABI BAC BTCFC DCFCU FIRST QCRH SCICAPCU 
KYRiverFoot CVNB&T FITB ONE WBC 
LittleDixie FUB&T 
MercyHous CIB WM ZION 
MINeighPart CMA 
MileHighUW KEY WFC 
MountHope BFCU 
NCDOL BAC CENB FCNCA HTBP LXBK RIACU WB 
OHCDC BAC BFO FDEF FDFCU FFSN FITB HBAN 
PADCED FBF PNC 
Peninsula C 
Penquis BNK BSB CAC FCBM FNSB GSI NSBM SIFS 
PeopleInc BLUG BOM FAB FU FVB HBKA 
RamseyAct BFC FIRST WPFCU 
RiverCo CNC 
SoMDTriCo MRBK 
CtrWomen&Fam NCC RBCAA 
UWGtrStLo ALLE BAC FIRST 
WICAPAssn AB ABCW ASBC BOAB CBCF CBL CFBX CUNACU FBS FIRST FTFC MCU MI 










row labels embedded 
column labels embedded 
format = nodelist2 
data: 
2ndDist C RY 
ActFABC CF 
TulEdFund HIB UB&TC WTNY 
AffordHous DCOM FNFG HBC HRBT MTB PSB SEFCU 
AidtoVics BAC 
AllBright CBSS CFG CNBKA FBF PFSB PSBM WAIN 
AlternFCU AFCU 
ALULike BOH HE 
AtlCoop CCBT CZBS 
BethelNL FBOPC 
CalebCDC HIB ONE 
CamdenCo WB 
CAPSvcs ABCW CBCF CCU CFCU FCCU FEBB FTFC GMB MI 
CAAB C 
CASA CB OSUFCU OURCU PRWT SVB UMPQ WCBO WM 
CathChar MI 
CathFamSvcs ANB 
CenVTCAC MBVT NSBVT UNB VDCU 
CityofLA WM 
CityofSA CFR SSFCU WFC 
CityofTucs AZFCU 
CityVision FC-FCU HBAN MCBC 
CoastEnter BSB BSI CAC COMCU GSI KSB NSBM SIFS 
CAAOKC BOKF FCBOK MFC 
CACStaBarb PCBC WFC 
CAA A1FCU 
CACSTX FNBH FSBSD IBOC TRBS 
CAPSonCo EXSR 
CommIMPACT ASO FBOT FTN USB 
CommSvcNet SB 
CSA&DC WFC 
CoOpprty COI FBF PBCT WBS 
CTEInc C FBF JPM PBCT TSI 
Dist7MT FCFCU FIB RB SFC USB 





ElPasoCo INB WFC 
ElPuente WFC WTCU 
EmpRes CATC 
EnternED UB VOCU 
FamSvcs C PBCT 
5thAve ICB 
FirstCoast FFBNF 
FirstState ART WL 
FiveCap IBCP LOSB 
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FoundComm CBSS 
FreshMini STI WB 
GreatRivers USB 
GulfCoast SWBT WFC 
HaciCDC HCCU 
HIAlli BOH HE 
HeartofAm UNIZ USB 
ILCAA AMFI NCC ONE 
INDOC BCFCU BFSB BPSB CBC CBI CBIN CBK CCFCU CENCU CFFG FFBC FFBT FITB 
FSBM GABC GCSB HBAN HBNC HOMF IFC LBT LKFN MNBI MORE MSFG NBI NWIN ONB 
RBCAA SB&T SFSB SRCE STAR THSB TOFC USB WFC 
ISED ABI BT COMN QCRH SCICAPCU USB 
IIBoston CFG 
JackCoCAC SOTR 
JEDI LFC PRWT 
KYRiverFoot CVNB&T FITB ONE WBC 
LDCofENY MTB 
MercyHous HBEK WM ZION 
MesaCAN WFC ZION 
MINeighPart CMA 
MileHighUW WFC 
MOAssnCA ABOM BBP BOOM CBY DFC FSBK INVN SSBMO USB WPBT 
Montachu EB GCB SOV 
MountHope BFCU C 
NewCDC CFB 





NCDOL BAC BBT BCAR FCNCA HTBP LXBK NCF RY SWFCU WB WBNK 
NoDadeCDC WB 




OakLiv BACCU CBCF FITB NCC TCFCU 




PADCED ASB CBPA CBU CITCU COAT COFCU CVAL CVLY CZFS CZNC CZPY DNBF FBF 
FKFS FNB FRBK FSBI FSFF FTB FULT GHCCU HU LARL MFFCU MTB NCC NHCFCU 
NPBC NWSB PBIX PFBT PNC PPFR PVSA RBOA RBS SENFCU SFCU SKYF SOV STBA 
SUBI SUSQ TUFCU UBI USFCU UVSP WB WFSB WVFC WYPT 
PartAccts MSTI 
Peninsula C 
Penquis BNK BSB CAC FBF FCBM FNSB GSI KEY NSBM SIFS 
PeopleInc ASO BBT BLUG BOM HBKA WB 
PeoplesCDC BAC 
PortHous CACB WM 
RamseyAct BFC CCOFCU NSBV WBK WFC 
ReDevOpps USB 
RiverCo C CNC FHLBSF RCCU TIN 
SFranFoun C 
SoARCD SUM 
SENDCAA BFC BNCC CFBX 
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SoFinPart F&MBS MCGB MFBD PMGB SDC SFNC 
SoMDTriCo MRBK 
SpokeNeigh FMB STSA USB WFC 
StarkCo UNIZ 
CTDOL FBF WB WBS 
SteFamFou BMO IBCB ONE 
StudAltern IBOC 
SuffolkCDC C 




NewAmFound CBB WM 
UrbLeague SUMSC 
TotalAct BBT F&MB FCNCA FNEX NCF VYFC WB 
TuscaHous CBSS 
UniComCtrs WFC 
UWCommSvcs FINB NCC 
UWForsyCo BAC 
UWGtrLA BAC ECFCU HTHR UB USB WM ZION 
UWGtrStLo ALLE BAC USB 
UWKingCo SSB USB WM 
UWMetroAtl SOTR WB 
UWSEPA CFG 
UWTXGC CBSS JPM WFC 
UpETNHAD AFGECU AJB BTC CCB FCEN HBKA HCB JCB 
WECOFund CMCU FCUCU 
WestEnt HBEK REBC 
WestPCDC C 
WestHous BK C WB 
WCarolCA FCNCA RY 
WICAPAssn AB ASBC BOAB CITFCU CUNACU FTFC GB HCU LB MCU MI MMBI NATCOM 
PNBL RCU USB WCCU WFC 
WIWomBus MI 









row labels embedded 
column labels embedded 
format = nodelist2 
data: 
CSA&DC PNB USB 
EBayALDC CALFED CBB USB ZION 
EOBClarkCo ZION 
INDOC BPSB CBI FFBT FITB FSBM LBT MORE MSFG NWIN ONE SB&T SRCE STAR  
ISED ABI BAC BTCFC DCFCU FIRST QCRH SCICAPCU 
KYRiverFoot CVNB&T FITB ONE WBC 
MercyHous CIB WM ZION 
NCDOL BAC CENB FCNCA HTBP LXBK RIACU WB 
OHCDC BAC BFO FDEF FDFCU FFSN FITB HBAN 
RamseyAct BFC FIRST WPFCU 
UWGtrStLo ALLE BAC FIRST 
WICAPAssn AB ABCW ASBC BOAB CBCF CBL CFBX CUNACU FBS FIRST FTFC MCU MI 
NATCOM PCCU PNB PNBL RCU WB WCCU WCNB WIFSB 
WIWomBus MI 
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row labels embedded 
column labels embedded 
format = nodelist2 
data: 
2ndDist C RY 
TulEdFund HIB UB&TC WTNY 
AffordHous DCOM FNFG HBC HRBT MTB PSB SEFCU 
AidtoVics BAC 
AllBright CBSS CFG CNBKA FBF PFSB PSBM WAIN 
CalebCDC HIB ONE 
CamdenCo WB 
CAPSvcs ABCW CBCF CCU CFCU FCCU FEBB FTFC GMB MI 
CAAB C 
CASA CB OSUFCU OURCU PRWT SVB UMPQ WCBO WM 
CathChar MI 
CityofLA WM 
CityofSA CFR SSFCU WFC 
CityVision FC-FCU HBAN MCBC 
CoastEnter BSB BSI CAC COMCU GSI KSB NSBM SIFS 
CACStaBarb PCBC WFC 
CommIMPACT ASO FBOT FTN USB 
CSA&DC WFC 
CoOpprty COI FBF PBCT WBS 
CTEInc C FBF JPM PBCT TSI 
Dist7MT FCFCU FIB RB SFC USB 
EBayALDC C CBB PCPFCU USB WM ZION 
EOBClarkCo WFC 
ElPasoCollab WFC 
ElPasoCo INB WFC 
ElPuente WFC WTCU 
EnternED UB VOCU 
FamSvcs C PBCT 
FoundComm CBSS 
FreshMini STI WB 
GreatRivers USB 
GulfCoast SWBT WFC 
HeartofAm UNIZ USB 
ILCAA AMFI NCC ONE 
INDOC BCFCU BFSB BPSB CBC CBI CBIN CBK CCFCU CENCU CFFG FFBC FFBT FITB 
FSBM GABC GCSB HBAN HBNC HOMF IFC LBT LKFN MNBI MORE MSFG NBI NWIN ONB 
RBCAA SB&T SFSB SRCE STAR THSB TOFC USB WFC 
ISED ABI BT COMN QCRH SCICAPCU USB 
IIBoston CFG 
JackCoCAC SOTR 
JEDI LFC PRWT 
KYRiverFoot CVNB&T FITB ONE WBC 
LDCofENY MTB 
MercyHous HBEK WM ZION 
MesaCAN WFC ZION 
MileHighUW WFC 
MOAssnCA ABOM BBP BOOM CBY DFC FSBK INVN SSBMO USB WPBT 
Montachu EB GCB SOV 
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NCDOL BAC BBT BCAR FCNCA HTBP LXBK NCF RY SWFCU WB WBNK 
NoDadeCDC WB 




OakLiv BACCU CBCF FITB NCC TCFCU 
OHCDC BAC FDEF FDFCU FFSN FITB HBAN MCFCU SKYF UNIZ 
OIC USB 
OFANE CFG 
PADCED ASB CBPA CBU CITCU COAT COFCU CVAL CVLY CZFS CZNC CZPY DNBF FBF 
FKFS FNB FRBK FSBI FSFF FTB FULT GHCCU HU LARL MFFCU MTB NCC NHCFCU 
NPBC NWSB PBIX PFBT PNC PPFR PVSA RBOA RBS SENFCU SFCU SKYF SOV STBA 
SUBI SUSQ TUFCU UBI USFCU UVSP WB WFSB WVFC WYPT 
Peninsula C 
Penquis BNK BSB CAC FBF FCBM FNSB GSI KEY NSBM SIFS 
PeopleInc ASO BBT BLUG BOM HBKA WB 
PeoplesCDC BAC 
PortHous CACB WM 
RamseyAct BFC CCOFCU NSBV WBK WFC 
ReDevOpps USB 
RiverCo C CNC FHLBSF RCCU TIN 
SFranFoun C 
SENDCAA BFC BNCC CFBX 
SpokeNeigh FMB STSA USB WFC 
StarkCo UNIZ 
CTDOL FBF WB WBS 
SteFamFou BMO IBCB ONE 
SuffolkCDC C 
CtrWomen&Fam NCC RBCAA 
NewAmFound CBB WM 
TotalAct BBT F&MB FCNCA FNEX NCF VYFC WB 
TuscaHous CBSS 
UniComCtrs WFC 
UWCommSvcs FINB NCC 
UWForsyCo BAC 
UWGtrLA BAC ECFCU HTHR UB USB WM ZION 
UWGtrStLo ALLE BAC USB 
UWKingCo SSB USB WM 
UWMetroAtl SOTR WB 
UWSEPA CFG 
UWTXGC CBSS JPM WFC 
UpETNHAD AFGECU AJB BTC CCB FCEN HBKA HCB JCB 
WestEnt HBEK REBC 
WestPCDC C 
WestHous BK C WB 
WCarolCA FCNCA RY 
WICAPAssn AB ASBC BOAB CITFCU CUNACU FTFC GB HCU LB MCU MI MMBI NATCOM 
PNBL RCU USB WCCU WFC 
WIWomBus MI 




Appendix E: Degree and Closeness Centrality Statistics for 2004 Networks 
 







Mean Degree Value 










N = 99 




N = 255 




n = 14 




n = 3 
2 1 1.33 0.471 100.00% (1.00) 
 
 



















n04G = 99 




n04B = 257 




n = 14 




n = 3 
100.00 66.67 77.78 15.71 100.00% (1.00) 
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Discussion of Degree and Closeness Centralization Measures 
Although the financial partner affiliation network is over twice the size of the 
grantee affiliation network, the two share relatively similar network centralization scores 
(far right column of Table D-1), both under the 50 percent cut-off value.  The example 
network’s centralization scores exhibit much greater differences between the two index 
scores (7.46 percent for the cluster graph and 100 percent for the 3-point graph).  One 
might reasonably assume, therefore, that the relative centrality indices of the two 2004 
affiliation network samples reveal aspects of centralization in addition to the high 
clustering effects of the centralized nodes of the 2004 incidence network.  That is to say, 
the relationships among grantees and relationships among financial partners in the two 
networks have both clustering and centralization characteristics in their core structures. 
In the two affiliation networks, US Bank (USB) in the financial partner network 
was the most central when measured by degree centralization and is directly adjacent to 
87 other financial partners in the network.  In the grantee network, the Indiana 
Department of Commerce (INDOC) and the East Bay Asian Local Development 
Corporation (EBayALDC) share the same raw degree scores, and each link through 
financial partners with 34 other grantees in the network. 
Table D-2 summarizes the closeness statistics for the two study networks and the 
examples.  The percentage values presented in Table D2 are the inverse sum geodesics 
and related statistics expressed as percentages (Borgatti et al., 2002).  The closeness 
centralization scores for the 2004 financial partner and grantee networks fall under the 
.50 cut-off value.  Again, despite the much smaller sizes of the two example networks, 
their closeness centrality indices are greater than those for the 2004 networks. 
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Appendix F: 1-Clique Memberships in the 2004 Affiliation Networks 
 
Table E-1 1-Clique membership in 2004 Grantee Network of cliques sized  3 
Cl. 
No. 
Grantee Members* Cl. 
No. 
Grantee Members* 
1 CommIMPACT  Dist7MT  EBayALDC GreatRivers  
HeartofAm  INDOC  ISED MOAssnCA  OIC  
ReDevOpps SpokeNeigh  UWGtrLA  UWGtrStLo 
UWKingCo  WICAPAssn 
17 CalebCDC  ILCAA  KYRiverFoot 
SteFamFou 
2 CASA  CityofLA  EBayALDC  MercyHous  
NECommFCU NewAmFound  PortHous  
UWGtrLA UWKingCo 
18 CalebCDC  NELADeltaCDC  TulEdFund 
3 EBayALDC  INDOC  MesaCAN SpokeNeigh  
UWGtrLA  WICAPAssn 
19 CityVision  INDOC  OHCDC 
4 EBayALDC  MercyHous  MesaCAN UWGtrLA 20 CTEInc  CoOpprty  FamSvcs 
5 2ndDist  CAAB  CTEInc  EBayALDC FamSvcs  
MountHope  NPAssist Peninsula  RiverCo 
SFranFoun SuffolkCDC  WestHous  WestPCDC 
YWCARMC 
21 CtrWomen&Fam  ILCAA  OakLiv 
PADCED  UWCommSvcs 
6 AffordHous  LDCofENY  PADCED 22 CtrWomen&Fam  INDOC  OakLiv 
7 AidtoVics  NCDOL  OHCDC PeoplesCDC  
UWForsyCo  UWGtrLA  UWGtrStLo 
23 ILCAA  KYRiverFoot  OakLiv 
8 AllBright  CTDOL  CTEInc  CoOpprty PADCED  
Penquis 
24 INDOC  KYRiverFoot  NWMIHSA 
OHCDC  OakLiv 
9 AllBright  CTEInc  UWTXGC 25 NCDOL  OHCDC  PADCED 
10 AllBright  FoundComm  TuscaHous UWTXGC 26 2ndDist  NCDOL  WCarolCA 
11 AllBright  IIBoston  NHComLnFund OFANE  
UWSEPA  YouthBuild 
27 2ndDist  NCDOL  WestHous 
12 AllBright  Montachu  PADCED 28 NCDOL  TotalAct  WCarolCA 
13 CACStaBarb  CSA&DC  CityofSA EOBClarkCo  
ElPasoCo  ElPasoCollab ElPuente  GulfCoast  
INDOC  MesaCAN MileHighUW  NWNMCDC  
RamseyAct SpokeNeigh  UWTXGC  UniComCtrs 
WICAPAssn 
29 HeartofAm  INDOC  OHCDC  UWGtrLA 
UWGtrStLo 
14 CAPSvcs  CathChar  WICAPAssn WIWomBus 30 OHCDC  OakLiv  PADCED 
15 CTDOL  CamdenCo  FreshMini  NCDOL 
NewVNewV  NoDadeCDC  PADCED PeopleInc  
TotalAct  UWMetroAtl WestHous 
31 HeartofAm  OHCDC  StarkCo 
16 CTDOL  CTEInc  PADCED  WestHous   
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Table E-2 1-Clique membership in 2004 Financial Partner Network of cliques sized  3 
Clique 
No. 
Financial Partner Members 
1 BCFCU  BFSB  BPSB  CBC  CBI  CBIN  CBK  CCFCU  CENCU  CFFG  FFBC  FFBT  FITB  
FSBM  GABC  GCSB  HBAN  HBNC  HOMF  IFC  LBT  LKFN  MNBI  MORE  MSFG  NBI  
NWIN  ONB  RBCAA  SB&T  SFSB  SRCE  STAR  THSB  TOFC  USB  WFC 
2 AB  ASBC  BOAB  CITFCU  CUNACU  FTFC  GB  HCU  LB  MCU  MI  MMBI  NATCOM  
PNBL  RCU  USB  WCCU  WFC 
3 FMB  STSA  USB  WFC 
4 USB  WFC  ZION 
5 ABOM  BBP  BOOM  CBY  DFC  FSBK  INVN  SSBMO  USB  WPBT 
6 ALLE  BAC  USB 
7 ASO  FBOT  FTN  USB 
8 BAC  ECFCU  HTHR  UB  USB  WM  ZION 
9 BAC  FITB  HBAN  UNIZ  USB 
10 ABI  BT  COMN  QCRH  SCICAPCU  USB 
11 C  CBB  PCPFCU  USB  WM  ZION 
12 FCFCU  FIB  RB  SFC  USB 
13 SSB  USB  WM 
14 ABCW  CBCF  CCU  CFCU  FCCU  FEBB  FTFC  GMB  MI 
15 ABN  BMO  NCFCU 
16 AFGECU  AJB  BTC  CCB  FCEN  HBKA  HCB  JCB 
17 AMFI  NCC  ONE 
18 ASB  CBPA  CBU  CITCU  COAT  COFCU  CVAL  CVLY  CZFS  CZNC  CZPY  DNBF  FBF  
FKFS  FNB  FRBK  FSBI  FSFF  FTB  FULT  GHCCU  HU  LARL  MFFCU  MTB  NCC  
NHCFCU  NPBC  NWSB  PBIX  PFBT  PNC  PPFR  PVSA  RBOA  RBS  SENFCU  SFCU  
SKYF  SOV  STBA  SUBI  SUSQ  TUFCU  UBI  USFCU  UVSP  WB  WFSB  WVFC  WYPT 
19 BACCU  CBCF  FITB  NCC  TCFCU 
20 BAC  BBT  BCAR  FCNCA  HTBP  LXBK  NCF  RY  SWFCU  WB  WBNK 
21 BBT  F&MB  FCNCA  FNEX  NCF  VYFC  WB 
22 ASO  BBT  BLUG  BOM  HBKA  WB 
23 BFC  CCOFCU  NSBV  WBK  WFC 
24 BFC  BNCC  CFBX 
25 BK  C  WB 
26 BMO  IBCB  ONE 
27 BNK  BSB  CAC  FBF  FCBM  FNSB  GSI  KEY  NSBM  SIFS 
28 BSB  BSI  CAC  COMCU  GSI  KSB  NSBM  SIFS 
29 CB  OSUFCU  OURCU  PRWT  SVB  UMPQ  WCBO  WM 
30 CBSS  CFG  CNBKA  FBF  PFSB  PSBM  SOV  WAIN 
31 CBSS  FBF  JPM 
32 CBSS  JPM  WFC 
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33 CFR  SSFCU  WFC 
34 C  CNC  FHLBSF  RCCU  TIN 
35 COI  FBF  PBCT  WBS 
36 CVNB&T  FITB  ONE   WBC 
37 DCOM  FNFG  HBC  HRBT  MTB  SEFCU 
38 EB  GCB  SOV 
39 C  FBF  JPM  PBCT  TSI 
40 C  FBF  WB 
41 FBF  WB  WBS 
42 FBNKO  NECFCU  PCU  UCBH  WM 
43 FC-FCU  HBAN  MCBC 
44 BAC  FDEF  FDFCU  FFSN  FITB  HBAN  MCFCU  SKYF  UNIZ 
45 HBEK  WM  ZION 
46 HIB  UB&TC  WTNY 
47 FITB  NCC  SKYF 
48 FITB  NCC  ONE 
49 FITB  NCC  RBCAA 
50 C  RY  WB 




Appendix G: Methods for Performing a Quadratic Assignment Procedures (QAP) 
 
 The Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) tests used in the dissertation study 
follow the methods discussed by Borgatti & Feld (1994) in their tests of Granovetter’s 
(1973) “Strength of Weak Ties” argument.  The QAP was used to test the correlation 
between two sets of matrices.  One set compared the non-dichotomized ties of the 2004 
and the overlap of ties among grantees.  A second set compared the non-dichotomized 
ties with ties based on a grantee’s USDHHS region. 
Testing Overlap 
 To perform the first correlation test, a matrix depicting the “overlap” (Borgatti & 
Feld, n.p) must be created.  This matrix is created by the following steps (see Figure F1, 
on the next page for an illustration): 
 
1) The non-dichotomized relations matrix is Dichotomized (so that relationships are 
either shown by a “1”, indicating a “strong relationship” or a “0”, indicating a 
weak relationship). 
 
2) A Transposed matrix is created from the dichotomized matrix, which 
“transposes” the rows and columns of the dichotomized matrix. 
 
3) The Dichotomized matrix is multiplied by the Transposed matrix, which creates a 
Connection matrix that indicates all times “two actors are connected by the same 
third party” (Borgatti & Feld, n.p.). 
 
 
The Connection matrix and the original Non-Dichotomized matrix are used for 
the QAP, which assesses the strength of correlation and significance of the relationship 
via a Pearson Correlation Coefficient.  The QAP compares the “observed correlation” 
against a “distribution of random correlations” (Borgatti & Feld, n.p.).  The Pearson 
Correlation statistic reflects the “proportion of random correlations that are as large or 
larger than the observed correlation” (Borgatti & Feld, n.p.). 
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Testing Correlation of USDHHS Region 
A similar procedure was used to test the correlation between the shared ties with 
financial partners and the shared ties through USDHHS regional designation.  A non-
dichotomized matrix of the grantee ties with financial partners was tested against a non-
dichotomized matrix of ties based on region.  Unlike the first QAP test, the second 
procedure did not require the transposing of matrices or other manipulation of network 
data.  The results of the QAP tests are discussed in Chapter 4 of the main body of the 
dissertation report. 
Non-Dichotomized  
Adjacency Matrix  
 
(Indicating 
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